in nature and society. But this does not prove that in either case it is not directly known, or that what is known is not the real mind. Every complex object presents its parts in a different order when approached in different ways, but in the object as wholly known these parts fit and supplement one another. As introspection obscures the instrumental and action factors of mind, so general observation obscures its content factor. But when these factors are united, they compose a whole mind, having a structure and a function that may be known by any knower, whatever his initial bias.

[NOTE (see p. 299). Since this book was written Professor E. B. Holt's views to which the author had already been indebted, have been published. Holt's Concept of Consciousness, and Response and Cognition" in Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. XII, Nos. 14 and 15, now constitute the most able statement of the above theory with special emphasis on its physiological aspects.]

CHAPTER XIII

A REALISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

I. THE THEORY OF IMMANENCE

1. THE new realism is a revival of what has been referred to as the "antiquated metaphysics, which talks about existence per se, out of all relation to

The Old Real

ism and the

New

1

minds." But lest it be thought that this theory is altogether antiquated, it is important to point out its precise relation to earlier forms of realism. The most remarkable parallel which the past affords is to be found in a theory which Hume entertained provisionally as a natural sequel to his analysis of mind. This parallel is so instructive as to warrant its being quoted in full.

"We may observe," writes Hume, "that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity. Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be consider'd as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being. If the name of perception renders not this separation from a mind absurd and contradictory, the name of object, standing for the very same thing, can never render their conjunction impossible. External objects are seen, and felt, and become present to the mind; that is, they acquire such a relation to a connected heap of perceptions, as to influence them very considerably in augmenting their

1 G. H. Howison: The Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays, p. 21

number by present reflections and passions, and in storing the memory with ideas. The same continu'd and uninterrupted Being may, therefore, be sometimes present to the mind, and sometimes absent from it, without any real or essential change in the Being itself."

It will be noted that Hume here regards things not only as possessing being independently of the mind, but also as identical with perceptions when present to the mind. Indeed, he was first convinced of their identity with perceptions, and suggested their independence only as an afterthought. In this respect Hume's view is to be distinguished from the "natural realism" of the Scottish School of Reid' and Hamilton. These writers were concerned primarily to avert the sceptical and absurd consequences of the "ideal philosophy," which merged external reality into the mind's ideas. They sought to restore the traditional substances, the mind within and the nature without; and regarded both as distinct from the ideas that "suggest them. In the case of the "primary" physical qualities, "extension, solidity, and motion," they did, it is true, assert a doctrine of "real presentationism." But they did not explain how bodies can be "suggested," "presented," or "conceived," without becoming ideas; or how without the mediating function of ideas, minds can know bodies. In other words, the dualistic difficulty was aggravated and not relieved.2

Modern realism is closer to the monistic realism of "ideas," suggested by Hume, than to the dualistic realism of mind and matter, propounded by the Scottish School; and this in spite of the fact that the Scottish philosophy was primarily a polemic, in the name of "realism," against

1 Hume: Treatise of Human Nature (Selby-Bigge's edition), p. 207. Cf. above, pp. 137-138. Professor W. P. Montague called attention to this aspect of Hume in an article entitled "A Neglected Point in Hume's Philosophy," Phil. Review, Vol. XIV, 1905.

2 Thomas Reid: Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), ch. I, V, VII; Sir William Hamilton: Notes B, C, D, appended to his edition of the Philosophical Works of Thomas Reid; especially, eighth edition, p. 825. Cf. J. S. Mill: Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, Ch. II.

Hume, as the last and most outrageous of the idealists. The new realism, while it insists, as all realism must, that things are independent, asserts that when things are known, they are ideas of the mind. They may enter directly into the mind; and when they do, they become what are called 'ideas.' So that ideas are only things in a certain relation; or, things, in respect of being known, are ideas.

It is important, therefore, in expounding the general realistic theory of knowledge, to distinguish two component theories. The first I shall call the theory of 'immanence.' This is the same theory as that which I have in another connection termed 'epistemological monism.'1 It means that when a given thing, a, is known, a itself enters into a relation which constitutes it the idea or content of a mind. The second I shall call the theory of 'independence;' and it means that although a may thus enter into mind, and assume the status of content, it is not dependent on this status for its being, or nature. After discussing these two theories, which deal with the problem of the relation of knowledge to its objects, I shall apply them briefly to the problem of truth.

The Duality of Mind and

§ 2. There are two varieties of dualism which the theory of immanence makes it possible to escape; the dualism between mind and body, and the dualism between thought and things. The theory of immanence escapes these dualisms by employ. ing the notion of relation in place of the notion of substance.2

Body as a Dif

ference of Organization

The dualism between mind and body received its classic formulation, as we have seen, in the philosophy of Descartes. This was essentially a 'substance-attribute'

1 Cf. above, pp. 124-126.

It has been suggested that the categories of substance, quality, and relation represent natural stages in the evolution and refinement of thought. Cf. Ludwig Stein: "Der Neo-Idealismus unserer Tage," in his Archiv für systematishe Philosophie, Vol. IX, 1903; referred to by W. P. Montague: "The Relational Theory of Consciousness and its Realistic Implications," Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. II, 1905.

philosophy. Mind and body were conceived as two selfcontained and mutually exclusive spheres, characterized and distinguished by the two attributes, 'thought' and 'extension.' These two attributes Descartes regarded as ultimately different, and as involving a complete disjunction between the substances which they qualified. The Cartesian dualism gave rise to the most baffling perplexities. If mind and body be disjoined by definition, how explain the empirical fact of their union? For those facts which are so prominently in evidence in philosophy, namely, the processes of perception and of voluntary action, are neither exclusively mental nor exclusively bodily, but a blend of the two. In perception a process which begins as bodily ends as mental; and in volition a process which begins as mental ends as bodily. Notwithstanding these difficulties the Cartesian dualism has been perpetually confirmed by the habits of common sense; and still remains the most plausible, and superficially the most intelligible, doctrine. For it is customary and instinctive to think of all duality as exclusive, like the duality of bodies or non-intersecting spaces. Gesture and symbol — in short, every method of sensuous representation, exhibit the same type of duality; so that it requires more than the ordinary precision of thought to avoid the assumption of its universality.

Human experience abounds, however, in dualities of another type. Social aggregates, for example, are distinguished not by the inherent nature of their contents, but by some unifying relation. Thus the residents of the United States are divided into sexes, political parties, races, ages, and innumerably many other groups; and these groups overlap and intersect. They do not possess their members exclusively, but share their members. The difference between any two groups, such, for example, as the Democratic party and the proletariat, is not a difference of members for it is conceivable that their membership should exactly coincide; but a difference of