them under the colors that are most favorable to his cause; to place in the most striking light every circumstance that is to his advantage, and explain away, as far as possible, such as make against him.

§ 466. The fourth division is the Reasoning; and on this every thing depends. It is here that the arguments are found which are to induce conviction, and to prepare for which is the object of the parts already discussed. The following suggestions should be regarded :

I. The writer should select such arguments only as he feels to be solid and convincing. He must not expect to impose on the world by mere arts of language; but, placing himself in the situation of a reader, should think how he would be affected by the reasoning which he proposes to use for the persuasion of others.

II. When the arguments employed are strong and satisfactory, the more they are distinguished and treated apart from each other, the better; but, when they are weak or doubtful, it is expedient rather to throw them together, than to present each in a clear and separate light.

III. When we have a number of arguments of different degrees of strength, it is best to begin and close with the stronger, placing the weaker in the middle, where they will naturally attract least attention.

IV. Arguments should not be multiplied too much, or extended too far. Besides burdening the memory, and lessening the effect of individual points, such diffuseness renders a cause suspected.

§ 467. The fifth division is the Appeal to the Feelings. This should be short and to the point. All appearance of art should be strictly avoided. To move his readers, the writer must be moved himself.

§ 468. The last division of a discourse is the Peroration; in which the writer sums up all that has been said, and endeavors to leave a forcible impression on the reader's mind.

§ 466. What is the fourth division? Of what does it consist? What arguments should be selected? When the arguments employed are strong and satisfactory, how should they be treated? How, when they are weak or doubtful? When we have a number of arguments of different degrees of strength, how is it best to arrange them? What is the effect of multiplying arguments too much, or extending them too far?

§ 467. What is the fifth division of a discourse? What should be the character of an appeal to the feelings?

§ 468. What is the last division of a discourse? In it, what does the writer do?

§ 469. As examples, two argumentative discourses are presented below, supporting, respectively, the affirmative and the negative of the question, "Does virtue always insure happiness?"

[Affirmative.]

VIRTUE ALWAYS INSURES HAPPINESS.

Selfishness exerts a powerful influence over the actions of all inen. Even when we least suspect that we are complying with its dictates, if we closely examine the springs of our action, we shall find that we are instinctively following the promptings of our own tastes and propensitics. We can hence perceive the wisdom of Providence, who, to win men to virtue even against their own will, has annexed to it an invariable reward. Happiness He has made depend solely and exclusively on uprightness; and this proposition it is the object of the present discourse to establish.

It would seem as if this were so palpable a truth that it would require no demonstration, but would be at once universally admitted. Yet there are some, who, despite the teachings of moralists of every age, deeming themselves wiser in their generation than the children of light, have thought proper to deny it, and thus have sought to overthrow the strongest bulwark on which society depends. Whatever the scoffer may say, however confidently he may point to individual instances as contradicting the position here maintained, it becomes the candid examiner not to be driven from the truth by ridicule or sophistry; not to let sneers prevail against the weight of testimony that ancient sages, as well as modern philosophers, have borne on this subject; and, finally, to consider with care before he ventures to disbelieve a doctrine which is at the foundation of all morality.

In the first place, it is necessary to define virtue; we regard it as consisting in the discharge of our duty to God and our neighbor, despite all temptations to the contrary. Our first argument is, that a virtuous course is so consonant to the light of reason, is so agreeable to our moral sentiments, and produces such peace of mind, that it may be said to carry its reward along with it, even if unattended by that recompense which it ought to receive from the world.

This is evident in the very nature of things. The all-wise and beneficent Author of nature has so framed the soul of man that he can not but approve of virtue, whether in himself or in others, and has annexed to the practice of it an inward satisfaction that surpasses all the blessings of earth. The goods of fortune, wealth, rank, external prosperity,-all these may take to themselves wings and fly away; but of the happiness which springs from the consciousness of a proper discharge of duty, no thief can rob us, no stroke of adversity can deprive us.

But the reward of virtue is not always confined to this internal peace and happiness. As, in the works of nature and art, whatever is really beautiful is generally useful, so in the moral world, whatever is truly virtuous, is at the same time so beneficial to society that it seldom goes without some external recompense. Men know that they can depend on one who acts from principle; they have confidence in his words and representations, and give him the preference in all matters of business. Thus, even in a worldly point of view, the virtuous man has an advantage over those of loose principles or immoral lives.

In the third place, nothing is so liable to create in our behalf firm and lasting friendship on the part of the good, as virtuous practices. The associations of the wicked are undeserving of the name of friendship; it is only to the elevated

fellowship of upright minds that this term is applied. Now, that friendship is a source of the purest happiness none will deny; and for the blessings resulting from it we are thus indebted, in a great measure, to virtue.

But there is another important consideration that we should not forget. Few men are so constituted as to be insensible to the approbation or censure of the world. To many, its smile is alone sufficient to constitute happiness; its frown is a source of misery. Now, this smile is gained in no way so readily as by a course of integrity.

How has the approbation of all ages rewarded the virtue of Scipio! That great warrior had taken a beautiful captive, with whose charms he was greatly enamoured; but, finding that she was betrothed to a young nobleman of her own country, he, without hesitation, generously delivered her up to his rival. This one act of the noble Roman has, more than all his conquests, shed an imperishable lustre round his character.

Nor has the approbation of society been limited to the virtuous actions of individuals. The loveliness of virtue generally has been the constant topic of all moralists, ancient and modern. Plato remarks, that, if virtue were to assume a human form, it would command the admiration of the whole world. A late writer has said, "In every region, every clime, the homage paid to virtue is the same. In no one sentiment were ever mankind more generally agreed."

If, therefore, virtue is in itself so lovely; if it is accompanied with an inward peace and satisfaction; if it is a source of temporal advantages; if it is the spring from which flow the blessings of friendship; if it wins for those who practise it the approbation of the world;-it must be admitted by every candid inquirer that the proposition with which we started is true, that virtue always insures happiness. Though it must be acknowledged that it is frequently attended with crosses in this life, and that something of self-denial is implied in its very idea; yet the wise will admit the truth of the poet's words, will consider

"The broadest mirth unfeeling Folly wears,
Less pleasing far than Virtue's very tears".

Our own experience, no less than the arguments here adduced, must convince us that

"Guilt ever carries his own scourge along;

Virtue, her own reward".

[Negative.]

VIRTUE DOES NOT ALWAYS INSURE HAPPINESS.

In contemplating the maxims of the ancient Stoic philosophers, we can not help being struck with the soundness of their principles, and the stern requirements of their moral code. Yet there is one of their propositions to which we can not yield assent: and that is, that temporal happiness is the necessary consequence of virtue. So important a question,-one on which so many issues; and those the practical issues of life, are staked,-is well worthy of discussion.

It is well understood that, in treating this question, prejudices will have to be combated and removed: for there are many who, without having looked closely at the subject, have followed the ancient Stoics; and, because it is a convenient creed to teach, and one which it is believed will lead to the practice of virtue, have sought to inculcate this selfish principle. A regard for virtue should be instilled by higher arguments than this; virtue should be practised because it is a duty, because it is the command of God.

In the first place, we lay down the proposition that there is no necessary connection between virtue and happiness. To the ancients, who knew not that the

soul was immortal, it may have seemed necessary that the patient self-denial, the forgiving charity, and the active benevolence, of virtue, should be rewarded in this world; but we, who live in the light of a revelation from on high, know that there is a hereafter, and look to that infinite cycle of ages, not to this finite state of probation, for the reward to which virtue may be entitled.

Again; no one can deny that it is an important principle of our religious system that the virtuous and the pious should be put to the trial, and that afflictions and crosses are sent by the Omnipotent to test the stability of their faith and practice. As Job, a man that "feared God and eschewed evil", was tried by visitations from on high; so have the good of all ages been obliged to submit to similar probation. Viewed in this light, it would seem that trial is peculiarly, in this world, the lot of virtue; the necessary preparation to be made, in time, by those who would enjoy a blissful eternity.

But those who, with the poet, believe that

"Virtue alone is happiness below",

point us to the pleasures of a quiet conscience, and the peace which a knowledge of the performance of duty brings with it. It is admitted that these are great blessings, and that without them happiness can not exist; but are they alone sufficient to make a man happy? Can the quietest conscience in the universe remove the pangs of hunger, alleviate the sufferings of the sick, or comfort the mourner? The experience of the world will answer no. There are many Jobs; there are many good, but unhappy, men.

To go a step further; to say what is necessary to insure happiness; to point to religion, the hope of that which is to come, as an anchor to which the soul may cling "amid a sea of trouble ",-would be foreign to the question. In view of the arguments we have advanced, in view of the striking argument furnished by our own experience, we think we may fairly conclude that

"Virtue alone is " not "happiness below".

EXERCISE.

Write an Argumentative Discourse supporting either the affirmative or the negative of the question, "Do public amusements exercise a beneficial influence on society?"

LESSON CIV.

ORATIONS.

SERMON-WRITING.

§ 470. AN Oration is a discourse intended for public delivery, and written in a style adapted thereto. At the present day, this term is generally applied to discourses appropriate to some important or solemn occasion; such as a funeral, an anniversary, a college commencement, &c. It is

§ 470. What is an oration? To what is the term generally applied at the present day? How does the oration differ from the harangue and the address ?

a speech of an elevated character, and differs in this respect from the harangue and the address: the former of which implies a noisy and declamatory manner in the speaker; the latter, a less stately style than characterizes the oration.

§ 471. The ancients recognized three classes of orations; the demonstrative, the deliberative, and the judicial. The scope of the first was to praise or to censure; that of the second, to advise or to persuade; that of the third, to accuse or to defend. The chief subjects of demonstrative eloquence, for instance, were panegyrics, invectives, gratulatory and funeral orations; deliberative eloquence was displayed chiefly in the senate-house and assembly of the people; while ju dicial eloquence was confined to the courts of law.

In modern times, also, a threefold division has been adopted, though one different from that just described. Orations are now distinguished as, I. Speeches to be delivered in deliberative public assemblies; as in Congress, at popular meetings, &c.

II. Speeches at the bar.

III. Sermons, or discourses to be delivered from the pulpit.

§ 472. The style of an oration should be elevated and forcible. It should not lack ornament; and whatever embellishments are introduced must be of the most exalted character.

An argumentative discourse, written in the style just described, and intended for delivery in public, becomes an oration. To the latter, therefore, the principles laid down for such discourses in the last lesson are equally applicable. The same formal divisions may be adopted, either in whole or in part, as occasion may require.

§ 473. Sermons constitute the most important class of orations. For the benefit of those who desire brief and practical directions for the preparation of such discourses, we condense the following remarks from Hannam's valuable “Pulpit Assistant"

:

§ 471. How many classes of orations did the ancients recognize? Name them, and state the scope of each. In modern times, what division has been adopted? § 472. What should be the style of an oration? What should be the character of the ornaments introduced? What divisions may be adopted in the preparation of orations?