to any old legend of knight-errantry,—then I have a right to charge my antagonist with having either no Taste at all, or one in a high degree corrupted; and I appeal to whatever I regard as the standard of Taste, to show him his error.

It remains to inquire what this standard is, to which, in such opposition of Tastes, we must have recourse. The term properly denotes something established as a rule or model, of such undoubted authority as to be the test of other things of the same kind. Thus, when we say a standard weight or measure, we mean one appointed by law to regulate all other weights and measures.

§ 246. Whenever an imitation of any natural object is aimed at, as for instance when a description of a landscape or a portraiture of human character is attempted, fidelity to nature is the proper criterion of the truly beautiful, and we may lay down the proposition that Nature is our standard. In such cases, reason can readily compare the copy with the original; and approve or condemn, as it finds the peculiarities of the object imitated more or less truthfully represented.

§ 247. In many cases, however, this principle is inapplicable; and for these we are obliged to seek some other standard. Were any person possessed of all the mental powers in full perfection, of senses always exquisite and true, and particularly of sound and unerring judgment, his opinions in matters of Taste would beyond doubt constitute an unexceptionable standard for all others. But as long as human nature is liable to imperfection and error, there can be no such living criterion; no one individual who will be acknowledged by his fellow-men to possess a judgment superior to that of all the rest. Where, then, can we find the required standard? Manifestly, in the concurrent tastes of the major

of Tastes, to what does it become necessary to appeal? What does the term standard denote? What do we mean by a standard weight or measure?

§ 246. When an imitation of any natural object is aimed at, what is the criterion of the beautiful? What faculty is called on to approve or condemn? On what is its decision based?

§ 247. In what cases is this principle inapplicable? Why can not the Taste of a person of sound judgment be taken as a standard? What is the only safe standard that can be adopted? Show how we appeal to this standard in cases of literal taste.

ity of mankind. What most men agree in admiring must be considered beautiful; and his Taste alone can be esteemed true who coincides with the general sentiment of his species.

If any one should maintain that sugar is bitter and tobacco sweet, no reasoning could avail to prove it, because it contradicts the general voice of mankind. The taste of such a person would inevitably be regarded as diseased. In like manner, with regard to the objects of internal Taste, the common opinion of mankind carries the same authority, and constitutes the only test by which the impressions of individuals can be tried.

§ 248. When we speak of the concurrent Tastes of men as the universal standard, it must be understood that we mean men placed in situations favorable to the proper development of this faculty. Such loose notions as may be entertained during ages of ignorance and darkness, or among rude and uncivilized nations, carry with them no authority. In such states of society, Taste is either totally suppressed or appears in its worst form. By the common sentiments of men, therefore, we mean the concurrent opinions of refined men in civilized nations, by whom the arts are cultivated, works of genius are freely discussed, and Taste is improved by science and philosophy.

Even among such nations, accidental causes occasionally pervert the Taste; superstition, bigotry, or despotism, may bias its decisions; or habits of gayety and licentiousness of morals may bring false ornaments and dissolute writings into vogue. Admiration of a great genius may protect his faults from criticism, and even render them fashionable. Sometimes envy obscures for a season productions of great merit; while personal influence or party-spirit may, on the contrary, exalt to a high though short-lived reputation what is totally undeserving. Such inconsistencies may lead us to doubt the correctness of our standard; but it will be found that these vagaries in the course of time invariably correct themselves; that the genuine Taste of mankind in general ultimately triumphs over the fantastic notions which may have attained temporary currency with superficial judges. The latter soon pass away; whereas

§ 248. What do we mean by the concurrent Tastes of men, which we make the universal standard? Even among cultivated nations, what may pervert the Taste? Show how its decisions are sometimes influenced. What feeling is likely to be produced by these inconsistencies? Ultimately, however, what will we find?

the principles of true philosophic Taste are unchangeable, being the same now that they were five thousand years ago.

The universality of Taste and the consistency of its decisions, except when temporarily perverted by external causes, prove that it is far from being arbitrary, is independent of individual fancies, and employs a practical criterion for determining their truth or falsehood. In every composition, what captivates the imagination, convinces the reason, or touches the heart, pleases all ages and all nations. Hence the unanimous testimony which successive generations have borne to the merit of some few works of genius. Hence the authority which such works have acquired as standards of composition; since from them we learn what beauties give the highest pleasure, and elicit the general admiration of mankind.

§ 249. The terms Taste and Genius being frequently confounded, though signifying quite different things, it is of importance clearly to define the distinction subsisting between them. Taste consists in the power of judging; Genius, in that of creating. Genius includes Taste; whereas the latter not only may, but generally does, exist without the former. Many are capable of appreciating poetry, eloquence, and the productions of art, who have themselves no abilities for composing or executing. Delicate and correct Taste forms a good critic; but Genius is further necessary to form a poet, an orator, or an artist. Genius, therefore, is a higher power than Taste. It implies a creative or inventive faculty, which not only perceives beauties already existing, but calls new ones into being, and so exhibits them as strongly to impress the minds of others.

The term genius, as commonly used, extends further than to the objects of Taste. Thus we speak of a genius for mathematics, for war, for politics, and even for mechanical employments. In this acceptation, it signifies a natural talent or aptitude for excelling in any particular vocation.

How is it proved that the principles of Taste are not arbitrary? How have the great works of genius been regarded in all ages?

§ 249. What terms are often confounded? Show the difference between Taste and Genius. Which forms the critic, and which the poet? Which is the higher power? What is the common acceptation of the term genius? As possessed by individual minds, which extends to the wider range of objects, Genius or Taste?

Genius, the creative faculty, as possessed by individual minds, does not extend to so wide a range of objects as Taste. It is not uncommon to meet persons possessed of good Taste in several of the elegant arts, in painting, sculpture, music, and poetry; but to find one who is an excellent performer in all these is much more rare, or rather not to be expected at all. A universal genius is not likely to excel in any thing; only when the creative powers of the mind are directed exclusively to one object, is there a prospect of attaining eminence. With Taste the reverse is the case; exercising it on one class of objects is likely to improve it as regards all.

§ 250. Genius, as remarked above, implies the existence of Taste; and the more the latter is cultivated and improved, the nobler will be the achievements of the former. Genius, however, may exist in a higher degree than Taste; that is, a person's Genius may be bold and strong, while his Taste is remarkable for neither delicacy nor correctness. This is often the case in the infancy of a literature or an art: for Genius, which is the gift of nature, attains its growth at once; while Taste, being in a great degree the result of assiduous study and cultivation, requires long and careful training to attain perfection. Shakspeare is a case in point. Full of vigor and fire, and remarkable for the originality of his thoughts, he still lacks much of that delicacy, both of conception and expression, which has been attained by later writers of far inferior Genius. Indeed, those who dazzle the minds of their readers with great and brilliant thoughts are too apt to disregard the lesser graces of composition.

What is said of a universal genius? What is the result of exercising Taste on any particular class of objects?

§ 250. What is implied in Genius? Taste? When is this often the case?

May it exist without a high degree of What author is a case in point?

LESSON XXXVII.

PLEASURES OF THE

IMAGINATION.

§ 251. THE pleasures of Taste, since they arise from impressions made on the imagination, are generally known as the Pleasures of the Imagination.

§ 252. The Imagination is that faculty of the mind by which it conceives ideas of things communicated to it by the organs of sense, and, selecting parts of different conceptions, combines them into new wholes of its own creation.

Imagination, like every other faculty of mind, is of course confined to man. Opening to him, as it does, an enlarged sphere of manifold and multiform pleasures, it affords a striking proof of divine benevolence. The necessary purposes of life might have been answered, though our senses had served only to distinguish external objects, without conveying to us any of those delightful emotions of which they are now the source. The Creator, however, has seen fit to vouchsafe to man these pure and innocent enjoyments for the purpose of elevating his aspirations, ennobling his emotions, banishing unworthy thoughts from his breast, freeing him from the control of passion and sense, and leading him to look beyond the earth, and

"Before the transient and minute

To prize the vast, the stable, the sublime".

The mind that has once feasted on the pleasures which imagination affords, will never be satisfied to leave them for meaner enjoyments; any more than one who from some height views a majestic river rolling its waves through spacious plains and past splendid cities, will withdraw his gaze from the inviting prospect, to contemplate the stagnant pool at his feet.

§ 253. The process by which the emotions alluded to affect the imagination next requires attention. Whenever an

§ 251. From what do the pleasures of Taste arise? What are they generally called?

§ 252. What is meant by the imagination? To whom is it confined? Show how its bestowal is a proof of divine beneficence. How do the pleasures of the imagination compare with other enjoyments ?

§ 253. Describe the process by which the sensations in question affect the imagination. What, besides the sensation, is essential to the production of a pleas