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every thing must be necessary: a chain of necessary fate ART. must run through the whole order of things; and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a necessity of nature. This some have thought was no absurdity: God is necessarily just, true, and good, not by any extrinsic necessity, for that would import an outward limitation, which destroys the idea of God; but by an intrinsic necessity that arises from his own infinite perfection. Some have from hence thought that, since God acts by infinite wisdom and goodness, things could not have been otherwise than they are: for what is infinitely wise or good cannot be altered, or made either better or worse. But this seems on the other hand very hard to conceive: for it would follow from thence, that God could neither have made the world sooner nor later, nor any other way than now it is: nor could he have done any one thing otherwise than as it is done. This seems to establish fate, and to destroy industry and all prayers and endeavours. Thus there are such great difficulties on all hands in this matter that it is much the wisest and safest course to adore what is above our apprehensions, rather than to inquire too curiously, or determine too boldly in it. It is certain that God acts both freely and perfectly: nor is he a Being subject to change, or to new acts; but he is what he is, both infinite and incomprehensible: we can neither apprehend how he made, nor how he executes his decrees. So we must leave this difficulty, without pretending that we can explain it, or answer the objections that arise against all the several ways by which divines have endeavoured to resolve it.

The third thing under the head I now consider is, God's being without passions. That will be soon explained. Passion is an agitation that supposes a succession of thoughts, together with a trouble for what is past, and a fear of missing what is aimed at. It arises out of a heat of mind, and produces a vehemence of action. Now all these are such manifest imperfections, that it does plainly appear they cannot consist with infinite perfection. Yet after all this, there are several passions, such as anger, fury, jealousy, and revenge, bowels of mercy, compassion and pity, joy and sorrow, that are ascribed to God in the common forms of speech, that occur often in scripture, as was formerly observed, with relation to those figures that are taken from the parts of a human body. Passion produces a vehemence of action: so, when there is in the providences of God such a vehemence as, according to the manner of men, would import a passion, then that passion is ascribed to God: when he punishes men for sin, he is said to be angry: when he does that by severe and redoubled strokes, he is said to be full of fury and revenge: when he punishes for idolatry, or any dishonour done himself, he is said to be jealous: when he changes the course of his proceedings, he is said to repent: when his dispensations of

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ART. providence are very gentle, and his judgments come slowly from him, he is said to have bowels. And thus all the varieties of Providence come to be expressed by all that variety of passions, which among men might give occasion to such a variety of proceeding.

The fourth head in this article is concerning the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, that he is infinite in them. If he can give being to things that are not, and can also give all the possibilities of motion, size, and shape, to beings that do exist, here is power without bounds. A power of creating must be infinite, since nothing can resist it. If some things are in their own nature impossible, that does not arise from the want of power in God, which extends to every thing that is possible. But that, which is supposed to be impossible of its own nature, cannot actually be: otherwise a thing might both be and not be; and it is perceptible to every man that this is impossible. It is not want of power in God, that he cannot lie nor sin: it is the infinite purity of the Divine nature that makes this impossible, by reason of his infinite perfection. Nor is it a want of power in God, that the truth of propositions concerning things that are past, as that yesterday once was, is unalterable. Among impossibilities, one is, to take from any being that which is essential to it. God can annihilate every being at his pleasure; for, as he gave being with a thought, so he can destroy it with another: and this does fully assert the infinite power of God. But if he has made beings with such peculiar essences, as that matter must be extended and impenetrable, and that it is capable of peculiar surfaces and other modes, which are only its different sizes and shapes, then matter cannot be, and yet not be, extended; nor can these modes subsist, if the matter of which they are the modes is withdrawn. The infinite power of God is fully believed by those who acknowledge both his power of creating and annihilating; together with a power of disposing of the whole creation, according to the possibilities of every part or individual of it; though they cannot conceive a possibility of separating the essential properties of any being from itself; that is to say, that it may both be, and not be, at the same time; since an essential property is that which cannot be without that substance to which it belongs.

The wisdom of God consists first in his seeing all the possibilities of things, and then in his knowing all things that either are, or ever were, or shall be: the former is called the knowledge of simple intelligence or apprehension; the other is called the knowledge of vision. The one arises from the perfection of the divine Essence, by which he apprehends whatever is possible; the other arises from his own decrees, in which the whole order of things is fixed. But besides these two ideas that we can frame of the knowledge of God, some have

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imagined a third knowledge, which, because it is of a middle ART. order betwixt intelligence and vision, they have called a middle knowledge; which is the knowing certainly how, according to all the possibilities of circumstances in which free agents might be put, they should choose and act. Some have thought that this was a vain and needless conceit; and that it is impossible that such knowledge should be certain, or more than conjectural; and, since conjecture implies doubt, it is an imperfect act, and so does not become a Being of infinite perfection. But others have thought that the infinite perfection of the divine Mind must go so far as to foresee certainly what free creatures are to do; since upon this foresight only they imagine that the justice or goodness of God in his providence can be made out or defended. It seemed fit to mention this upon the present occasion; but it will be then proper to inquire more carefully about it, when the article of predestination is explained.

It is necessary to state the idea of the goodness of God most carefully; for we naturally enough frame great and just ideas of power and wisdom; but we easily fall into false conceits of goodness. This is that of all the divine perfections in which we are the most concerned, and so we ought to be the most careful to frame true ideas of it: it is also that, of all God's attributes, of which the scriptures speak most copiously. Infinite goodness is a tendency to communicate the divine perfections to all created beings, according to their several capacities. God is original goodness, all perfect and happy in himself, acting and seeing every thing in a perfect light; and he having made rational beings capable of some degrees of his light, purity, and perfection, the first and primary act of goodness is to propose to them such means as may raise them to these, to furnish them with them, to move them oft to them, to accept and to assist their sincere endeavours after them. A second act of goodness, which is but in order to the first, is to pity those miseries into which men fall, as long as there is any principle or possibility left in them of their becoming good; to pardon all such sins as men have committed, who turn to the purposes of becoming seriously good, and to pass by all the frailties and errors of those who are truly and upon the main good, though surprise and strong temptations prove often too hard for them. These two give us as full an idea as we can have of perfect goodness; whose first aim must be the making us good, and like to that original goodness: pity and pardon coming in but in a subsidiary way, to carry on the main design of making men truly good. Therefore the chief act and design of goodness is the making us truly good; and, when any person falls below that possibility, he is no more the object of pity or pardon, because he is no more capable of becoming good. Pardon is offered on design to make us really good; so it is not to be sought for,

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nor rested in, but in order to a farther end, which is the reforming our natures, and the making us partakers of the divine nature. We are not therefore to frame ideas of a feeble goodness in God, that yields to importunate cries, or that melts at a vast degree of misery. Tenderness in human nature is a great ornament and perfection, necessary to dispose us to much benignity and mercy: but, in the common administration of justice, this tenderness must be restrained; otherwise it would slacken the rigour of punishment too much, which might dissolve the order and peace of human societies. But since we cannot see into the truth of men's hearts, a charitable disposition and a compassionate temper are necessary to make men sociable and kind, gentle and humane. God, who sees our hearts, and is ever assisting all our endeavours to become truly good, needs not this tenderness, nor is he indeed capable of it; for, after all its beauty with relation to the state wherein we are now put, yet, in itself it implies imperfection. Nor can the miseries and howlings of wicked beings, after all the seeds and possibilities of goodness are utterly extinguished in them, give any pity to the divine Being. These are no longer the object of the primary act of his goodness, and therefore they cannot come under its secondary acts. It is of such great consequence to settle this notion right in our minds, that it well deserves to be so copiously opened; since we now see in what respects God's goodness is without bounds, and infinite; that is, it reaches to all men, after all sins whatsoever, as long as they are capable of becoming good. It is not a limitation of the divine goodness to say, that some men and some states are beyond it; no more than it is a limitation of his power to say, that he cannot sin, or cannot do impossibilities: for a goodness, towards persons not capable of becoming good, is a goodness that does not agree with the infinite purity and holiness of God. It is such a goodness, that if it were proposed to the world, it would encourage men to live in sin, and to think that a few acts of homage offered to God, perhaps in our last extremities, could so far please him, as to bribe and corrupt him.

This is that which makes idolatry so great a sin, so often forbid by God, and so severely punished, not only as it is injurious to the majesty of God, but because it corrupts the ideas or notions of God. Those ideas rightly formed are the basis upon which all religion is built. The seeds and principles of a new and godlike nature spring up in us as we form ourselves upon the true ideas or notions of God. Therefore, when God is proposed to be adored by us under a visible shape or image, all the acts of religion offered to it are only so many pieces of pageantry, and end in the flatterings and the magnifyings of it with much pomp, cruelty, or lasciviousness, according to the different genius of several nations. So

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the forming a false notion of the goodness of God, as a tender- ART. ness that is to be overcome with importunities and howlings, and other submissions, and not to be gained only by becoming like him, is a capital and fundamental error in religion.

The next branch of this article is, God's creating and preserving of all things; and that both material substances, which are visible, and immaterial and spiritual substances, which are invisible. God's creating all things has been already made out. If matter could neither be eternal, nor give itself a being, then it must have its being from God. Creating does naturally import infinite power; for that power is clearly without bounds, that can make things out of nothing: a bounded power, which can only shape and mould matter, must suppose it to have a being, before it can work upon it. We cannot indeed form a distinct thought of creation, for we cannot apprehend what nothing is. The nearest approach we can bring ourselves to a true idea of this, is, the considering our own thoughts; especially our ideas of mathematical proportions, and the other affections of bodies: those ideas are the modes of a spiritual substance; and there is no likeness nor resemblance between them and the modes of material substances, which are only the occasions of our having those ideas, and not in any wise the matter out of which they are formed. Here seems to be a sort of beings brought out of nothing; but, after all, this is vastly below creation, and is only a faint resemblance of it.

With the power of creating we must also join that of annihilating, which is equal to it, and must necessarily be supposed to be in God, because we plainly perceive it to be a perfection. The recalling into nothing a being brought out of nothing, is a necessary consequence of infinite power, when it thinks fit so to exert itself. There is a common notion in the world, that things would fall back into nothing of themselves, if they were not preserved by the same infinite Power that made them: but without question it is an act of the same infinite Power to reduce a being to nothing, that it is to bring a being out of nothing: so whatever has once a being, must of its nature continue still to be, without any new causality or influence. This must be acknowledged, unless it can be said, that a tendency to annihilation is the consequent of a created being. But as this would make the preservation of the world to be a continued violence to a natural tendency that is in all things; so there is no more reason to imagine that beings have a tendency to annihilation, than that nothing had a tendency to creation. It is absurd to think that any thing can have a tendency to that which is essentially opposite to itself, and is destructive of it.

The preservation of things is the keeping the frame of nature, and the order of the universe, in such a state as is suitable to the purposes of the supreme Mind. It is true, natural