truth that is enjoyed, is but a small fraction of the being that is. Furthermore, though we narrow the world to the process of thought, it must yet be objected that not all thought is crowned with success. What, then, is that perfect goodness which is the author of the "being and essence" of all things? Clearly it is not a case of moral goodness, or of beauty, or even of truth, in the sense of intellectual happiness. And yet Plato freely attributes all three of these values to it! But does he mean to do so literally? It is impossible to say; for at this point the absolutist begins to speak a strange tongue. The good is not good in any known sense, only because it is of surpassing goodness. It is more, not less than virtue, beauty, and insight. Now to be good, and to have goodness enhanced by other values beside, this truly is to be more than good; but to be lacking in goodness through excess of it, to be more than good and yet not good at all – this passes comprehension. And yet precisely this profound and misleading equivocation lies at the root of all Platonic mysticism. - An admirable illustration of this procedure of thought is afforded by the theology of Dionysius the Areopagite, the Christian neo-Platonist. I quote from Berkeley's account. "In his treatise of the Celestial Hierarchy, he saith that God is something above all essence and life; and again, in his treatise of the Divine Namès, that He is above all wisdom and understanding, ineffable and innominable; the wisdom of God he terms an unreasonable, unintelligent, and foolish wisdom. But then the reason he gives for expressing himself in this strange manner is, that the Divine wisdom is the cause of all reason, wisdom, and understanding, and therein are contained the treasures of all wisdom and knowledge. He calls God vπépropos and ὑπέρσοφος vπéрlws; as if wisdom and life were words not worthy to express the Divine perfections: and he adds that the attributes unintelligent and unperceiving must be ascribed to the Divinity, not kar' auf, by way of defect, but κай' ντερоxýν, by way of eminency; which he explains by our giving the name of darkness to light inaccessible."1 In its endeavor to give concrete sufficiency to its first principle, absolutism is thus driven from one error to another from formalism to equivocation. The truly general, or logical, elements of experience having proved insufficient to the complex objects in which they are found, conceptions that are sufficient within limits are now rendered equivocal through being employed symbolically or analogically beyond those limits. §4. The nature of the all-general, all-sufficient principle thus remains problematic, because the most general cateThe Dogmatic gories are insufficient, and the most sufficient Character of categories are limited in generality. What, now, shall be said of the proof of such a principle? It is argued that knowledge employs a principle which admits of degrees; that knowledge can be complete only when this principle reaches a maximum; and that since we must attribute to reality the character it obtains in complete knowledge, we must define it in terms of such a maximum. It appears, however, that the principles which knowledge employs do not define a maximum; and that were their limitations removed they would at once lose their meaning. Let us turn again to the case of Plato. He would say that we know things in so far as we apprehend them as good; and would proceed to infer their absolute goodness. But in every verifiable case of such knowledge the goodness of things is limited. Thus, for example, the activity of the wise ruler is good and intelligible in that it answers to the demands of social life, and to concrete historical 1 Berkeley: Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher, Fraser's edition, Vol. II, pp. 182-183. Berkeley's comment is as follows: "Upon the whole, although this method of growing in expression and dwindling in notion, of clearing up doubts by nonsense, and avoiding difficulties by running into affected contradictions, may perhaps proceed from a well-meant zeal, yet it appears not to be according to knowledge." exigencies. Without reference to these limiting conditions it is impossible to define the goodness of the ruler; and if that reference be condemned, then the method of definition is condemned. There is no ground for the assertion of a perfection so exalted that it shall be limited by no conditions whatsoever. Nor is the situation essentially altered if a more general conception of value is employed. Suppose that we define the activity of the ruler in terms of the demands of social life, and then define these in terms of the demands of human nature. Social life itself may then be understood in the Platonic way, as the organization of activities necessary to the expression of the ideal essence of man. But even so, although what man does may now be understood as good in terms of what man is, the ideal essence of man has itself to be defined in terms of categories that are not teleological at all. And if this be regarded as vicious, then the whole method is vicious. Similarly, every case of knowledge by teleological principles involves the apprehension and acceptance of some elements which are not determined by such principles. We are not justified in projecting a good that shall be all good, or a teleological system that shall be through and through teleological, for this would be to contradict the meaning of goodness and teleology. Nor does absolutism succeed any better if we substitute the mathematical-deductive logic of Spinoza for the teleological logic of Plato. Spinoza thought that the conception of substance implied the conception of an absolute substance that is "self-caused" in that its "essence involves existence"; and "infinite," in that it contains all attributes in its definition, and implies all things and events as its modes. But precisely as there is no absolute maximum definable in terms of goodness, so there is no absolute maximum definable in terms of deductive necessity. The actual deductive systems of human knowledge are 1 Spinoza: Ethics, loc. cit. those in which, as in the case of Euclidean geometry or the Newtonian mechanics, the axioms, postulates, indefinables, etc. that is, the terms and propositions that are not deduced are few and fruitful. The investigator doubtless makes them as few and as fruitful as possible. But there is no deductive principle that determines how few or how fruitful they shall be. The deductive method, which is the basis of Spinoza's system, clearly requires some elements that are not deduced. These elements stand in certain simple relations, such as difference, to one another; but they are not brought under the determination of the principles of the system itself. Now this being the case, it is clearly absurd to infer an absolute system in which every element shall be deduced-a system in which, through excess of deductive cogency, the very conditions of deduction shall be removed! Or, if this be untrue to Spinoza's real intent, it is still gratuitous even to infer that there shall be but one deductive system. There is, let us grant, a universal totality;1 but is there any reason why it should possess any definite degree of deductive unity? Is there any reason why that totality should not be composed of many systems which are related to one another, as are the non-deductive elements within these several systems? Now if it be contended that this is equivalent to the assertion of a single all-embracing system, of which the particular systems, such as geometry, mechanics, ethics, etc., shall be the axioms, then we have only to remind ourselves of the entire insignificance of such a contention. There is no ground for determining whether these several systems, together with such systems as exceed present knowledge, form a highly coherent or a loosely collective system. It is entirely possible that together they imply nothing other than that which they imply severally, except the collective totality of all that they 1 On the ground that all the components of the universe must be somehow 'related.' That relation does not imply dependence and unity, is the contention of 'pluralism.' The issue is discussed below, pp. 242-246. imply. In other words, we are justified in saying no more than that if we knew all the first principles, we could deduce all objects and events. No self-respecting philosopher would go to the trouble of proving this, and it is certain that Spinoza did not mean to assert so trivial and obvious a proposition. But the dilemma is unavoidable. Either he is limited to that conclusion, or he must be charged with attempting to override his own logic - with seeking to find an argument for an absolute deductive system by condemning the deductive method itself. Thus the proof of absolutism fails through the fact that neither teleology nor deduction defines an absolute maximum or ideal. And this failure is fraught with serious consequences. For in order to prove the necessity of 'absolute' knowledge, the actual instances of knowledge are virtually discredited. In other words, the procedure of absolutism involves more than inconsistency and failure - it involves agnosticism, that is, the denial of positive knowledge, and the substitution for it of an unrealized project. It encourages the sweeping condemnation of science, and an irresponsible and autocratic procedure in philosophy. Such, then, was the state of absolutism at the time of Kant. Ambitious in the interests of the speculative dogma to formulate an all-general and all-sufficient principle, it neglected the essential formality and abstractness of logic (the discovery of which was its great achevement); it violated the meaning of ethical, physical, and other conceptions by over-generalizing them; and disparaged actual knowledge by arbitrarily asserting a problematic conception of ideal knowledge. We have now to consider whether modern idealism, profiting by the insight of Kant1 has succeeded in avoiding formalism, equivocation, and dogmatism. § 5. There is, as we have seen, a merely 'critical' as 1 Inasmuch as 'absolute idealism' is identified with objective idealism it develops from Kant, rather than from Berkeley. |