the yearly rent or sum of £1057. 9s. 3d. for the said demised premises, in the room and stead of the yearly rent first thereby reserved and made payable; such last-mentioned yearly rent to be recovered and recoverable by distress, and by all the means whereby the rent therein firstly reserved was or might be recovered, and to be paid and payable at the time and in the manner as the said firstly reserved rent." Held, that the sum so covenanted to be paid, was in the nature of an increased rent or liquidated damages, and not of a penalty, and that on the breach of the covenant by conversion of a portion of the land into tillage, the jury were bound to find the increased rent, and were not at liberty to award arbitrary damages. L. E. Smith v. Ryan.

LIBEL.

See SERVICE, 3.

iv.

235

1. A libel, which, by the inuendo at the heading of it, was alleged to be conversant about a false charge of felony, made through feelings of religious bigotry, by the plaintiff against one D.S., went on to allege, that the plaintiff was aided in making the said charge by one C. R., who was stated to "have been, for some time back, employing every means to win the confidence of this young gentleman, their intended victim (meaning thereby that the said plaintiff, and the said C. R., had been contriving some plan to assail the character, and destroy the reputation of the said D. S.), as taking him on country visits, and inviting him to the Continent, with the hope, it is alleged, of getting him altogether to themselves, and destroying his prospects, the more easily, by some foul charge, which he could not find means of contradicting, there being to be no one else of the company. They had met with a direct refusal, it seems, to their invitation to the Continent, and therefore rather prematurely opened their present plot, (meaning the said charge of felony). Affidavits are, we understand, shortly to be laid before the law officers of the Crown, charging the above facts, toge

ther with certain conversations between the pair of Romanists who have trained this ingenious manoeuvre (meaning the charge of felony aforesaid)." Held, that the said libel did not amount to a charge of conspiracy, though, in the introductory part of the declaration, the plaintiff alleged, that the object of the defendant was to injure him, &c., by causing it "to be suspected, and believed, that he, the said plaintiff, was guilty of conspiracy, calumny, and fabrication of false charges;" and that, therefore, it was not necessary that the defendant should have justified such a charge. (Dissentientibus, JACKSON, J., RICHARDS, B., CRAMPTON, J.) Ex. Ch. O'Connell v. Mansfield.

179

1. The 7th section of the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 68, applies to the case of a person who has been previously licensed, as well as to the case of a person applying for a license for the first time; and, therefore, it is necessary that a party applying for and obtaining a license, should enter into the bond required by the 7th section, even though he should have obtained a license, and entered into a similar bond, in the preceding year. Ex. Ch. M Garry v. Pape.

141

2. Ejectment for non-payment of rent is maintainable during the continuance of a lease, although more that twenty years have elapsed since the last payment. Q. B. Lessee Crosbie v. Sugrue. 17

3. To a scire facias in 1846, to revive a judgment recovered in 1811 by W. against L., which scire facias stated the recovery, in 1827, of a judgment in an action of debt by the executors of W. against L. for the amount of the judgment debt of 1811, and of another judgment debt due from L. to W., and contained an averment, that upon the recovery of the judgment in 1827, a present right to receive the amount of the judgment of 1811 accrued to the executors of W.; Held, that a plea of the Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, s. 40) was a valid defence. C. P. Watters v. The Heir and Terte

nants of Lidwell. 362 4. A judgment in an action of debt upon a judgment, has not the same effect upon the original judgment, as a judgment of revivor by scire facias.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. See COVENANT, 5.

MAGISTRATES. See CERTIORARI, 1. EVIDENCE, 1, 3. NOTICE OF TRIAL.

MALICIOUS INJURY.

Ibid

2.

41

Where on the face of a return to a mandamus, the law and facts are mixed, the Court will, before argument on the law, reserve liberty for the prosecutor to file a traverse if necessary. Q. B. The Queen at the prosecution of Carpenter v. The Corporation of Dublin. 65 3. The statute 47 G. 3, c. 109, vests the property in the streets of the city of Dublin in Commissioners, and enacts that no person shall open those streets for any purpose whatsoever, without having obtained the consent of the Commissioners. A mandamus having issued, directed to those Commissioners, calling on them to grant a license to open certain streets for certain purposes therein stated, subject to certain terms and conditions; to which mandamus the Commissioners made a return, stating that they, in the due exercise of the discretion vested in them by this Act, and in good conscience, did determine that it was not consistent with their duty as such Commissiouers, or for the benefit of the inhabitants within their jurisdiction, that a license should be granted as prayed for; and that they therefore declined to grant it. Held, a sufficient return. Q. B. The Queen at the prosecution of the Alliance Gas Company v. The Paving and Lighting Commissioners.

4.

448

Held also-Where a discretion was vested in those Commissioners, this Court had no power to issue a mandamus to control that discretion. 5. The remedy by mandamus is only to compel the performauce of an abstract

Ibid

7. Where to a mandamus directed to Poor-law Guardians commanding them to appoint collectors of poor-rate, and to issue their warrants to the persons so appointed, the Guardians made a return, stating that they had appointed collectors, all of whom, save one, had entered into securities as required by the Poor-law Act; that one of the collectors had not 1. duly perfected his securities, and that the Guardians had passed a resolution not to issue their warrants until all the collectors had been duly appointed, and had perfected their securities; Held, that the return was insufficient, and offered no reasonable excuse for the Guardians not doing their duty. Q. B. The Queen v. The Guardians of the Tuam Union. 320

8. The question as to whether those statutes applied to Ireland was fully argued in the case of The Queen at the prosecution of Moss v. The Corporation of Dublin, in last Hilary Term, and on the 28th of April following, BLACKBURNE, C. J. observed that the Court were of opinion these Acts did not extend to this country. Subsequently thereto the 6 & 7 Vic. c. 67, passed, and by its enactments the Court are empowed to award costs in mandamus cases. Q. B. The Queen v. The Guardians of the Tuam Union.

MANSLAUGHTER.

326 n.

On an application to admit to bail persons charged by a coroner's jury with manslaughter, the Court will exercise a discretion; and if it be satisfied that the offender will be made amenable to

2.

To a habeas corpus, directed to the Marshal of the Four-Courts Marshalsea, a return, setting forth a writ of attachment from the Court of Chancery to the Sheriff of the city of Dublin, commanding him to attach H., in order to answer as well touching a contempt, as such matters as should be objected against him; which writ was marked for the levy of certain monies; and also setting forth the Sheriff's warrant to his special bailiffs for the arrest of H.; and alleging that the arrest took place in pursuance of the writ, and after the delivery thereof, and after the issuing of the warrant, and before the return of the writ, and after the passing of the 5 & 6 Vic. c. 95; and also setting forth the return of the writ; and certifying that after the arrest the Sheriff did, in due form of law, commit H. to the FourCourts Marshalsea, there to remain in safe custody until he should pay the said monies marked at the foot of the writ, or until he should be otherwise discharged by due course of law, since which committal the Marshal, in aid and on behalf

NOTICE OF TRIAL.

The defendants having been arrested under the 19th section of 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 55, in a house in which illicit distillation was then carrying on, and brought before a magistrate, were then admitted to bail under the 36th section of that Act, to appear on a certain day before the Petty Sessions. On the day fixed for the trial they appeared, and objected that they were not duly summoned, or any notice of trial for that day served upon them, in contravention of the terms of that section. The magistrates admitting the objection, dismissed the complaint. Held, that such summons or notice for trial was not necessary; and, therefore, this Court, upon certiorari, quashed the decision of the magistrates, and sent the case back to them to rehear on the merits. R. E. The Queen v. Gillespie and another. 36

NUL TIEL RECORD.
See PLEADING, 21, 22.

A scire facias recited a judgment for the not performing certain promises and assumptions; the judgment had been entered on the common counts. On plea of nul tiel record; Held, no variance. L. E. Morrissy v. Walsh. 293

ORDER.

See CHARGIng Order.

PAPIST.

See ROMAN CATHOLIC.

PARTNERSHIP. See EVIDENCE, 9, 10.

PAVING BOARD. See MANDAMUS, 3, 4.

PENAL RENT. See LEASE, 8.

PENALTY.

See PROCTOR.

ROMAN CATHOLIC, 3.

PETTY SESSIONS. See NOTICE OF TRIAL. PLEA.

See AMENDMENT, 4. DILATORY PLEA, 1, 2, 3. PLEADING.

PLEA PUIS DARREIN CONTINUANCE.

At the Sittings after Term, a cause having been called on for trial, the defendant filed a plea in the nature of a plea puis darrein continuance, alleging that the matter of defence arose "after the several supposed causes of action accrued;" in an affidavit, contemporaneous with and in verification of the plea, defendant stated that the matter of the plea had arisen within eight days last past next before the pleading of the said plea. Held, that the plea was ill, there being no precise averment that the matter of defence had arisen after the last continuance; and Semble, that even if the averment in the affidavit had been sufficient, it could not be read in support of the plea. C. P. Atkinson Nesbitt. 271

V.

PLEADING.

See ATTORNEY, 4.

CONSPIRACY.

I. Generally.

1. Although words of equivalent import may suffice in pleading a statute, the better course is an exact adoption of the language of the Legislature. C. P. Kealy v. Heir and Tertenants of Bodkin. 283

II. Declaration.

2. A declaration for slander stated in one count, that the plaintiff was guilty of abominable conversation, and public exposure of his naked person, and in another, that he was guilty of publicly and indecently exposing and uncovering

3. In a declaration on quare impedit, the plaintiff set out, as the commencement of title, letters patent of the 6th of April 1662, whereby King Charles the Second granted unto Rickard, the sixth Earl of C., and his heirs, inter alia, the advowson of K., habendum to the use of C. MC., Lord M., his heirs and assigns, until the said Rickard, or his heirs, should pay to the said Lord M., his heirs or assigns, the several sums in said letters patent specified, at the time, and in the manner therein mentioned, which sums the declaration averred had been long since duly paid off and discharged, to wit, on the day and year, and at the place last aforesaid, and from and after due payment of said several sums in form aforesaid, then to the use of the said Rickard, and his heirs male, &c. The declaration then stated, that by the Act of Settlement (14 & 15 Car. 2), it was enacted, that all houses, castles, &c., and other hereditaments whatsoever, granted by said patent, should be immediately vested, settled, and established, and were thereby vested, settled, and established, in the said Rickard, and his heirs, to and for the uses, &c., expressed and set forth in said patent, saving all manner of persons, &c., other than his said Majesty, his heirs and successors, or those claiming under him, and other than such whose estate would have vested in his said Majesty, his heirs and successors, or those claiming under him, and other than such whose estate would have vested in his said Majesty, by the scope of this Act, if the above provision had not been inserted; and other than such as might claim any right or title thereto, in prejudice of any of the uses limited by said patent, by descent, or by virtue of any estate tail in remainder, from any of the late Earls of C. It was then averred, that the said Rickard, as also his heir, William, the seventh Earl, were, and continued to be, Irish Papists, until their respective