ESSAY ON THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS. SECTION I. ON THE TERMS BELIEF, ASSENT, AND EVERY proposition presented to the mind, the terms of which are understood, necessarily occasions either belief, doubt, or disbelief. These are states or affections of the mind on which definition can throw no light, but which no one can be at a loss to understand; resembling, in this respect, all the other simple operations and emotions of which we are conscious. Although we cannot define or illus B trate them, we may, nevertheless, enlarge or limit the application of the terms by which they are distinguished. By some writers the term belief has been restricted to the state of the understanding with regard to propositions of a probable nature. Locke, for instance, makes a distinction between the perception of truth in propositions which are certain, and the entertainment, as he expresses it, given by the mind to those which are only probable; styling the former knowledge, the latter belief, assent, or opinion*. This distinction, however, is not sanctioned by the practice of the generality of metaphysicians, who constantly employ the * 66 Probability is likeness to be true, the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments, or proofs, that are found to persuade us to re ceive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so.”— Essay on the Understanding, book iv, chapter 15. term belief in reference to facts and propositions of all kinds. They speak of the belief, not only of our own identity, of the existence of an external world, and of the being of a God, but of the axioms and theorems of geometry. Nor does there appear to be any ground for the distinction when we appeal to our own consciousness. The nature of the affection is the same, whatever be the nature of the subject which has occasioned it. It is a state, indeed, which admits of various modifications; or, in other words, the belief of some things may be more firm and lively than of others. This strength and liveliness, however, do not at all depend on the logical nature of the propositions entertained. We believe as firmly, that there was a sanguinary contest between the English and French on the field of Waterloo, as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, although the one would be ranked by logicians amongst probable, and the other amongst certain propositions. There are two other terms sometimes employed as synonymous with belief, viz. assent and opinion, but all the three have their respective shades of meaning. Assent appears to denote the state of the understanding with regard only to propositions; while belief has a more comprehensive acceptation, expressing the state of the mind with regard to any fact or circumstance, although that fact or circumstance may never have occurred to it in the form of a proposition, or, what is the same thing, may never have been reduced by it into words. Every body believes in his own identity, and in the existence of an external world, although comparatively few have thought of these truths in express terms. It would, therefore, be more proper to speak of a man's belief in his identity than of his assent to his identity; of his belief in the existence of matter than of his assent to it; but we might with perfect propriety speak of his assent to the proposition that matter exists. The term opinion is used by Locke, in some |