weighed the objections to the evidence on which it rests, is lauded for his acquiescence, while obloquy from every side is too often heaped on the man, who has minutely searched into the subject, and been led to an opposite conclusion. There are few things more disgusting to an enlightened mind than to see a number of men, a mob, whether learned or illiterate, who have never scrutinized the foundation of their opinions, assailing with contumely an individual, who, after the labour of research and reflection, has adopted different sentiments from theirs, and pluming themselves on the notion of superior virtue because their understandings have been tenacious of prejudice.

This conduct is the more remarkable, as on every side we meet with the admission, that belief is not dependant on the will; and yet the same men, by whom this admission is readily made, will argue and inveigh on the virtual assumption of the contrary.

This is a striking proof, amongst a mul

titude of others, of what the thinking mind must have frequently observed, that a principle is often retained in its applications, long after it has been discarded as an abstract proposition. In a subject of so much importance, however, it behoves intelligent men to be rigidly consistent. If our opinions are not voluntary, but independent of the will, the contrary doctrine and all its consequences ought to be practically abandoned; they ought to be weeded from the sentiments, habits, and institutions of society. We may venture to assert, that neither the virtue nor the happiness of man will ever be placed perfectly firm basis, till this fundamental error has been extirpated from the human mind.

ESSAY

ON THE

PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS.

SECTION I.

INTRODUCTION.

IT has been shown in the preceding essay, that belief is an involuntary act or state of the understanding, which cannot be affected by rewards and punishments, and that, consequently, opinions are not the proper subjects of legislation. The publication of opinions, however, being a voluntary act, the propriety or impropriety of interfering with it must be determined by other principles.

The advocates of restraints on the freedom of public discussion, renouncing the criminality of opinions as a ground of legislative enactments, may be conceived as urging the following arguments.

"The formation of opinions may not depend on the will; but the communication of them being voluntary, it is surely wise to prevent the dissemination of such as have an injurious tendency, which can be effected only by attaching a punishment to it. In the same way that we are justified in restraining the liberty of a man who arrives from a country infected with the plague, by making him perform quarantine; we are justified in restraining the liberty of every man who entertains opinions of an evil tendency, by requiring him to keep them to himself. And as in the former case it is necessary to punish him who breaks through so salutary a restraint, so it is in the latter. This is all for which we contend. In either case there may be no criminality attaching to the individual, on ac

count of his body or his mind being the seat of a noxious principle; but the community has a right to impose upon him whatever regulations are necessary to prevent its diffusion, and to inflict a penalty on the transgression of regulations so imposed."

That the general principle involved in this reasoning is correct there can be no doubt. A society has a perfect right to adopt such regulations, for its own government, as have a preponderance of advantages. Utility, therefore, in the most comprehensive acceptation of the term, is the test by which every institution, every law, and every course of action must be tried. Restrictions of any kind must be acknowledged to be proper, if, taking in the whole of their consequences, they can be proved to be beneficial to the community, although they may be directed against actions involving no moral turpitude. The only point is to establish their beneficial tendency. The laws of quarantine furnish a good illustration of the general principle, but

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