upon he gave them an order to sell the goods and apply the proceeds in payment of the bill. C. afterwards, and before the goods were sold, became bankrupt. A. and Co. handed over the goods to B., at his request, but he afterwards returned them; and after they were returned, C.'s assignees, having made a demand of the goods, brought trover: Held, that they could not maintain it, for that, after the order given by C. to A. and Co. to sell the goods and apply the proceeds in payment of the bill, they remained in their hands subject to the charge; because A. and Co. must be presumed to have asked security as agents for B., whose ratification of their act for his benefit might also be inferred. Bailey v. Culverwell, T. 9 G. 4.

A. agreed to sell to B. his interest in a public house, and his furniture, &c., at an appraisement to be made by two appraisers, the same to be paid for at a day fixed by the agreement, on B.'s taking possession, which was to be on or before the 25th of March then next, and 301. was paid by B. as a deposit; and he agreed that if he should not complete his part of the agreement the sum so paid should be forfeited. The buyer and seller appointed appraisers respectively. On the 25th of March the two appraisers met, and the seller's appraiser was then informed that the appraiser of the buyer could not conveniently on that day complete the valuation, but would finish the business the next day. No objection was then made to the proposed delay. The appraiser of the buyer went to the seller's premises the following day to make the valuation, but the seller refused to allow him so to do, and said he would not complete the contract: Held, that under the circumstances, it was incumbent on the seller, if he intended to insist that the contract should be completed on the day mentioned in the agreement, to have notified such intention to the buyer; and, not having done so, that the latter was entitled to recover back the deposit. Carpenter v. Blandford, M. 9 G. 4.

WARRANT.

See COMMISSIONERS OF BANKRUPT.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.

See BANKRUPT, 4, 9. PRACTICE, 2.

575

WELSH JUDICATURE ACT.

By the Welsh judicature act, 5 G. 4, c. 106, s. 21, it is enacted, that in all transitory actions which shall be brought in any court of record out of the principality, and the debt or damages recovered shall not amount to 50., and it shall appear on the evidence given on the trial, that the cause of action arose in the principality, and that the defendant was resident in Wales at the time of the service of any writ or other mesne process served on him in such action, and it shall be so testified under the hand of the Judge who tried the cause, a judgment of nonsuit shall be entered: Held, that it is discretionary in the Judge who tries the cause, to grant or refuse the certificate mentioned in the act; and that where the Judge has refused to certify, this Court has no power to order a judgment of nonsuit to be entered.

Held, by Lord Tenterden, C. J., at Nisi Prius, that it lies upon the defendant to show that he was residing in Wales at the time when the writ or mesne process was served on him in the action, and that general evidence that his usual place of residence both before and subsequent to the commencement of the action was in Wales was not sufficient. Jones v. Kenrick, T. 9 G. 4. 337

WHARFAGE.

By an act of parliament certain persons were incorporated as the Hull Dock Company, and premises (before the property of the crown) were given to them for the purposes of the act, and they were authorised to make a dock, quays, wharfs, &c., which it was enacted should be vested in them for the purposes of the act. Amongst other things it was provided, that "all goods, &c., which should be landed or discharged upon any of the quays or wharfs which should be erected by virtue of that act, should be liable to pay, and should be charged and chargeable with the like rates of wharfage and payments as were usually taken or received for any goods, &c., loaded or discharged upon any quays or wharfs in the port of London:" Held, that as the premises were only vested in the company for the purposes of the act, they had no common-law right to a compensation for the use of them; and that the statute did not give them any right to claim wharfage for goods shipped off from their quays. The Dock Company at Kingston-upon-Hull v. La Marche, E. 9 G. 4.

WILLS.

See EVIDENCE, 3, 7.

WITNESS.

42

See BANKRUPTt, 3. BILL OF EXCHANGE, 5. EVIDENCE, 14, 15.

WORK AND LABOUR AND MATERIALS.

See ASSUMPSIT, 3.