Religion must accept, once for all, "the concatenation of phenomena"; and abandon the "self-contradictory religious supernaturalism" that "attempts self-satisfaction. by transfiguring a fragment torn from the temporal series of history." Religion and true philosophy do not abide here but in the "eternal." We must concede the scientist's claim of the universal ramification of "causal connections"; but the hope of deliverance lies in the immediate qualification—"so far as the scientific interest is concerned." For the scientist forgets "that all this causal explanation has no meaning whatsoever, and his statements no truth, and his universe no reality, if he and we are not presupposing an idealistic belief in those absolute standards of eternal values by which we can discriminate the true and untrue, the good and the bad, the real and the unreal." "The deepest and most thorough reconciliation of Science and Religion which it is possible to conceive," says another philosopher, "puts an end in principle to the unworthy bickerings between them about the territories of each, and the futile attempts at the delimitation of their borders," permitting "each to claim the whole of experience in its own fashion." "Science may justly deal with all things ... so may Religion." But there is a deeper ground for both, since "both are means of transmuting the crude 'matter' of 'appearance' into forms better, truer, more beautiful and more real." Thus it may be said that the religio-philosophical critique of science has on the whole abandoned the old supernaturalistic ground. In other words, it no longer attempts to make exceptions, and to dispute the rule of natural law in specific localities of nature. The integrity of science is acknowledged, and whatever criticism is urged against science is urged against it as a system. 228. 1 R. M. Wenley: Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief, pp. 78, 229, 'H. Münsterberg: Science and Idealism, p. 70 (italics mine). F. C. S. Schiller: Riddles of the Sphinx, third edition, pp. 463-464 (last italics mine). of Science 4. But the old warfare between science and religion. has not wholly ceased. There is a lingering spirit of hosThe Fallibility tility that still stands in the way of mutual sympathy and understanding. It appears on the side of science, in the 'anti-metaphysical' polemics of such writers as Pearson, and in the irreverent animus of such writers as Haeckel. On the side of religious philosophy it appears in a disposition to disparage science, to belittle its achievements, and exploit its failures and shortcomings. This disposition pervades what is perhaps the most monumental critique of science that has recently appeared in the English language - James Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism. While this book aims to refute naturalism rather than science, the author nevertheless repeatedly argues from the incomplete success of science.1 He points out the "lacuna" of science, such as the gap between the organic and the inorganic realms. He reminds us, in other words, that there are scientific problems that the scientist has not yet solved! He suggests contradictions within the body of scientific truth; and dwells upon the uncertainty of scientific hypotheses that are not as yet completely verified. As if all human knowledge did not, at any historical moment, have its residual ignorance, its outstanding difficulties, its transitive phrases, and its haunting doubts! Indeed, the frankness with which science has avowed these limitations - these penalties of human frailty, and risks of human temerity-merits confidence and not distrust. Professor Ward finds evidence of the unreliability of science above all in the fact that its theories must perpetually submit to correction. He quotes Boltzmann: "Today the battle of opinion rages tempestuously. What 1 The reader may be interested in referring to the replies of J. E. Creighton, and of Professor Ward himself, to this criticism. Cf. Journal of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. I (1904), Nos. 10, 12. The present writer's rejoinder, from which parts of the present text are drawn, appeared in the same Journal, Vol. I, No. 13. will the outcome be? . . Will mechanical models in any case persist, or will new, non-mechanical models prove better adapted, and the component factors of energy control absolutely the domain? . . . Is it possible that the conviction will ever arise that certain representations are per se exempt from displacement by simpler and more comprehensive ones, that they are true? Or is it perhaps the best conception of the future to imagine something of which one has absolutely no conception?" And the author concludes a criticism of Principal Rücker with the comment, "after all, then, he is only defending a working hypothesis, and one, moreover, that has lost greatly in prestige in the last half century." Now the folly of such arguments lies in the fact that they can be urged with equal force against any human pretension. It amounts, all of it, to no more than the hoary commonplace that mortal mind is fallible. Any assertion whatsoever may prove to be mistaken, even Professor Ward's criticisms, and the "Spiritual Monism" of his own adoption. This fact of human fallibility, since it may be urged against all knowledge, cannot be urged against any. It justifies a certain modesty and openmindedness in thinkers, but can never constitute ground for the rejection of any particular theory. Knowledge can be disproved only by better knowledge. If a specific scientific theory is doubtful, well and good; but it can justly be regarded as doubtful only for scientific reasons, and these had best be left to the scientist himself. It is scarcely necessary to add, that if variety and change of opinion are to be urged against any branch of knowledge, the philosopher of religion can least afford to urge them. For of all cognitive enterprises his is on this score the most in need of indulgence. Where the general fallibility of human knowledge is urged against a special branch of knowledge, it betrays an over-eager and blind partisanship. An apologist for 1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, second edition, Vol. I, pp. 307, 314. religious orthodoxy writes as follows: "Men of science may be right or wrong in their deductions from the fragmentary information possessed by them. Generally they are wrong, as is clearly enough shown by the fact that a large part of the work of each generation of men of science consists in overturning or modifying the theories of their predecessors." Hence "the utter futility of setting up the deductions of the human reason against the assertions of the Word of God."1 To such ideas as these Professor Ward virtually gives countenance. But how reactionary, and how fatuous! Science and religion are both institutions which serve man. A religious believer, since he is a man, needs science; as a scientist needs religion. Hence a philosopher of religion who seeks to discredit science, injures himself. He abets a domestic quarrel. There can be no victories for science that do not promote man and all his works, including religion; nor any defeat of science that is not a common disaster. For science and religion are the supporting wings of one army engaged in the conquest of ignorance and death. The Disparage- § 5. The criticisms of science to which I shall now invite attention avoid in the main both the obsolete policy of interfering in the affairs of science and the obsolescent animus of partisan strife. Science is to be acknowledged as unimpeachable when it acts within its proper sphere; and is admitted to friendly alliance with philosophy and religion. But it is held to be inherently lacking in self-sufficiency and finality. It presupposes something else; and that which it presupposes is more fundamental, or more 'real,' and confers priority on philosophy and religion. I shall first consider what may be regarded as the methodological critique of science.2 According to this 1P. Mauro: "Life in the Word," published in a series of pamphlets issued in defence of Christian orthodoxy, and entitled The Fundamentals, Vol. V, p. 47. 'This critique is intimately connected with the pragmatist's attack upon "intellectualism," and will receive further treatment in Chapter X. critique the concepts of science are 'mere' descriptions, and the laws of science hypothetical or 'contingent.' Science, although systematic and complete in its own terms, cannot, owing to the nature of its method, yield reality. Its findings are true only in the limited sense of being convenient. They are not necessary, but only expedient. Like conventions, with which they may be classed, they are not inevitable, but optional and arbitrary. It is significant that this critique of science is based upon the acceptance of what I have called 'the analytical version' of scientific concepts. It urges against science the very refinement and exactness of its method. That which in the judgment of critical naturalism commends science, and justifies its exclusive claim to the title of knowledge, is here regarded as a deficiency. James Ward, again, will serve as an illustration. This author traces with admirable lucidity the development which such conceptions as 'matter,' 'mass,' 'force,' and 'energy' have undergone in the history of science. He finds that these terms now connote factors in the exact calculations and formulas of science, and are no longer charged with the vague ontological predicates of common sense. So far the author's exposition is unexceptionable and instructive. But somehow at the same time that science has been growing more exact, it has lost its hold upon reality. "To distinguish them from the old school, whom we may fairly term physical realists, we might call the new school physical symbolists. . The one believes that it is getting nearer to the ultimate reality, and leaving mere appearances behind it: the other believes that it is only substituting a generalized descriptive scheme that is intellectually manageable, for the complexity of concrete facts which altogether overtask our comprehension." To this symbolistic version of modern science, Professor Ward subscribes. He quotes But it is by no means peculiar to pragmatism; it is, in fact, employed by the great majority of contemporary opponents of naturalism. 1 Cf. above, pp. 60-62. |