from its perusal. In like manner, whenever in works of Taste an imita tion of nature is attempted, whenever it becomes necessary to consider the adaptation of means to an end, or the connection and consistency of parts uniting to form a whole, the judgment must always play an important part.

In the operations of Taste, then, two different elements seem to have a share: first, a natural susceptibility or sensitiveness to pleasurable emotions arising from the contemplation of beauty and sublimity; and, secondly, a sound judgment, to enable this faculty, with or without consciousness of such assistance, to appreciate what is beautiful and sublime, and admire it intelligently. To the exercise of this faculty, however, in its perfection, a good heart is no less essential than a sound head. Not only are the moral beauties superior to all others, but their influence is exerted, in a greater or less degree, on many objects of Taste with which they are connected. The affections, characters, and actions of men, certainly afford genius the noblest subjects; and of these there can be no due appreciation by minds whose motives and principles conflict with those which they respectively contemplate or describe. On the selfish and hard-hearted man the highest beauties of poetry are necessarily lost.

§ 242. The characteristics of Taste, in its most improved state, are reducible to two, Delicacy and Correctness.

Delicacy of Taste implies the possession of those finer organs and powers which enable us to discover beauties that lie hid from the vulgar eye. It may be tested by the same process that enables us to estimate the delicacy of an external sense. As the acuteness of the palate is tried, not by strong flavors, but by a mixture of different ones, each of which, notwithstanding it is blended with others, is detected and recognized; so the Delicacy of internal Taste appears by a lively sensibility to the finest, minutest, and most latent objects, even when most inti

ure arise? Show where the exercise of judgment is necessary. In what cases does this faculty always play an important part?

What two elements have a share in the operations of Taste? To the exercise of Taste in its perfection, what is essential? Show how this is the case. What effect have the highest beauties of poetry on selfish men?

§ 242. What are the characteristics of an improved Taste? What does delicacy of Taste imply? How may it be tested? Show some of the peculiarities of a deli

mately blended and compounded together. Many have strong sensibility, yet are deficient in Delicacy. They may be deeply impressed by such beauties as they perceive, but can perceive only what is coarse, bold, or palpable; chaster and simpler graces escape their notice. The man of delicate Taste, on the other hand, has not only strength, but also nicety, of feeling. He sees distinctions and differences which are lost on others; neither the most concealed beauties nor the minutest blemishes escape him.

Addison, in his Spectator, No. 409, gives a striking illustration of Delicacy of Taste. "We find," says he, "there are as many degrees of refinement in the intellectual faculty as in the sense which is marked out by this common denomination. I knew a person who possessed the one in so great a perfection, that, after having tasted ten different kinds of tea, he would distinguish, without seeing the color of it, the particular sort which was offered him; and not only so, but any two sorts of them that were mixed together in an equal proportion; nay, he has carried the experiment so far as, upon tasting the composition of three different sorts, to name the parcels from whence the three several ingredients were taken. A man of fine taste in writing will discern, after the same manner, not only the general beauties and imperfections of an author, but discover the several ways of thinking and expressing himself which diversify him from all other authors, with the several foreign infusions of thought and language, and the particular authors from whom they were borrowed."

Correctness of Taste implies soundness of understanding. It judges of every thing by the standard of good sense; is never imposed on by counterfeit ornaments; duly estimates the several beauties it meets with in works of genius; refers them to their proper classes; analyzes the principles from which their power of pleasing proceeds; and enjoys them according to their respective merits.

These two qualities, Delicacy and Correctness, though quite distinct, to a certain extent imply each other. No Taste can be exquisitely delicate without being correct, or thoroughly correct without being delicate. Still one or the other characteristic predominates. Among ancient crit

cate Taste. What striking illustration does Addison give of delicacy of Taste? What does correctness of Taste imply? By what standard does it judge of things? Show how a correct Taste deals with works of genius. What relation subsists between delicacy and correctness? What critics among the ancients are respectively distinguished for delicacy and correctness of Taste? Who, among modern critics?

ics, Longinus possessed most Delicacy; Aristotle, most Correctness. Of moderns, none exceed Addison in Delicacy; and few in Correctness equal Johnson and Kames.

§ 243. We have thus far contemplated Taste in its sound or healthy state; we find, however, from our own experience, as well as from the history of the past, that it is liable to change, and may in both individuals and nations become weakened and even vitiated. There is, indeed, nothing more fluctuating or capricious. The inconsistencies of this faculty, and the wrong conclusions at which it often arrives, have even created in some a suspicion that it is merely arbitrary; that it is not grounded on invariable principles, is ascertainable by no standard, and is dependent exclusively on the changing fancy of the hour; and that therefore all labored inquiries concerning its operations are useless.

One or two examples of the opposite Tastes which have prevailed in different parts of the world, and the revolutions that have taken place from time to time in the same country, may here be cited with propriety. In eloquence and poetry, nothing has ever pleased the Asiatics except the tumid, the ornamental, the artificial, and the gaudy; whereas the ancient Greeks, despising Oriental ostentation, admired only what was chaste and simple. In architecture, the models of Greece for centuries met with general preference; subsequently, however, the Gothic style prevailed to the exclusion of all others; and this in turn was afterwards laid aside, while the Grecian was again received into popular favor. Again, in literature, how completely opposite is the taste of the present day to that which prevailed during the reign of Charles II.! Nothing was then in vogue but an affected brilliancy of wit; the simple majesty of Milton was overlooked; labored and unnatural conclusions were mistaken for scintillations of genius, sprightliness for tenderness, and bombast for eloquence. Examples of vitiated Taste, whether we apply this term, literally, to the external sense, or, figuratively, to the internal faculty, meet us on all sides. The Hottentot smears his body with putrid oil; the Greenlander delights in rancid fat; the Alpine hunter takes

§ 243. How have we thus far contemplated Taste? To what do we find it liable? What character does it sometimes assume in both individuals and nations? What suspicion have the inconsistencies of this faculty produced in some? What example is cited of opposite Tastes in eloquence and poetry? In architecture? Compare the literary taste of Charles Second's era with that of the present day. Give examples of vitiated Taste.

pride in the swollen neck peculiar to his people; the woman of fashion prefers rouge to the roses which nature has planted in her cheeks; and some intellects admire Jack the Giant-killer more than the sublimest strains of the Epic Muse.

§ 244. In view of such facts as these, it is natural to fall back on the trite proverb de gustibus non disputandum, "there is no disputing about tastes "; and to conclude that, as long as there is so great a diversity, all standards and tests must be arbitrary, and consequently worthless. But let us see to what this doctrine leads. If the proverb is true of Taste in its literal signification, it must be equally true of the other senses. If the pleasures of the palate are superior to criticism, those of sight, smell, sound, and touch, must be equally privileged. At this rate, we have no right to condemn one who prefers the rude head on a sign to Raphael's glorious creations, the odor of a decaying carcass to that of the most fragrant flower, or hideous discord to exquisite harmony. This principle, applied to Taste in its figurative acceptation, is equivalent to the general proposition that, as regards the perceptions of sense, by which some things appear agreeable and others disagreeable, there is no such thing as good or bad, right or wrong; that every man's Taste is to him a standard without appeal; and that we can not, therefore, properly censure even those who prefer the empty rhymester to Milton. The absurdity of such a position, when applied to extremes, is manifest. No one will venture to maintain that the Taste of a Hottentot or an Esquimaux is as delicate as that of a Longinus or an Addison; and, as long as this is the case, it must be admitted that there is some foundation for the preference of one man's Taste to another's, some standard by which all may be judged.

§ 244. What conclusion may naturally be drawn from this variety in Tastes? Where does this doctrine lead us? Applied to the faculty of Taste, to what is this principle equivalent? Show the absurdity of such a position. If one man's Taste is to be preferred to another's, what must exist? In what case is diversity of Tastes not only admissible but to be expected? Show in what Tastes may differ and yet be correct.

It must be observed that the diversity of men's Tastes does not necessarily imply incorrectness in any. Where the objects considered are different, such diversity is not only admissible but to be expected. One man relishes poetry most; another takes pleasure in history alone. One prefers comedy; another, tragedy. One admires the simple; another, the ornamental. Gay and sprightly compositions please the young; those of a graver cast afford more entertainment to the old. Some nations delight in bold delineations of character and strong representations of passion; others find superior charms in delicacy of thought and elegance of description. Though all differ, yet all select some one beauty which suits their peculiar tone of mind; and therefore no one has a right to condemn the rest. It is not in matters of Taste as in questions of mere reason, that but one conclusion is true, and all the rest are erroneous. Truth, which is the object of reason, is one; beauty, which is the leading object of Taste, is manifold.

LESSON XXXVI.

STANDARD OF TASTE.

§ 245. TASTES, we have seen, admit of variety; but only when exercised on different things. When on the same object men disagree, when one condemns as ugly what anther admires as beautiful, then we have no longer diversity, but direct opposition; and one must be right and the other wrong, unless we allow the absurd position that all Tastes are equally good.

Suppose a certain critic prefers Virgil to Homer; I, on the contrary, give the preference to the latter. The other party is struck with the elegance and tenderness which characterize the Roman bard; I, with the simplicity, sublimity, and fire, of the Greek. As long as neither of us denies that both these poets have great beauties, our difference merely exemplifies that diversity which, as we have seen, is natural and allowable. But, if the other party asserts that Homer has no beauties whatever, that he is dull and spiritless, that his Iliad is in no respect superior

§ 245. In what case may Tastes differ without being directly opposite? Illus trate this point by a comparison of Virgil with Homer. In case of an opposition

х