the establishments of Ireland which appears in his later despatches. The suspicion naturally arises that something must have happened in the interval to affect his judgment, and we know that a good deal had actually occurred. We now know that when the King became aware that the admission of the Catholics into the Irish Parliament was in contemplation, he at once expressed his decided hostility to such a project. We know that Fitzgibbon had drawn up a statement to the effect that it was not within the competence of the King to assent to such a measure, as it would be a violation of his Coronation Oath and of the fundamental principles of the Constitution as established under the Act of Settlement. We know that Lord Westmorland, the bitterest enemy of Lord Fitzwilliam, had communicated to the King the views and letters of Fitzgibbon, and that, at least in his later years, those views were adopted by the King to their full extent. The knowledge of the King's sentiments which the ministers possessed makes their later conduct in holding out hopes of immediate emancipation to the Catholics, without taking any measure for securing the assent of the King, in my judgment peculiarly culpable, but at the time of the administration of Lord Fitzwilliam it may in some degree explain and perhaps excuse their conduct. It may have convinced them that, though no serious difficulties were to be apprehended in Ireland, the difficulty in England might be very great.

There is also reason for believing that the project of a legislative union was not alien to their conduct. An examination of the confidential papers of the time shows that such a measure had been for some years in the contemplation of Pitt, and that Fitzgibbon, from the time when the Catholics were admitted to the franchise, in 1793, had been writing to England that by such a measure alone could the connection between England and Ireland be

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permanently maintained. The bearings of the Catholic question on the question of Union were clear and manifold. If the Catholics were admitted into the Irish Parliament, and especially if their admission was followed by a measure of parliamentary reform, the difficulty of inducing the Irish Parliament to surrender its separate existence would probably be much increased. It was possible to argue that the admission of Catholics into a separate Irish Parliament would be fatal to the Protestant Establishment in Ireland, while, in a united Parliament in which they would always be a small minority, they would be impotent and innocuous; and both the hope and the fear of Catholic Emancipation might easily be made a powerful inducement to Protestants and Catholics to consent to a union. The passage in the confidential despatch, published by Fitzwilliam, in which Portland urged that by deferring the Catholic question he would be the means of doing a greater service to the British Empire than it has been capable of receiving since the Revolution or, at least, since the Union,' was at once and generally interpreted in Ireland as pointing to such a measure. Fitzgibbon believed this interpretation to be correct, and when Pelham, in the succeeding administration, wished to disclaim it he was not allowed to do so.

The conduct of Grattan through the events that have been described needs no defence. He opposed strongly and eloquently the policy that produced the recall of Lord Fitzwilliam, but in the critical and dangerous period that immediately followed the announcement of that recall he appears to have been eminently a moderating influence. He persuaded Conolly to withdraw a hostile motion. protesting against the prorogation of Parliament before grievances were redressed. He used all his influence to keep the Catholics from mixing themselves up with the French policy of the United Irishmen, and he expressed

his conviction that if they kept within the limits of the Constitution their cause must speedily triumph. When Lord Camden came over to succeed Fitzwilliam there was a party who desired to oppose the usual parliamentary address of congratulation; but Grattan declared that, though he could not concur with the address, he would not oppose it, and it accordingly passed unanimously. Camden and Pelham, his Chief Secretary, in their confidential letters to England acknowledged fully the moderation, temper and courtesy with which he spoke, and they believed that both he and Forbes were well disposed to the Lord Lieutenant. The truth seems to be that Grattan at first believed that the Catholic policy of Fitzwilliam was not the real cause of the change of administration, and that his successor would soon carry it out as the only means of pacifying the country, and if this were done he was very indifferent to questions of persons and patronage.

6

There was, at least, one important member of the Whig party in the English Cabinet who fully appreciated his conduct, and who hoped that the new administration would diverge very little from the spirit of its predecessors. It is my earnest hope,' wrote Windham to Pelham, 'that you will still be able to preserve a good intelligence with Grattan, and to satisfy him that both in respect to men and measures, except in the single point of an immediate and unlimited concession to the Catholics, Lord Camden's Government will be such that he will not feel it necessary to be in opposition to. . . . It is a debt due in justice to Grattan not to suffer the consequences of his fairness and real regard for the public welfare to operate to his disadvantage, nor pass in the eyes of the world as a want of power rather than as a want of will to do mischief. I say this because in the minds of some of our friends on this side of the water justice is not done to him in that respect,

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nor sufficient credit given him—at least, as I have sometimes thought-for that forbearance which he manifested during all the latter period of Lord Westmorland's Administration. Few public men have to my mind given such an honourable proof of their willingness to sacrifice even their immediate political consequence-the last sacrifice that such men are in general willing to make-to the general interests of the country. . . . For my own part, I cannot bear the thought of being on any other terms with him than those of confidence and co-operation in the great cause to which he has shown himself so truly attached. . . I should be sorry to have him suppose that anything that has passed or anything that I am persuaded can pass can make me otherwise than ambitious of his friendship

and good opinion.'

The spirit, however, of this letter was not that which inspired the Government of Ireland. It was determined that Catholic Emancipation should be resisted to the utmost, and in order that this should be done it was necessary that an anti-Catholic movement should be directly stimulated by men who were ministers of the Crown. Camden was instructed by Portland to do all in his power to convince the most important persons in Ireland that the contemplated concessions must be either subversive of the Protestant Establishment or wholly insignificant, and at the same time to rally the Protestant interest against them. He was himself to hold a firm and decided language of hostility to them, but to tell the Protestants that Government can only effectually resist (as it wishes to do) the Catholics by their concurrence, and that if the Protestants will only support them, the Government will be ready to make any exertion they can desire to prevent the admission of Catholics to seats in the Legislature.'1

1 Secret instructions to Lord Camden, March 26, 1795.

In order to carry out this policy, leading members and supporters of the Government went down to the grand juries to induce those bodies to pass resolutions against Catholic Emancipation, and at the same time the overwhelming parliamentary influence of the Government was strained to the utmost. After a memorable and instructive debate, in which the independent members of the House urged in the most solemn accents the danger and the madness of the policy that was being pursued, the Bill for Catholic Emancipation was thrown out by 155 votes to 84. The members of the Government no longer placed their resistance on any grounds of temporary expediency, but on the highest and most permanent grounds of principle, declaring it to be inconsistent with the most fundamental laws of the State, and holding out no expectation of future concession. This was the language of the Chief Secretary, who asserted that the exclusion of Catholics from Parliament and the State is necessary for the Crown and the Connection,'' while the Solicitor-General not only declared Catholic Emancipation to be contrary to the Coronation Oath, by which the King held his throne, and to the Bill of Rights, but even declared that the Crown and Parliament, together being but trustees for the preservation of the Constitution, had no right to carry it. In order to show beyond all doubt what were the sentiments of the Cabinet, Fitzgibbon was now made Earl of Clare. His inexorable hostility to all Catholic concessions made this promotion in the highest degree significant, and it was pre-eminently on this ground that it was recommended by Camden. Its object, he said, was to encourage the Protestants in their resistance to Catholic claims. They found it difficult to believe that the Government were in earnest. This would do much to convince them.

'See Grattan's Speeches, iii. 243.