FOREIGN LITERATURE. ART. I. Verhandelingen raakende den Natuurlyken en Geopenbaarden Godsdienft, &c. i. e. N° Prize Differtations relative to Natural and Publifhed by TEYLER'S THEOLOGICAL 4to. pp. 219. Haarlem. 1790. To ftudy has called forth the efforts of human genius, more than that of metaphysical fubjects; and yet no ftudy has been lefs amply rewarded. The fineft imaginations, and the acuteft reafonings, have been employed to fcarcely any other purpose, than to convince us of our own ignorance, by pointing out to us the intricacies of the fubjects attempted: but wonderful as it may appear, no part of metaphyfics is furrounded with fo many difficulties, as that which pertains to the knowlege of ourselves; and the nearer we approach to our own minds, the more our embarraffments increase! Whence came we ?-whither are we going?-and what conflitutes the nature of man, in this fmall interval between the paft and the future? are queftions that have occupied the earliest attention of philofophers; and although they have demonftrated that the human mind is capable of poffeffing the most amazing talents, yet the folution remains as unfatisfactory as at the firft moment of their difcuffion. Doth the law of our conftitution confine us to the investigation of properties merely, in which we are doubtlefs more immediately interefted? Is it the ordinance of heaven, that the nature and effences of things fhall not be penetrated by the wifeft, in the prefent ftate of imperfection; and that thefe fubjects are referved for the enjoyment of the intelAPP. REV. VOL. III. LI lectual lectual principle in a higher fphere? This perpetual failure of fuccefs prompts us to believe that this is really the case. After fo many volumes have been written concerning the nature of the human foul, it is very humiliating that there fhould ftill be any propriety in the queftion propofed by the learned body, which has given rife to the publication before us. Are there fatisfactory proofs of the immateriality of the foul of man? If fuch exift, what conclufions are to be drawn from them, with respect to the foul's duration, fenfation, and employment in its fate of feparation from the body? With what fuccefs this queftion has been answered, or whether any new light has been thrown on this obfcure fubject, we fhall not determine: but we will attempt to lay before our readers fuch a general view of the arguments adduced, as may enable them, in fome degree, to judge for themfelves. Three of thefe differtations are in favour of the immateriality of the foul, and the laft oppofes that doctrine. It is eafy to perceive, from the author's manner of treating this question, in the third differtation, that he is a gentleman of the faculty; and it is obfervable that the only abettor of materialism, is a very worthy and pious divine of the Baptift perfuafion. We mention thefe circumftances, with fingular pleafure, as they are ftriking indications, that as all phyficians are not materialifts, alias infidels, in the vulgar acceptation of that term, fo theology itfelf begins to fhake off fome of the ftrongeft prejudices that have fo clofely adhered to it. They prove that men, regardlefs of profeffional trammels, dare to think; which muft finally iffue in thinking right, as far as fubjects will admit of inveftigation. We behold, with the greatest fatisfaction, philofophers of every clafs, uniting to chace away the fpectre, which has fo long guarded the cavern of ignorance, the danger of Herefy. When alfo we fee argument, candour, and piety, walk hand in hand, we begin to be lefs concerned about the particular tuff of which the foul is made, from a conviction that it is fometimes made to appear of most excellent fluff. It is to be expected, that, in treating a queítion which has been fo frequently agitated, many arguments and obfervations will be repeated that have been formerly advanced: we will, therefore, pafs over thefe as flightly as poffible, and direct our chief attention to the favourite ideas entertained by each candidate, in the fupport of his own fyftem. The firft anfwer to the queftion, and which was judged worthy of the golden medal, was written by the Rev. M. ALLARD HULSHOFF, A. L. M. et Phil, Doctor, minifter of the Anabaptift church in Amfterdam. 13 This This divine, who is manifeftly a difciple of Dr. Reid's fchool, commences his enquiry into the immateriality of the foul, by ftating the various opinions that have been formed concerning matter. Common people, he obferves are uniformly of opinion that matter exifts externally, and that it really poffefies all thofe properties which ftrike the fenfes; fuch as cold, heat, colour, found, &c. Thefe he diftinguishes by the title of common atomifts. Superficial reafoners, and thofe who have not directed their ftudies into this channel, think with the vulgar: but, fince the days of Des Cartes, the diftinction between effential and accidental properties has been univerfally admitted. The effential properties, which are extenfion, impenetrability, cohefion, and the power of being moved, are placed in the firft rank, and fenfible qualities are placed in the fecond: but, as all philofophers agree in rejecting the real or external exiftence of the latter, they may be comprized under the general name of philofophic atomifts. Thefe, however, he divides into two claffes. Simple or pure atomifts acknowlege extenfion and impenetrability alone, and the attributes neceffarily arifing from thefe, vis inertia and cohesion. According to them, matter is merely paffive, poffeffing no internal powers; and cohefion, though not neceffarily contained in the idea of matter, is eflential to the idea of extenfion fo that all changes are effected by powers foreign to matter. In nature, it is the power of God; in creatures, the powers of the foul. Mixed atomifts, or Dynamifts, he remarks, differ not from the preceding, as long as the attention is confined to appearances in nature: but in advancing further, the diftinction is fufficiently obvious. They place powers in matter itself, which they fuppofe belonging to it, and inherent in fuch a manner that they are independent of fpiritual fubftance, and are formed in bodies, or fuperadded as attributes of material exiftences. Of this kind, are gravity, elafticity, irritability, attraction, repulfion, &c. &c. Thefe powers operate according to the organization of bodies. To atomifts of each clafs, he oppofes the idealifts, who entertain the fame opinions concerning the primary qualities of bodies, that atomifts hold concerning the fecondary. As the latter maintain that no light can exift without being feen, or found without being heard, fo the former affert that neither impenetrability nor extenfion can have place, independently of our conceptions. This opinion, which feems to have been countenanced by Plato, is fully developed in the system of Berkeley. The prefent author next proceeds to clafs the most diftinguifhed writers on matter and fpirit, under these different orders. Malebranche he places among the idealifts, as his mathematical L12 mathematical points, conftituent of extenfion, vanish into nothing when we attempt to analyze them. Locke, by fuppofing that matter may be made capable of thought, approaches to the dynamifts. Leibnitz and Wolf may be deemed idealifts, fince, in reality, they allow of no material exiftence out of the mind for although the monades,are the occafion of our ideas, yet these ideas have nothing in common with the object. Kant, who derives no fenfations from the attention of the foul to real exiftences, though he acknowleges that our ideas are in fome other manner excited, by fomething exifting out of the mind, is placed alfo under the idealifts; as, according to him, all our obfervations and determinations are founded on appearOf Dr. Priestley, he remarks, that although he makes the foul material, he makes matter fpiritual. He is placed with the mixed atomifts. ances. Having made thefe preliminary obfervations and distinctions, the candidate proceeds to his arguments; which are levelled against the atomifts. He introduces this part of the fubject, by remarking that the idea of the immateriality of the foul is moft confonant with the common opinion of mankind; and suppose it were granted, that this fentiment was originally implanted in the mind by tradition, government, or imagination, yet the propenfity to believe the doctrine, is a fufficient evidence, that the operations of the mind will never be attributed by mere common fenfe to a material caûfe. His grand philofophical argument is divided into two fections. In the one, he attempts to prove that the foul is not material; and in the other, that it cannot be afcribed to any power or energy fituated in matter. His proof that the foul is not material, is derived from the influence of fenfible objects on it. He felects the laws of vision to illuftrate his point; and having proved that colour does not exist in the body, by means of which the fenfation is excited, he proceeds in the following manner: Thus have we traced colour back to the ray of light. We shall likewife chace it thence. The propofition which we oppofe, is the following, colour is inherent in the vifual ray. My first queftion is, with respect to the light or colour refident in this material ray, is it material, or not material? The last cannot be afferted; fince what is immaterial cannot inhere, or be remarked by the fenfes. You allo acknowlege that the material ray is cloathed or penetrated by the matter of light, or of colour. You affert, perhaps, that the matter which compofes thefe rays is inconceivably fine; and that ray which yields the particular colour, is yet finer. I will not difpute its tenuity, if you will not difpute its materiality: but I fhall take the liberty to magnify and give fome specific form to this your impenetrable extention. Being magnified many, many, millions of times, your element of colour becomes a globe, or a triangular figure. I now afk, is this fimple rednefs? fo that the colour of red makes its effence even to its very centre? No: but broken through, you will fay, it will appear in every part red as vermillion. Confequently you allow that the furface only is red: but the furface is merely red, when it throws off no other than red rays. Thus are we exactly where we began; and the colour of red is no where to be found without. No redness can exift without a perceptive immaterial foul.' The author next reprefents fome young philofopher oppofing to his argument the laws of optics, and explaining to him the manner in which external objects are painted on the retina, and thence conveyed by the optic nerve to the feat of perception. To this he anfwers, in the argument of Dr. Reid: The rays of light, or of colour, or the particles which proceed from every luminous point, unite again to one point on the retina: but the painting cannot be extended farther. Behind the retina, there is no reprefentation. All that can further happen, is either the motion of a fluid, or the vibration of the folids. Let the fuppofed workmanship within, be fo fine, compact, and organized, that it can preferve infinitely more diftinctions, than Bonnet himself can imagine: What will this avail? By magnifying an object, I make no change in the materials or arrangement. Let us then magnify the above mentioned part of the brain, till it be of an immenfe fize. What is the confequence? I behold wheels, axes, pullies, hammers, &c. as in a paper or an oil mill. The fluids drop, ftream, or make a vortex: but with all this, I remain as diftant as ever from the caufe of perception. It muft at laft be supposed that the foul fees the miniature reprefentation without a medium but my foul perceives no diminished object; it is as large as in nature; of which, the whole cerebrum is able to contain a very small portion but what are we to understand by feeing the reprefentation? muft a particle of the rays be reflected from each luminated point on the furface of the foul, to be there refracted? Then must the foul be an eye, and this eye muft again have a foul. Turn the fubject as you pleafe, in matter there is no colour-In matter, there can be nothing that has the leaft refemblance to colour-In matter, can there be no natural caufe of the perception of colours :-there can be no medium by which matter and motion can be converted into fenfible perceptions. -Hence, I conclude that as certain as we are of our own perceptions, fo certain are we that the Percipient Being is totally diftinct from matter.' In a fecond chapter, M. HULSHOFF proceeds to attack the mixed atomifts, who afcribe the power of thinking to fome inherent power in matter; and after fhewing, with much ingenuity, that no other powers can be fuppofed to fubfift in matter, than those ordained by the Divine Mind for the regular and uniform maintainance of the laws of nature, he objects that matter, L13 |