SUTHERLAND 1850. was satisfied before the writ of error was sued out. This case therefore does not fall within the provisions of the 3 Hen. 7, c. 10; and consequently the defendant in error is not entitled to costs in error. V. WILLS. Rule refused. HELLAWELL v. EASTWOOD. THIS case was decided in the present Sittings, but, from want of room, is omitted. It will, however, appear in an early part of the next Volume. INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS, ACCORD. ACTION (CAUSE OF). AFFIDAVIT. AGREEMENT. See COVENANT, (2). RAILWAY COMPANY, (1). Where a building agreement be- AMENDMENT. The Court refused to amend the VOL. V. them to appoint an arbitrator on their behalf, and stating that it was his intention to appoint M. as his arbitrator; and that if, for the space of fourteen days after that notice, the Company failed to appoint an arbitrator on their behalf, he would appoint M. to act for both parties. The Company having refused to refer the matter to arbitration, B., on the 1st of January following, served them with a notice, which, after reciting that he had appointed M. as his arbitrator, stated that he then appointed M. to act as arbitrator on behalf of both parties. The arbitrator having awarded a certain sum to be paid to B., the Court refused to enforce or set aside the award on motion, intimating their opinion that there was no valid appointment of the arbitrator. Semble, that, under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, s. 25, an appointment by the claimant of an arbitrator to act for both parties is not valid, unless he has previously appointed an arbitrator on his behalf, and notified such appointment to the Company. Bradley v. The London and North Western Railway Company, ARREST. 769 See BANKRUPT LAW CONSOLIDATION ARREST OF JUDGMENT. See PLEADING, I. (1), (7). ASSUMPSIT. Consideration. A declaration alleged, that, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, promised to marry him, he promised the plaintiff to marry her. Averments: that the plaintiff hath continued and still is unmarried, and, until the discovery of the defendant's marriage, was ready and willing to marry him; that, after the defendant's promise, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant, at the time of his promise, was, and still is, married, and that the plaintiff had not, at the time of the defendant's promise, any notice of the defendant's then marriage:-Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that the declaration was good; and that the plaintiff's remaining unmarried was a sufficient consideration to support the defendant's promise. Quare, whether a promise by a married man to marry another woman after his wife's death, is void. Millward v. Littlewood, 775 ATTACHMENT. See JUDGE'S ORDER. An action having, by an order of Nisi Prius, been referred to an arbitrator, who was to settle all matters in difference between the parties, and to order and direct as to the proper distribution of certain property as to him should seem fit, he accordingly made his award, and awarded (inter alia) that the plaintiff "do, on or before the 23rd of March next, duly execute an indenture to be prepared by H. H. (the defendant), in words and figures following," (setting it out). No demand of the execution of the instrument was made upon the plaintiff before or on the day mentioned in the award:-Held, that the plaintiff was not liable to an attachment for refusing to execute the deed on demand made after the 23rd of March. Doe d. Williams v. Howell, ATTESTATION. See POWER. ATTORNEY. 299 See PLEADING, II. (1). ATTORNEY. (1). Name on Roll. 1. On the application of an attorney to be allowed to substitute the name of J. Heaton D. on the roll of attornies, in the place of J. D., this Court refused to alter the roll, but directed the Master to make a memorandum on the roll opposite the party's name, stating that he was now known by the name of J. Heaton D., and that the memorandum was made by rule of Court. In re Dearden, Gent., one &c., 740 2. The Court allowed an attorney, named "Thomas James Moses," to be admitted on the rolls of this Court as "Thomas James," although he had no royal licence to change his name, it being sworn that he was not apprehensive of any proceedings being taken against him by his former name. In re Thomas James, 310 (2). Authority of Attorney to Receive Mortgage Money. The plaintiff lent to the defendant 1000l., upon the security of an indenture, which contained a covenant by the defendant to surrender certain copyhold premises to the plaintiff's use. No surrender was made. D., who acted as attorney for both parties, signed a receipt for the money, and the title-deeds were delivered to him, and he prepared and delivered to the defendant, but without the plaintiff's knowledge, a schedule of the deeds, at the foot of which was a memorandum signed by D., acknowledging the receipt of the deeds, and undertaking to deliver them up on payment of the principal money and interest. The mortgage deed remained in D.'s possession, and he from time to time received the interest and paid it over to the plaintiff. The principal money was paid to D., who appropriated it to his own use, and died insolvent-Held, first, that D.'s receipt for the principal, and the memorandum signed by him, were ad BANKING COPARTNERSHIP. 985 missible in evidence for the defendant. Secondly, that neither the possession of the mortgage deed nor the receipt of interest was any evidence of an authority to D. to receive the principal; and consequently that the plaintiff was entitled to recover it from the defendant. Wilkinson v. Candlish, 91 AWARD. See ARBITRATION, (1). LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION BAILIFF. See PLEADING, II. (5). BANK ACT, 7 & 8 VICT. c. 32. A Company, consisting of a large number of persons subscribing small sums, was formed for the purpose of buying land, erecting dwellings thereon, and allotting the same to the subscribers. The allotment depended upon the result of a ballot. În connection with this Company there was established a bank for receiving the deposits of small capitalists and working men, upon the security of the property of the Company; and, as part of the same concern, a bank in which the subscribers of the Company might place their savings for purchasing their land from the Company:-Held, that the scheme was illegal, as being contrary to the Bank Act. Quare, whether it was illegal as being contrary to the Lottery Acts, or whether it fell within the 11th section of the 12 Geo. 2, c. 28. O'Connor v. Bradshaw, 882 BANKING COPARTNERSHIP. See HUSBAND And Wife, (2). PLEADING, I. (4); III. (3), 2. A Company of persons, established for the purpose of carrying on the business of bankers under the provisss 2 sions of the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, in an action against a shareholder for the recovery of a debt, or for enforcing any claim or demand due to the copartnership, are bound to sue in the name of one of their public officers, and are not at liberty to sue in the names of the covenantees named in the deed of copartnership. The words of the 9th section of the Act "shall and may," are obligatory, and not merely permissive. Chapmanv. Milvain, 61 BANKRUPT. See BILL OF SALE. COVENANT, (2). FIAT IN BANKRUPTCY. The defendant, a railway shareholder, became bankrupt on the 8th of February, 1848. On the 18th of the same month a call was made, and three other calls were subsequently made. On the 24th of April, 1848, the defendant obtained his certificate. The scrip was handed over to the assignees, and some correspondence took place between the trade assignees and the official assignee, in the course of which the former sent the latter a statement of the bankrupt's property, comprising in it the probable value of the shares in question, and containing in it an estimate of the amount forthcoming to work the fiat and pay dividends. The trade assignee subsequently wrote to the official assignee, suggesting the propriety of selling the shares. The shares, however, continued in the possession of the assig nees:-Held, first, that there was no evidence of an acceptance of the shares by the assignees. Secondly, that, the property in the shares continuing in the bankrupt, the claim was not barred by his certificate, inasmuch as it was not proveable as a debt due in futuro under the 51st section of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, or as a debt due on a contingency, within the meaning of the 56th section of (2). Certificate given to Petitioning Trader. The certificate given to a petitioning trader, under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 216, only protects him from arrest at the suit of persons being creditors at the date of the petition, and who have received the notices required by that Act. Therefore, where the acceptor of a bill of exchange petitioned under the arrangement clauses of that Act, and gave the requisite notice to the drawer, whom he supposed to be the holder of the bill:-Held, that the certificate did not protect him from execution on a judgment in an action by an indorsee of the bill. Levy v. Horne, 257 (3). Judge's Order given by Trader. The 137th section of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, which declares that a Judge's order, made by consent, given by a trader defendant in any personal action, unless filed as thereby required, and the judgment and execution thereon, shall be "null and void to all intents and purposes whatever," does not avoid such order, &c. as against the trader himself, but only as against his assignees if he afterwards become bankrupt. Bryan v. Child, 368 (4). Protection from Arrest. In July, 1849, A. B. brought an |