performed in the one fyftem of man, to its conftituent parts. The bodily frame is conftituted of brain, nerves, the vascular fyftem, organs of fenfe, motion, nutrition, and of every other animal function. The foul is the invifible agent, which confers on the body all its powers and properties. The peculiarities of this conftitution, and the mutual influence which the two principles have on each other, are minutely delineated; and the author remarks, as the refult of his ftatement, that whenever the perception of external bodies, or fenfations relative to the state of a perfon's own body, be communicated by the nerves of the different organs to the brain, or whenever the moveable parts of the frame are fet in motion by the power of the will, the foul is confcious of thefe operations, and conceives an idea of them; and the is able to effect her purposes by the power of her agency on her corporeal frame.'

Thefe powers of the foul are, perception, fenfation, underftanding, defire, and volition. The feat of the understanding is the head; the heart is the feat of the defires or affections; and volition is the operative power of the foul to accomplish the end, according to the dictates or fuggeftions of each. Having thus examined what may be fuppofed to conftitute the nature of man, he proceeds to the question. The argument in favour of immateriality is very fimilar to the preceding, though reprefented in a different point of view. The following fummary will convey to our readers fome idea of his manner :

As we have no medium by which we can judge of the state and properties of material fubitances, but by the lenfes, fo have we no other medium whereby we can judge of the ftate and properties of the foul, than by an attention to its operations in ourselves, of which we have the confcioufnefs. As our fenfes make no report of the inward conftituent principles of matter, fo our confcioufness gives us no information concerning the effence or ftate of our fouls, independently of its operations: but, by obferving its internal and external operations, and by comparing them together, we are able to attain fome degree of important knowlege. Thus, whenever I feek external objects with my eyes, my fingers, or the organs of hearing, I not only difcover the properties of these bodies, and judge accordingly, but I judge that there is a principle in me which takes cognizance of the external object; and that this principle is of a different nature from the object obferved, and from the fense or inftrument by which it is obferved. Whenever I feel an agreeable or difagreeable fenfation, I have a confciousness of the particular kind, and degree of either, and I immediately judge that the fenfient principle in me is different from the organ in which fenfation is placed. Thus, when I write, walk, or fpeak, I know what I do, and I conclude that the operative principle is diftinct from the inftrumental and paffive. Further, when I attend to the operation and defires of my mind, though they be excited by external objects,

I perceive that I can dwell on them, change them, fend my thoughts abroad, recal them, &c. I am confcious that my mind defires or fhuns things which appear good or bad, true or falfe: but that these affections are made by a principle different from the brain and nerves, through whofe medium thefe affections are excited.'

The philofopher therefore concludes, from a train of reasoning fimilar to the above fpecimen, that as certainly as we poffefs the evidence of our fenfes for the existence of our fenfes, fo have we the evidence of our confcioufnefs for the existence of mind.

Though his conclufions are the fame as the preceding, yet we fhall juft obferve, that there is a confiderable difference in his premifes. Meffrs. Hulshoff and Rochuffen obviously confider the fpiritual nature of man as fuperadded to the animal; according to this ftatement, the foul of man is free to enjoy separate exiftence, from the infinite fuperiority of its nature, without fuppofing that other animals fhall partake of the fame bleffing the author before us attributing the vital powers of the animal nature to the activity of the foul, muft admit that every living creature poffeffes an immaterial, and confequently an immortal nature.

In the conjectural part, the anonymous author confeffes the difficulties that prefent themfelves in contemplating the existence of the difembodied fpirit. He confefles that it must be deprived of many fources of information, by being deftitute of the ufual organs; yet he maintains that, as the foul bestows powers and activity on the body, as it is the principle of life, or poffefles life within itfelf, it must retain active powers when the body is no more. He alfo maintains, that a fufpenfion of action is fimilar to annihilation.

The fourth effay was given in by the Rev. M. HENDRICK VAN VOORST, minifter of a congregation of Anabaptifts at Oostzaandam; the fame gentleman who obtained the filver medal on a former occafion *. This divine takes the negative of the queftion. After a few words of introduction, in which he affumes, that every thing hitherto advanced in proof of the immateriality of the foul must be unfatisfactory, fince the learned fociety deem the query ftill pertinent, he enters on the subject; and endeavours to fupport his pofition, that there are no fatiffactory proofs of the immateriality of the foul. For this purpofe, he advances, and enlarges on, the following particulars, with much ingenuity: 1. The fimilarity of the human species to other animals, and in what they may be fuppofed to differ,

See Appendix to the First Vol. of the Monthly Review enlarged, p. 559. 2. What

2. What contributes to advance the human fpecies to perfection; and what acts as an impediment. 3. The fentiment, that human nature is constituted of two diftinct parts, is liable to many objections. 4. It is poffible for the Supreme Being to communicate fuch properties to matter, as are afcribed to an immaterial foul. 5. Identity, or the consciousness that we continue the fame perfons, is no proof of immateriality. 6. The confused idea entertained of the origin of the foul, is an argument that it is not conftituted as the popular philofophy afferts. 7. The growth and decay of the mental faculties, with the corporeal frame, indicate that the former depend on the latter. 8. If the immateriality of the foul, and its confequent immortality, were fo important a doctrine as it has been reprefented, it ought to have been made level to common understandings. 9. The belief of one fimple nature in man, is attended with lefs difficulties than the oppofite fentiment. 10. The question, what shall remain after death? need not excite our apprehenfions, fince Revelation has affured us of a future ftate.

The fuppofitions of the advocates for immateriality, concerning the operations of the foul after death, are unfatisfactory. 12. The facred writings are the only fources of information concerning a future ftate. 13. Conjectures concerning the intermediate state.

The importance of the fubject having already induced us to extend this article to an unusual length, we fhall not follow this ingenious author, nor trace his mode of reafoning under each of these particulars. This will alfo be the lefs neceffary, as his arguments on many of them are fimilar to thofe employed by our great apoftle af materialifm. We shall therefore content ourselves with tranfcribing a few hints that more immediately relate to thofe proofs of immateriality, on which the other candidates dwell, as the bulwark of their caufe.

After ftating the objection, that it is not in the nature of matter to become cogitant, he answers:

6

It is true, we are not acquainted with any matter poffeffing this property but is it not poffible for the Almighty Creator, who forms, from dead and inactive matter, living bodies, to communicate to fome bodies, fuch powers and properties? Is it impoffible for matter to be fo conftituted, as to be prepared for the reception of fuch properties?-Since we must confefs our ignorance of the nature of matter, and of things that we fee and feel, how can we pretend to affert that a fomething exifts which has no connection with matter? What ideas can we poffibly form of a being, which, though it be a fubftance, has neither extenfion nor parts? If we cannot trace any relationship between the principle of perception and thought, and any fpecies of matter, neither can we remark any

natura!

natural connection between matter and gravity, or between various other properties which we acknowlege it poffeffes.'

The advocates for immateriality will now, we imagine, maintain, with an air of triumph, that this mode of reafoning endangers the spirituality of the divine nature.

The author feems to be moftly embarrafled under the fifth article, where he confiders the argument derived from confcious identity. He acknowleges the difficulty: but he thinks it is not of fufficient force to deltroy the whole train of evidences in fayour of materiality. If the pofition, that in the midst of the various changes which the body undergoes, fome parts may remain entire, and the power of confcioufnefs may refide in them, if this conjecture be not fufficient to folve the difficulty. he refers it to the will and power of the Supreme. Under the feventh article, he urges, with great force, the difficulties attending immateriality, from the laws of procreation; and fhews that every hypothefis, formed to evade the force of this argument, is defective.

His conjecture relative to an intermediate ftate, may easily be collected from the tenor of his other fentiments. He obferves, that there is no extravagance in the fuppofition that, after death, fome part of the matter of which man was formed, fhall continue in existence, without being confounded with the common mafs: that this may be the principle of thought, and may, at the refurrection, be united to other particles of matter, and form a new body but that, in the intermediate time, it is in a fate of inactivity. It refts in the grave, &c.

:

Thus have we endeavoured to give our philofophical readers as clear an idea as the abftrufe fubject and our contracted limits would admit, of the weapons employed by the different champions in the field of metaphyfics, in conteft for the prize held out to them by Teyler's learned fociety: to which fociety the public is already indebted for many matterly performances. They will perceive that much addrefs, and much manœuvering, have been practifed on each fide: they will remark, that each combatant is more vigorous and fuccefsful in his attacks, than he is fortunate in his defence; that each reciprocally points out the infuperable difficulties and abfurdities with which every explanation hitherto given of the phænomenon of our natures, is laden; and that each, after having exhibited great addrefs in maintaining the conteft, is obliged, when driven to the laft extremity, to take refuge in the wifdom and power of the Supreme. This power alone is equal to the tafk, either of communicating perception and cogitation to matter, or of uniting a fpiritual nature to a material frame. After con

testing

tefting with fo much earnestnefs, as if it were for the lives of their fouls, they all confefs, that the arguments for a future ftate, which are derived from the moral nature of man, and from the Chriflian religion, are infinitely more fatisfactory than any that can be deduced from reafon. On thefe arguments, they all enlarge with much energy, and in the language of triumph. Whatever may be the final illue of the debate concerning matter and fpirit, which has fo long agitated the philofophic world, we readily fubfcribe to the axiom of M. VAN VOORST, that if the natural immateriality of the foul were a doctrine of fuch moment, it would have been made level to the meanest capacities, inftead of eluding the inquiries of the greatest.

Cog.

ART. II. Brieven over Italien, i e. Letters concerning Italy, principally relative to Medicine, and Natural Hiftory; addroffed to Ed. Sandifort, M. D. and Profeffor of Anatomy in the Univerfity of Leyden. By W. X. JANSEN, Phil. & M. D. 8vo. PP. 314. Leyden. 1790.

Na preface to this publication, written by Profeffor Sandifort, we are not only prefented with the most ample teftimonies of the diligence of the ingenious Dr. JANSEN, during his ftudies. in the university of Leyden, but we are informed that he propofed to improve and augment, by travel, the knowlege that he had acquired in his academical ftudies; and that, accordingly, with this object before him, he vifited moft parts of Germany; formed an acquaintance with men who were the most distinguished for their learning in each place; and gained every means of information worthy the attention of a physician and a philofopher.

From Germany, he went into Italy with the fame curious and philofophic fpirit; and on his return to Duffeldorf, he determined to digeft and arrange his notes and obfervations, relative to the principal objects of his inquiry, and to communicate them to his friend the profeffor, in a feries of letters. We are alfo informed, that materiais for a fecond volume, of about an equal fize with the fpecimen before us, are in referve; and that, if the prefent work fhould prove acceptable, they are allo to be prefented to the public. The journey was undertaken in the year 1785.

This collection of letters, which are nineteen in number, contains a felection of M. JANSEN's obfervations in a tour from Triefte to Venice, Padua, Modena, Ferrara, Bologna, Loretto, Rome, Capua, Caferta, and Naples. Although his chief object was, as mentioned in the title, to acquire medical and philofophical knowlege, yet he has not fo ftrictly confined

himfelf