passages of his Essay, as synonymous with belief and assent, but there is a wide difference in its general acceptation. It is seldom, if ever, used in reference to subjects which are certain or demonstrable. We talk of a person's opinions in religion or politics, but not in algebra or geometry, and so far the last named philosopher and common usage are in accordance; but he appears to have sometimes forgotten that the term, in its ordinary sense, denotes not the state of the mind, but the subject of belief, the thing or the proposition believed. Thus we say to receive, to hold, and to renounce an opinion.

The distinctions here pointed out are not, however, very closely observed. On the contrary, it is surprising that words of so much importance should be employed with so little precision. Belief is often indiscriminately used to express a state or affection of the understanding, a proposition believed, a doctrine, and a collection of doctrines. In the following pages it will simply denote the state or

affection of the mind, while the term opinion will be employed (in reference to propositions of a probable nature) to designate that which is believed.

It may be remarked, that whatever we believe may be thrown into the form of a proposition; and when we say of such a proposition that we believe it, it is equivalent to saying that it appears to us to be true, or probable. The expressions are exactly synonymous, or convertible; for it would be a manifest contradiction to assert that we believed a proposition which did not appear true to us, or that a proposition appeared true which we did not believe.

SECTION II.

ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIEF ON

THE WILL.

It has been frequently asserted, and still more frequently assumed, that belief is, in many cases, a voluntary act of the mind. In what cases, however, it is dependant on the will, few writers have ventured to state in direct terms; nor do I know that the subject has ever been examined with that closeness of attention which its importance deserves. If it were a point of mere speculative curiosity, it would scarcely be worth while to rescue it from the vagueness in which it has hitherto remained; but the fact is, that many of the actions, as well as many of the moral judgments of mankind, proceed on an assumption of the voluntary nature of belief, and it therefore becomes of

practical moment to ascertain how far that assumption is founded in truth. Of the justness of this remark we shall have occasion in the sequel to adduce ample proof.

It may be observed, in the first place, that there are a great number of facts and propositions, in regard to our belief of which it is universally allowed that the will can have no power, and motives no efficacy. A mathematical axiom, for instance, cannot be doubted by any man who comprehends the terms in which it is expressed, however ardent may be his desire to disbelieve it. Threats and torments would be in vain employed to compel a geometrician to dissent from a proposition in Euclid. He might be compelled to assert the falsity of the proposition, but all the powers in the universe could not make him believe what he thus asserted. In the same way, no hopes nor fears, no menaces nor allurements, could at all affect a man's belief in a matter of fact which happened under his own observation. The remark is also true of innumerable

facts which we have received on the testimony of others. That there have been such men as Cæsar and Cicero, Pope and Newton, and that there are at present such cities as Paris and Vienna, it is impossible to disbelieve by any effort of the will.

In those cases, therefore, where the evidence is of such a nature as to produce universal assent, it is acknowledged by all that the will can have no power over our convictions. If it exercises any control at all, we must look for it in those subjects which admit of diversity of opinion. But the belief, doubt, or disbelief which a man entertains of any proposition, which others regard with different sentiments, may be the same in strength and every other respect as the belief, doubt, or disbelief which he entertains of a proposition in regard to which there is entire unanimity; and if in the latter case his opinion is involuntary, there can be no reason to suppose it otherwise in the former. The mere circumstance of others taking a different view of the subject