He requests the minister for foreign affairs to accept the assurances of his high consideration. Paris, 20th December, 1796. Credentials of Lord Malmesbury. GEORGIUS Tertius, Dei gratià Magna Britanniæ, Franciæ, et Hiberniæ Rex, Fidei Defensor, Dux Brunavicensis et Luneburgensis, Sacri Romani Imperii ArchiThesaurarius et Princeps Elector, etc. omnibus et singulis ad quos præsentes hæ litteræ pervenerint, salutem : Cum belli incendio jam nimis diu diversis orbis terrarum partibus flagrante in id quam maxime incumbamus, ut tranquillitas publica tot litibus controversiisque ritè compositis, reduci et stabiliri possit; cumque, eâ de causa, virum quemdam tanto negotio parem nostrâ ex parte plenâ auctoritate ad hoc tam magnum onus conficiendum munire decrevimus, sciatis igitur quod nos fide, industriâ, ingenio, perspicacia, et rerum usu fidelis et dilecti consiliarii nostri Jacobi Baronis de Malmesbury, honoratissimi ordinis Balnei equitis plurimum confisi, eumdem nominavimus, fecimus et constituimus nostrum verum, certum, et indubitatum commissarium et plenipotentiarium, dan tes et concedentes eidem omnem et omnimodam potestatem,facultatem, auctoritatemque necnon mandatum generale pariter ac speciale (itu tamen ut generale speciali non deroget nec à contra), pro nobis, et nostro nomine, cum ministro vel ministris, commissariis vel plenipotentiariis Reipublicæ Gallica pari auctoritate sufficienter instructo vel instructis, cumque ministris, aliorum principum et statuum, quorum inter es-e poterit, sufficienti itidem auctoritate instructis, tam singulatim ac divisim, quam aggregatim ac conjunctim, congre diendi et colloquendi, atque cum ipsis de pace firma et stabili, sincerâque amicitiâ et concordia quantociès restituendis, conveniendi et concludendi; eaque omnia quæ ita conventa et conclusa fuerint, pro nobis, et in rostro nomine subsignan. di; superque conclusis tractatum tractatusve vel al a instrumenta quosquot et qualia necessaria fuerint, conficiendi mutuoque tradendi, recipiendique omniaque alia quæ ad onus supra dictum feliciter exequendum pertinent transigendi, tam amplis modo et forma ac vi effectuque pari, ac nos si interessimus, facere et præstare possemus, spondentes et in verbo regio promittentes nos omnia et singula, quæcumque a dicto nostro plenipo tentiario transigi et concludi contigerint, grata, rata, et accepta omni melior modo habituros, neque passuros unquam ut in toto, vel in parte à quoniam violentur, aut ut is in contrarium eatur. In quorum omnium majorem fidem et robur, præsentibus manu nostrâ regia signatis, magnum nostrum Magnæ Britanniæ sigillum appendi fecimus. Quæ dabantur in palatio nostro Divi Jacobi die decimo ter tio mensis Octobris, anno Domini millenimo septengentesimo nonage simo sexto, regnique nostri trigesimo sexto. Translation of the Credentials given to Lord Malmesbury. George Rex. GEORGE, by the grace of God, commissariis, vel plenipotentiariis king of Great Britain, France and Ireland Ireland, defender of the faith, &c. to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting.-Seeing that the flame of war has for a long time raged in the different parts of the globe; deeply occupied with the project of terminating regularly so many quarrels and dissensions, of restoring and consolidating the public tranquillity; resolved for this purpose to chuse a man capable of a negociation of this importance, and to invest him with full authority to complete so great a work, be it known, that the fidelity, talents, genius, perspicuity and experience of our faithful and dear counsellor, James, Baron Malmesbury, knight of the most honourable order of the Bath, inspiring us with full confidence, we have named him, and he is appointed and constituted our true, certain, and accredited commissary and plenipotentiary, giving and conceding him, in all respects, full and entire power, faculty, and authority; charging him besides with our general and special order to confer on our part, and in our name, with the minister or ministers, commissioners, and plenipotentiaries, of the French republic, sufficiently invested with equal authority, as well as with the ministers, commissioners, or plenipotentiaries of the other princes and states who may take part in the present nego ciation, also invested with the same authority; to treat either separately or together; to confer upon the means of establishing a solid and durable peace, amity, and sincere concord ; and to adopt all resolutions and conclusions; to sign for us, and in our name, all the said conventions or conclusions; to make, in consequence, every treaty or treaties, and all other acts, as he shall judge necessary; to deliver and receive mutually all other ob jects relative to the fortunate execution of the above-mentioned work; to transact with the same force and the same effect as we should be able to do if we assisted in person; guaranteeing, and on our royal word promising, that all and each of the transactions and conclusions which shall be made and determined by our said plenipotentiary shall be made and agreed upon, ratified, accepted, and adopted with the best faith; that we shall never suffer any one, either in whole or in part, to infringe and act contrary to them; and in order to give to every thing more security and force, we have signed the present with our royal hand, and affixed to it the great seal of Great Britain. Given in our palace at St. James's 13th October, year of grace 1796, and of our reign, 37th. Manifesto of the British Government against France. THE negociation which an anxious desire for the restoration of peace had induced his majesty to open at Paris, having been abruptly terminated by the French government, the king thinks it due to himself and to his people to state, in this public manner, the circumstances which have preceded and attended a transaction of so much importance to the general interests of Europe. It is well known that early in the present year, his majesty, laying aside the consideration of many circumstances of difficulty and discouragement, determined to take such steps as were best calculated to to open the way for negotiation, if any corresponding desire prevailed on the part of his enemies. He directed an overture to be made in his name, by his minister in Swisserland, for the purpose of ascertaining the dispositions of the French government with respect to peace. The answer which he received in return was at once haughty and evasive; it affected to question the sincerity of those dispositions of which his majesty's conduct afforded so unequivocal a proof; it raised groundless objections to the mode of negotiation proposed by his majesty (that of a general congress, by which peace has so often been restored to Europe); but it studiously passed over in silence his majesty's desire to learn what other mode would be preferred by France. It at the same time asserted a principle which was stated as an indispensible preliminary to all negociation -a principle under which the terms of peace must have been regulated, not by the usual considerations of justice, policy, and reciprocal convenience; but by ao implicit submission, on the part of all the powers, to a claim founded on the internal laws and separate constitution of France, as having full authority to supersede the treaties entered into by independent states, to govern their interests, to control their engagements, and to dispose of their dominions. A pretension in itself so extravagant could in no instance have been admitted, or even listened to for a moment. Its application to the present case led to nothing less than that France should, as a preliminary to all discussion, retain nearly all her conquests, and those particularly in which bis majesty was most concerned, both from the ties of interest,and the sacred obligations of treaties: that she should in like manner recover back all that had been conquered from her in every part of the world; and that she should be left at liberty to bring forward such further demands on all other points of negotiation, as such unqualified submission on the part of those with whom she treated could not fail to produce. On such grounds as these it was sufficiently evident that no negociation could be established: neither did the answer of his majesty's enemies afford any opening for continuing the discussion, since the mode of negociation offered by his majesty had been peremptorily rejected by them, and no other had been stated in which they were willing to concur. His majesty was however not discouraged even by this result from still pursuing such measures as appeared to him most conducive to the end of peace; and the wishes of his ally the emperor correspond. ing with those which his majesty had manifested, sentiments of a similar tendency were pressed on the part of his Imperial majesty at the time of opening the campaign; but the continuance of the same spirit and principles, on the part of the enemy, rendered this fresh overture equally unsuccessful. ex with respect to the real cause of the prolongation of the war, and to cast a doubt on those dispositions which could alone have dictated the steps taken by his majesty and his august ally. In order to deprive his enemies of all possibility of subterfuge or evasion, and in the hope that a just sense of the continued calamities of war, and of the increasing distresses of France herself, might at length have led to more just and pacific dispositions, his majesty renewed, in another form, and through the intervention of friendly powers, a proposal for opening negotiations for peace. The manner in which this intervention was received indicated the most hostile dispositions towards Great Britain, and at the same time afforded to all Europe a striking instance of that injurious and offensive conduct which is observed on the part of the French government towards all other countries. The repeated overtures made in his majesty's name were never theless of such a nature, that it was at last found impossible to persist in the absolute rejection of them, without the direct and undisguised avowal of a determination to refuse to Europe all hope of the restoration of tranquillity. A channel was therefore at length indicated, through which the government of France professed itself willing to carry on a negotiation, and a readiness was expressed (though in terms far remote from any spirit of conciliation) to receive a minister authorised by his majesty to proceed to Paris for that purpose. Many circumstances might have been urged as affording powerful motives against adopting this suggestion, until the government of France had given some indication of a spirit better calculated to promote the success of such a mission, and to meet these advances on the part of Great Britain. The king's desire for the restoration of general peace on just and honourable terms, his concern for the interests of his subjects, and his determination to leave to his enemies no pretext for imputing to him the consequences of their own ambition, induced him to overlook every such consideration, and to take a step which these reasons alone could justify. The repeated endeavours of the French government to defeat this mission in its outset, and to break off the intercourse thus opened, even before the first steps towards negotiation could be taken; the indecent and injurious language employed with a view to irritate, the captious and frivolous objections raised for the purpose of obstructing the progress of the discussion; all these have sufficiently appeared from the official papers which passed on both sides, and which are known to all Europe. But above all, the abrupt termination of the negotiation has afforded the most conclusive proof, that at no period of it was any real wish for peace entertained on the part of the French government. After repeated evasion and de. lay, the government had at length. consented to establish, as the basis of the negotiation, a principle proposed by his majesty, liberal in its own nature, equitable towards his enemies, and calculated to provide for the interests of his allies, and of Europe. It had been agreed that that compensation should be made to France, by proportionable restitutions from his majesty's conquests on that power, for those arrangements to which she should be called upon to consent in order to satisfy the just pretentions of his allies, and to preserve the political balance of Europe. At the desire of the French government itself memorials were presented by his majesty's minister, which contained the outlines of the terms of peace grounded on the basis so established, and in which his majesty proposed to carry to the utmost possible extent the application of a principle so equitable with respect to France, and so liberal on his majesty's part. The delivery of these papers was accompanied by a declaration expressly and repeatedly made, both verbally and in writing, that his majesty's minister was willing and prepared to enter, with a spirit of conciliation and fairness, into the discussion of the different points there contained, or into that of any other proposal or scheme of peace which the French government might wish to substitute in its place. In reply to this communication, he received a demand, in form the most offensive, and in substance the most extravagant, that ever was made in the course of any negotiation. It was peremptorily required of him that in the very out set of the business, when no answer had been given by the French government to his first proposal, when he had not even learnt, in any regular shape, the nature or extent of the objections to it, and much less received from that go. vernment any other offer or plan of peace, he should in twenty-four hours deliver in a statement of the final terms to which his court would in any case accede a demand tending evidently to shut the door to all negotiation, to preclude all discussion, all explanation, all pos sibility of the amicable adjustment of points of difference-a demand in its nature preposterous, in its execution impracticable, since it is plain that no such ultimate resolu tion respecting a general plan of peace ever can be rationally formed, much less declared, without knowing what points are principally objected to by the enemy, and what facilities he may be willing to offer in return for concession in those respects. Having declined compliance with this demand, and explained the reasons which rendered it inadmissible, but having, at the same time, expressly renew. ed the declaration of his readiness to enter into the discussion of the proposal he had conveyed, or of any other which might be communicated to him, the king's mi nister received no other answer than an abrupt command to quit Paris in forty-eight hours. If, in additions to such an insult, any fur. ther proof were necessary of the dispositions of those by whom it was offered, such proof would be abundantly supplied from the contents of the note in which this order was conveyed. The mode of negotiation on which the French government had itself insisted, is there rejected, and no practicable means left open for treating with effect. The basis of negotiation, so recently established by mutual consent, is there disclaimed, and, in its room, a principle clearly inadmissible is reasserted as the only ground on which France can con sent |