vessels of thirty oars, and a prodigious number of barks to transport the necessary provisions for the fleet

and army.

The army and fleet began to move at the same time, and that they might act in concert, they separated from each other as little as possible. The war was to open with the siege of Pelusium; but so much time had been given the Egyptians, that Nectanebis had rendered the approach to it impracticable both by sea and land. The fleet, therefore, instead of making a descent, as had been projected, sailed forwards, and entered the mouth of the Nile called Mendesium. The Nile at that time emptied itself into the sea by seven different channels, of which only two remain at this day; and at each of those mouths there was a fort with a good garrison to defend the entrance. The Mendesium not being so well fortified as that of Pelu. > sium, where the enemy was expected to land, the descent was made with no great difficulty. The fort was carried sword in hand, and no quarter given to those who were found in it.

After this signal action, Iphicrates thought it advisable to reembark upon the Nile without loss of time, and to attack Memphis the capital of Egypt. If that opinion had been followed before the Egyptians had recovered the panic into which so formidable an invasion, and the blow already received, had thrown them, they had found the capital without any defence, it had inevitably fallen into their hands, and all Egypt been reconquered. But the gross of the army, not being

arrived, Pharnabasus believed it necessary to wait its coming up, and would undertake nothing, till he had reassembled all his troops; under pretext, that they would then be invincible, and that there would be no obstacle capable of withstanding them.

Iphicrates, who knew that in affairs of war especially, there are certain favourable and decisive moments, which it is absolutely proper to seize, judged quite differently, and in despair to see an opportunity suffered to escape, that might never be retrieved, he made pressing instances for permission to go at least with the twenty thousand men under his command. Pharnabasus refused to comply with that demand, out of abject jealousy; apprehending, that if the enterprise succeeded, the whole glory of the war would redound to Iphicrates. This delay gave the Egyptians time to look about them. They drew all their troops together into a body, put a good garrison into Memphis, and with the rest of their army kept the field, and harassed the Persians in such a manner, that they prevented their advancing farther into the country. After which came on the inundation of the Nile, which laying all Egypt under water, the Persians were obliged to return into Phenicia, having first lost ineffectually the best part of their troops.

Thus this expedition, which had cost immense sums, and for which the preparations alone had given so much difficulty for upwards of two years, entirely miscarried, and produced no other effect, than an irreconcileable enmity between the two generals, who had the command of it. Pharnabasus, to excuse himself, accused Iphicrates of having prevented its success;

and Iphicrates, with much more reason, laid all the fault upon Pharnabasus. But well assured that the Persian lord would be believed at his court in preference to him, and remembering what had happened to Conon, to avoid the fate of that illustrious Athenian, he chose to retire secretly to Athens in a small vessel which he hired. Pharnabasus caused him to be accused there, of having rendered the expedition against Egypt abortive. The people of Athens made answer, that if he could be convicted of that crime, he should be punished as he deserved; but his innocence was too well known at Athens to give him any disquiet upon that account. It does not appear that he was ever called in question about it; and some time after, the Athenians declared him sole admiral of their fleet.

* Most of the projects of the Persian court miscarried by their slowness in putting them in execution. Their generals' hands were tied up, and nothing was left to their discretion. They had a plan of conduct in their instructions, from which they did not dare to depart. If any accident happened that had not been foreseen and provided for, they must wait for new orders from court, and before they arrived, the opportunity was entirely lost. Iphicrates, having observed that Pharnabasus took his resolutions with all the presence of mind and penetration that could be desired in an accomplished general," asked him one day, how it happened that he was so quick in his views, and so slow in his actions? "It is," replied Pharnabasus,

"because my views depend only upon me, but their execution upon my master.”

SECTION X.

THE LACEDEMONIANS SEND AGESILAUS TO THE AID

HIS DEATH.

OF TACHOS.

AFTER the battle of Mantinea, both parties, equally weary of the war, had entered into a general peace with all the other states of Greece, upon the king of Persia's plan, by which the enjoyment of its laws and liberties was secured to each city, and the Messenians included in it, notwithstanding all the opposition and intrigues of the Lacedemonians to prevent it. Their rage upon this occasion separated them from the other Greeks. They were the only people who resolved to continue the war, from the hope of recovering the whole country of Messenia in a short time. That resolution, of which Agesilaus was the author, occasioned him to be justly regarded as a violent and obstinate man, insatiable of glory and command, who was not afraid of involving the republic again in inevitable misfortunes, from the necessity to which the want of money exposed them of borrowing great sums, and of levying great imposts, instead of taking the favourable opportunity of concluding a peace, and of putting an end to all their evils.

Plut. in Agesil. p. 616-618. Diod. 1. xv. p. 397-401.

Whilst this passed in Greece, Tachos, who had ascended the throne of Egypt, drew together as many troops as he could, to defend himself against the king of Persia, who meditated a new invasion of Egypt, notwithstanding the ill success of his past endeavours to reduce that kingdom.

For this purpose Tachos sent into Greece, and obtained a body of troops from the Lacedemonians, with Agesilaus to command them, whom he promised to make generalissimo of his army. The Lacedemonians were exasperated against Artaxerxes, from his having forced them to include the Messenians in the late peace, and were fond of taking this occasion to express their resentment. Chabrias went also into the service of Tachos, but of his own head, and without the republic's participation. This commission did Agesilaus no honour. It was thought below the dignity of a king of Sparta, and a great captain, who had made his name glorious throughout the world, and was then more than eighty years old, to receive the pay of an Egyptian, and to serve a barbarian, who had revolted against his master.

When he landed in Egypt, the king's principal generals, and the great officers of his house, came to his ship to receive, and make their court to him. The rest of the Egyptians were as solicitous to see him, from the great expectation which the name and renown of Agesilaus had excited in them, and came in multitudes to the shore for that purpose. But when instead of a great and magnificent prince,

w A. M. 3641. Ant. J. C. 363. Xenoph. de reg. Agesil. p. 663. Cor. Nep. in Agesil. c. viii.