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must be brought on, as well as carried off, or the farm will be
Sailing, or feeding with green meat, increases the quantity
Mr. Parkinson speaks of an acre of peas, for podding, as in the neighbourhood of Doncaster worth 20 l. This we believe is more than they ever fetch in the neighbourhood of London: 10 and 121. per aere we have heard named as a good price.
The reader will find Mr. P. a great advocate for inclosing commons: but the reasons which he assigns are rather laughable, as well as local. When also he recommends the burning of pigeons' feathers under the noses of mares, as a sure means of preventing them from casting their foals, he reminded us of some of the curious remedies recommended by the Elder Pliny. Did Mr. Parkinson never hear that post hoc, ergo propter hoc, is a very unphilosophic mode of reasoning?
On the whole, however, Mr. P. gives a number of useful hints and directions, and his book is worth consultation: but we think that his statements of agricultural profits, on a general view of things, is exaggerated; and that he has not, on the other side, exhibited what an experienced farmer must have encountered, the hazards of farming.
ART. IV. Six Essays upon Theological, to which are added Two
THE facetious author of Hudibras calls
The maggots of corrupted texts:"
but we should rather term them the offspring of misconceived and
In the 2d essay, he remarks that the word Revelation re-
by which it is made known; while inspiration respects the way or the mode by which truth is made known, and not its nature; it implies not such knowlege, as is acquired by the customary use of our natural faculty, or by reasoning, or by mere human information, but which is conveyed to the mind by some incxplicable operation of God himself." The knowlege derived from inspiration is imparted first to the inspired person, and then transmitted to others; so that we receive it through the medium of writings, as we do other kinds of knowlege. Mr. Ludlam does not therefore see the use of an inspiration of words; and the different styles of the different sacred writers seem to de cide against this idea. Mr. L. observes that, when the prophets preface their predictions with thus saith the Lord," it means only a solemn demand of attention to a message from God."
He farther observes in the following essay, (on the curse mentioned in Gal. iii. 13.) what may indeed be well applied to the subject of this, that all language is imperfect, because the connection between ideas and words is wholly arbitrary, and therefore the writings of inspired persons differ not from the writings of uninspired persons, as far as the imperfection of human communication is concerned. The meaning intended to be conveyed can in both cases only be ascertained, where it is doubtful, by the explanations of the persons themselves; or, when such explanations cannot be obtained, collected from the application of the words used upon different occasions in their writings.' This observation is extremely judicious, and merits peculiar attention in theological controversy. Allowing the Apostle to be inspired in writing the Epistle to the Galatians, we are not (for instance) assisted by it to the precise meaning of the word sayopa Cev used by St. Paul in the verse which is in part the subject of the 3d Essay. Had he written in Latin, and employed the word redimere, the mere position of inspiration would not have helped to ascertain the Apostle's idea. It is to be supposed that he used the word in, the common acceptation of his time, and this is best known by adverting to the general application of it in his writings.
In the expression, Gal. iii. 13. "CHRIST being made a CURSE for us," the ignominious manner in which Christ was put to death is alluded to, (says Mr. L.) but not the way in which his
The sense in which the Latin word was sometimes taken by the Antients is evident from Juvenal's mode of describing the wretch Crispinus:
-Monstrum nullá virtute redemptum
death has its efficacy. Nothing is here said about the mode of its operation, about any translation of guilt, any commutation of punishment, any standing in our law-place: matters either utterly impossible, or utterly unintelligible.'
The 4th Essay is on the Nature of the Divine Being, as discoverable from his WORKS or his WORD.
Here Mr. L., with his usual clearness and precision, premises that, by the knowlege of God he understands a knowlege, 1st, of his Nature; and, 2dly, of his Character: that the first includes, 1st, a knowlege of his power, and 2d," of his mode of existence; and that the 2d, implying a knowlege of the Divine Character, includes a knowlege, 1st, of his dispositions; 2dly, of his will; 3dly, of his intentions respecting his intelligent creatures. He then adds, such knowlege of any of these particulars, which is collected from the deductions of reason founded on the use of our several senses, I call NA-, TURAL Religion. Such knowlege as is collected from immediate or transmitted revelation, I call REVEALED Religion.?
After this explanation, we expected to have seen an accurate line drawn between Natural and Revealed Theology: but the remainder of the essay is mostly occupied with explaining" the New Testament-account of the Son and Holy Spirit..
In the 5th essay, the author treats on the Nature of Human Authority, considered as a Proof of the Truth of Opinions; con- . taining Remarks on Dr. Knox's Christian Philosophy.
In one place, particularly, Mr. L. is rather severe on Dr. K.: but, abating the asperity of some expressions, we must pronounce this essay not unworthy of Dr. Knox's serious consideration. It is not only true that, by rejecting the application: of reason to religion, we do in fact make religion impossible, but the very attempts to reject it by appeals to authority serve only to establish the necessity of its exercise. Mr. L. very sensibly observes that
There is no weight in what Dr. Knox calls authority, when it relates to the truth of opinions, unless the maintainers of them enable you to judge for yourselves, and then this authority receives its weight, not from the assertions of the men, but from the proofs they allege; and there is as little, when it relates to the reality of facts, unless it can be confirmed by the testimony of able and impartial witnesses, and then the authority receives its weight, not from a single witness, but from the numbers, which, if necessary, can confirm it.'
The 6th Essay professes to treat of The Effects of the Fall.
Mr. L. does not minutely comment on the history of what. theologians call the Fall, but he offers a variety of judicious remarks relative to it. He tells us that, to suppose the fall to be intended by the Creator is to overturn the basis of all reDd 3 ligion;'
ligion; yet he allows it to be permitted, though the reason of the permission is not revealed;- that the scripture says very little of man's original character; and that, though a change took place in Adam's original character, we are not told bow far or in what manner it affected his posterity;-that the scriptures, when they acquaint us with the sin of man, do not inform us that this springs from Adam's sin, and no where intimate that man's intellectual faculties were injured by Adam's transgression. Hence it is evident that Mr. L is no advocate for speaking of the natural corruption of the human constitution,
Essay 7 is on the Difference between the Powers and Dispositions of the Human Mind. This difference our author thus explains:
The external motions of the body-the use of some of the senses the application of the intellectual faculties to their appropriate objects, which may be called our ACTIVE powers, depend on the determination of the human will. The sensations of the body-the dispositions of the mind, which may more procily be called our PASSIVE faculties, depend wholly on the influence of external objects. But though the exciting of certain affections be independant of the will, the degree and application of these affections depend on it, and as far as this is the case we are the proper and ONLY objects of moral judgment.'
Essay 8. on the Nature and Grounds of Moral Obligation; in which Dr, Paley's Notion of the Moral Sense, advanced in bis Lectures on Morality, is fully considered. Not only is every language in want of sufficient terms to mark and discriminate with precision the different ideas on moral subjects, but writers, who professedly treat of morality as a science, have not in general sufficiently weighed the meaning and tendency of those definitions and statements which they place at its foundation. After all that has been advanced in praise of virtue, the very questions-what is virtue ?—wherein does it essentially consist? remain undecided. Dr. Paley defined virtue to be, "doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." This, however, is a very defective definition; so also is his definition of obligation (which Mr. L. exposes in this essay), "It is (he says) a violent motive resulting from the command* of another." Mr. L. very justly observes that a confused and obscure notion of compul sion seems, with many writers, to enter into the idea of obligation; though this idea is utterly inconsistent with the nature and situation of such beings as are the subjects of moral obliga tion.' He makes the perception of what is right create in our
Command is net essential to obligation; neither is power.
minds the obligation, which can only be founded on the rectitude of the conduct to be pursued; or, in other words, that Obligation means only a state of mind perceiving the reasons for acting or forbearing to act,'
It is certain that a sense of obligation accompanies a sense of 'duty. It is what we express by the word ought.
Our author ascertains the province of Conscience, or the Mo-. ral Sense but for this and other subjects of inquiry, we must refer to the essay itself, which we should have gladly seen expanded.
We have perused this pamphlet with much satisfaction. It shews that Mr. L. is a man of reflection, and it is calculated to lead the mind to a discriminating and right way of thinking. For an account of the author's former Essays, see M, Rev. vol. xxiii, p. 132. N. S.
ART. V. Observations on the Structure, Oeconomy, and Diseases of the Foot of the Horse, and on the Principles and Practice of Shoeing. By Edward Coleman, Professor of the Veterinary College, Principal Veterinary Surgeon to the British Cavalry, and to His Ma jelty's Most Honorable Board of Ordnance, and Honorary Member of the Board of Agriculture. Vol. 1. 4to. pp. 128. with 8 Plates. 128. Boards. Johnson, &c. 1798.
"HE institution of the Veterinary College must be regarded, by every reflecting man, as an object of national importance, as well as of private utility, The habits and diseases of the noblest animal, that we have succeeded in domesticating, have long been committed to the management of the most obstinate and ignorant of human beings; and horses, invaluable for their qualities, have been destroyed by mistaken efforts intended for their relief. It was worthy the humanity of an enlightened age and nation, to provide more able practitioners for superintending the health of our mute companions, who can form no choice for themselves; and this specimen of the instruction for which we may hope, from the new seminary, is well calculated to gratify the public with knowlege immediately required, and to raise their expectation of what still remains unexecuted.
* We have seen a private letter from Mr. Ludlam, in which he corrects a mistake in Essay vi. p. 85, where he confounds Enoch, the seventh descendant from Adam, with a prior Enoch, the immediate descendant of Cain. He would thus read the passage: The change in Adam's character did not affect the moral character of all his descendants. Enoch was the righteous descendant of a sinful progenitor.