obtain the necessary funds from taxation or from loan. In the latter case, the action of the government is nothing but the diversion of capital from one branch of industry to another; in the former, though a tax may be nothing but a curtailment of an individual's enjoyments, the strongest plea of necessity must be alleged to justify such an appropriation, while in the great majority of cases such a tax would be a mere diversion of capital from a man's own ends to that of another, without even so much as giving him interest on his advances.

The plan of M. Schultze Delitzsch, as gathered from the excellent report of Mr. Morier (Correspondence of Her Majesty's Missions Abroad on Trades Unions, 1867), is as follows:-'If it be found possible to lend a producer, i. e. an artisan, capital at the ordinary rate of interest, he will be able not only to obtain the wages of his labour, but the profits of trade, i. e. in our nomenclature, the wages of superintendence ordinarily secured by the employer. It is true that the risk of lending an individual capital is so great, that it cannot be done at the ordinary rate of interest, for the labourer has nothing but his labour to pledge, i. e. inconvertible capital, and the trader has his stock in trade, i. e. convertible capital. Besides, with all the will to pay, the artisan may be disabled by sickness or accident; and thus the disposition to lend is restrained by two risks, that of dishonesty and incapacity. If, however, the loan is made to more than one artisan, the risks both of dishonesty and incapacity diminish with the increase of the number of co-operators. The insurance against incapacity is calculated on the ordinary risks of life and health; that against personal dishonesty may be obtained by infor

mation as to the borrower's character, and by accumulating motives to honesty. This scheme is formulated in two sentences-the minimum of risk, the maximum of responsibility.'

In order to accomplish these results, M. Delitzsch established credit banks on a peculiar principle. The capital of the bank is provided either by the contributions or deposits of the artisans, or from the advances of capitalists, the latter being the most considerable. The members of the association of credit banks can alone borrow. They need not, it appears, be possessed of capital themselves, but they must be able to work, and in regular employment. The best guarantee, however, of their fitness for association, and one which can be easily and most satisfactorily fulfilled, is the possession of a share in the bank. The principle of unlimited liability is the keystone of the system. If the assets of the business fail, the creditor may recover on the private property of the associates, each and all being jointly and severally liable to the debts of the association. In this way the maximum of responsibility is attained. It should be added, that the object of the credit bank is the interest of the borrower, not of the lender; and yet, according to Mr. Morier, the credit banks have become exceedingly lucrative to the lenders. The safety of the bank consists in its rigid limitation to the loans required by members of the association, and, as has been said, to the maximum of responsibility annexed to the personal property of the borrower a responsibility which is made to continue for twelve months after any member ceases to belong to the association. The principle of the accumulation of the stock capital is, that ultimately it should amount to fifty

per cent. of the borrowed capital. Each member is to have one share, and the shares must be all alike. The cardinal rule in loans is, not to lend for a longer time than the bank can borrow, and the general practice is to limit the time to three months.

Here then is a scheme, in active and successful working, by which the labourer can unite the functions and earn the wages of labourer and employer, by superseding the necessity of using the services of the latter functionary. The reason why this personage exists in modern trade and manufacture arises from the facts that he has security on which to borrow, and that general interest in the welldoing of the work which gives unity to the plan of operations stimulates economy in the details, and provides supervision over the whole mass of transactions. He subsists, in short, by the weakness of unassociated and irresponsible labour. Supply these two defects in the action of artisans, and the advantages obtained by the intermediary employer become an additional remuneration to the operative. Of course the high rate of interest obtained by these credit banks (Mr. Morier informs us that it is as much as eight to ten per cent., especially on short loans), is a merely temporary phenomenon, which only results from the fact that at present the borrowers obtain in their competition with employers all, or nearly all, the advantages which the ordinary trader or manufacturer accumulates. When the time comes-and come it will, should the system succeed largely and be largely adopted that the associations practically compete against each other, the margin will inevitably be narrower, and the terms of interest lower.

IV. Association of Employers with Operatives. The

jealousies, quarrels, and frequent strikes of labourers, and when these do not occur, the negligence, inefficiency, and slovenliness of the persons employed, have suggested. to some employers, that it would be well to take such men into a sort of modified partnership, so that two things might be effected: first, that the workman should be informed of the course of business and rate of profit; next, that he should be stimulated to activity and intelligent. industry by motives of self-interest. Several years ago,

M. Leclaire attempted some such scheme in Paris with the happiest and the most abiding results. The idea and the practice is of course not novel; for the custom of allowing certain subordinates in many kinds of trade a commission on goods sold is familiar. But the modern practice, now it appears increasing, is to lower the rate of wages by a certain percentage, and to offer the employé a share, calculated on an average at the residue, in the profits of the business. The objection alleged against the plan-an objection which may probably be fatal to its adoption in several kinds of business—is that it necessitates the abandonment of that secrecy which it is believed is essential at all times, and particularly in some emergencies, to success. The value of secrecy may be overrated, probably is; but its significance is felt, and will in all likelihood be felt more and more as the principle of limited liability is adopted. In some kinds of business, however, secrecy is of no importance. Thus, to take an example in which the association of employers and operatives has been tried, and, as I am informed, with great and uninterrupted success; I have learnt from Mr. H. Briggs, one of the partners in a colliery near Barnsley, that his firm had been harassed by incessant discontent, claims,

and strikes on the part of the colliers. It appeared to the partners that these inconveniences might be obviated if some plan could be devised by which the colliers could be made to feel an interest in the success of the undertaking. It was thereupon resolved to turn the colliery into a joint-stock company, to pay the workmen, in part at least, according to the market price, and to encourage them in the purchase of share capital. The plan has succeeded admirably, and the inconveniences felt under the old arrangement have been obviated.

My reader will see, however, that all these remedies for low wages, or rather all these expedients by which it is attempted to instruct operatives in the economical conditions under which wages are paid for work, and by which the labourer is enabled to better his own position in life, respect certain classes of labour only, and leave out of calculation the function of the peasant. Here in point of fact we have other difficulties to contend with. The system of farming in England is increasingly that of large as opposed to small culture. This is not the place in which to discuss the relative advantages of either method. The system of tenure in England is favourable to the accumulation of land in few hands; and the passion for becoming the possessor of a vast estate, and founding a family, is aided by the direct enactments of law and its indirect sanctions. This again is not the place in which to discuss the social and economical consequences of such a system. But of one thing we may be clear: if the advantages be great, the sacrifices are great also; if the large farm system be favourable to production-a position by no means proved; if the accumulation of real estate gives a solidity to public interests, and provides a variety of social safeguards — an