denied that, while all the other cessions consisted of frontier territories, leaving untouched the mountain-barrier which enclosed Mysore Proper, this included a portion of its very summit, and opened a ready access to the capital. But the truth is, that while Tippoo was eagerly_intent on pouring his vengeance on its brave people, Lord Cornwallis could not abandon to his fury faithful allies, and a race unjustly oppressed. Upon this refusal all was again in movement, the princes were separated from their native attendants, and arrangements entered into for despatching them to the Carnatic under an English escort,-preparations were made for renewing the siege, the army was again full of hope and animation,-Purseram Bhow began once more to plunder. In less than two days, however, Tippoo again felt the weight of the necessity which pressed upon him, and sent notice that the demand was acceded to. A considerable delay still intervened; but, on the 18th March, 1792, the definitive treaty was transmitted to the young princes, that by their hands it might be delivered. At ten in the morning of the 19th they waited on Lord Cornwallis, and the eldest presented to him all the three copies of the treaty; but as the vakeels of the two allied chiefs, who did not choose to appear in person, soon after entered, his lordship returned their copies, which the boy delivered to them in a manly though evidently less cordial manner; and on hearing something muttered by the Mahratta envoy, asked what he grumbled at, hastily adding, "they might well be silent, as certainly their masters had no reason to be displeased."

General Dirom estimates, that after deducting the company's share of the sum exacted from Tippoo, the extraordinary expenses of this war would scarcely amount to two millions sterling. Every department had been conducted with the strictest economy. Instead of the large grants that had accrued to individuals from the conquest of Bengal, the prize-money in three campaigns amounted only to 93,5841., which, after Cornwallis and Medows had given up their shares, and the company had added a large gra tuity, only allowed to a colonel 11617. 12s., and to a private soldier 147. 11s. 9d. The losses sustained by the sultan during the period of hostility are estimated by the same author at 49,340 men, 67 forts, and 801 guns.

GENERAL RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

105

This celebrated treaty has been the subject of much controversy; nor do the views which influenced Lord Cornwallis seem ever to have been fully understood. It appears to have effected either too little or too much. The cessions extorted were such as to preclude all hope of future friendship; for they inevitably created in the mind of a proud, ambitious, and restless prince a feeling of deadly enmity, as well as an incessant desire to retrieve his lost greatness; while they left him a degree of power which might easily become formidable in the hands of such an enemy.

Notwithstanding these unpromising circumstances, six years clapsed without any violation of the treaty; and all its conditions being fulfilled, the two young hostages were sent back to their father in 1794. Tippco saw no prospect of making war with advantage, and Sir John Shore, who succeeded as governor-general, followed a strictly pacific system, which he was even accused of carrying to excess. His policy was particularly questioned in the case of the nizam, when the Mahrattas, his late allies, carried into effect their long-cherished design of invading and plundering his territories. The engagements entered into with this prince previous to the commencement of the Mysore war, though somewhat vague, were such as reasonably led him, in that event, to look for British protection. The new governor, however, considered himself as strictly precluded by his instructions from engaging in any war that was not purely defensive. The nizam, in the exigency to which he was thus reduced, had recourse to a Frenchman named Raymond, who possessed no ordinary share of enterprise and military skill. He succeeded in alluring into the service of his employer a great number of French officers, and with their aid organized no less than 14,000 troops, who were superior to any native force, with the exception of the sepoys trained in the British army. Tippoo, meantime, was busily employed in attempting to improve his military system, though, from want of practical judgment and information, he met with very imperfect success. Such was the state of affairs, when, in May, 1798, the Earl of Mornington, afterward Marquis Wellesley, came out as governor-general. This nobleman, whose military career was destined to eclipse that of Clive, was sent with

the most solemn injunctions to follow a course directly opposite to that which, throughout the whole of his administration, he did actually pursue. He was instructed not to engage, if possible, in hostilities with any native power; and yet he waged deadly war with every one of them. He was desired not to add by conquest a single acre to the company's territory, and he subdued for them all India from the Himmaleh to Cape Comorin. Yet his adherents contend that he acted steadily and uniformly in the spirit of his instructions; and that, in deviating so widely from the wishes of his employers, he was carried along by a current of circumstances which existed prior to any step taken by him in the administration of that country.

He had no sooner assumed the reins of government than his attention was roused by a most remarkable proceeding on the part of the Sultan of Mysore. That prince, like his father Hyder, had been long connected in close alliance with the French, as the power by whose aid he hoped to subvert the dominion of the English. This connexion was in a great measure broken by the expulsion of those allies from India upon the breaking out of the revolutionary war; but Tippoo had listened with the utmost eagerness to the accounts of their success against Britain and the continental nations, and had been led to hope for their assistance in the re-establishment of his own greatness. While he was in this disposition, in the beginning of the year 1797, Ripaud, the captain of a French privateer, arrived at Mangalore, to solicit the means of repairing his shattered vessel. There he met with Gholaum Ali, whom the sultan had formerly employed on an embassy to France; and, finding a field open for the display of a little vainglory, he represented himself as second in command at the Mauritius, and stated that he had come to give notice of a large force being ready at that island to co-operate with Tippoo in driving from India their common enemy. . He was immediately forwarded to Seringapatam, where the sultan, contrary to the advice of his most prudent counsellors, who assured him that this stranger was an impostor, received him into his entire confidence. After a number of little arrangements and transactions, he sent two ambassadors along with Ripaud to the Isle of France, to adjust the terms of a treaty offensive and defensive. The mis

TIPPOO RECEIVES A PARTY FROM MAURITIUS. 107

All that

sion arrived at Mauritius, where they were altogether un expected; but when Malartic, the governor, learned their purpose, animated by that desire to promote national interests which generally characterizes Frenchmen, he deter mined to give them a cordial reception. They landed under a salute of artillery, and were conducted to the gov ernment-house, where they were received in state. Malartic expressed the utmost readiness to accede to the proposals of the sultan, which were no less than that he should send an army of 25 or 30,000 men to assist in conquering the English, the nizam, and the Mahrattas, and to divide all India with himself. The arrangement was fully com pleted, with the important exception, that of the powerful military force by which these mighty projects were to be accomplished there did not exist a single soldier. could be done was to transmit the plan, accompanied with strong recommendations, to the executive Directory; and, in the mean time, to invite as many as possible of the Frenchmen and natives resident on the island to enrol as volunteers. With the most palpable imprudence the governor issued a proclamation announcing the arrival of the ambassadors and the object they had in view, and calling upon all the citizens who had any martial spirit to enlist under the banners of the Mysorean sovereign, who made the most liberal offers of pay and allowances. They thus succeeded in levying exactly ninety-nine persons,-a motley group,-Europeans, creoles, citizens, soldiers, sailors; and with this troop, for want of more and better, the ambassadors were fain to depart. They landed at Mangalore on the 26th April, 1798; when Tippoo, though galled at the utter disappointment of his expectations, and the rash exposure made at the Mauritius, had still the means of averting the danger. He might, indeed, have disowned the envoys, and refused their mock-auxiliaries, while, by secret explanations, he might at the same time have contrived to keep open the communication with France. But he seems to have been in a state of blind and. violent excitation. The embassy, with their slender accompaniment, were welcomed to the capital, where they founded a Jacobin club, planted the tree of liberty surmounted with the cap of equality, and on the public parade hailed the sovereign as "Citizen Tippoo." In these republican forms the sultan

cordially concurred, although wholly ignorant of their meaning; imagining them to be the badges of a mystic association, whose members were to devote themselves to his aggrandizement.

These proceedings were fully communicated to the governor-general, who immediately transmitted to the court of directors his decided opinion that they were equivalent to a "public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war," and that "an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultan appeared to be demanded by the soundest maxims both of justice and policy." These conclusions have been generally assented to by British officers and politicians; yet Mr. Mill, with his usual anxiety to escape national partialities, has not hesitated to assert that the above incidents afforded no ground of attacking, or even of dreading, Tippoo, beyond what previously existed. No doubt, it is said, could be entertained, ever since the last peace, of his deep hostility against the English, and his disposition to embrace any opportunity of regaining his lost territories. There was, we admit, the most reasonable presumption of the existence, in his mind, of such sentiments. Well-founded, however, as this suspicion was, the governor had no right to proceed upon it without some overt act; it being something very different from the positive conclusion of a treaty aiming directly at the destruction of the British power in India. It is argued, indeed, that this treaty, having been entered into without any means of fulfilling it, might safely have been regarded as nugatory, and altogether neglected. This reasoning does not seem conclusive, unless there had been some certainty that the sultan could not obtain the means of carrying into effect those hostile schemes in which he had so eagerly engaged. But it is well known that he could depend upon the co-operation of the greatest military power in the world, animated, too, with the most rancorous feeling against Britain, and peculiarly desirous to strike a blow against her in this very quarter. The only security lay in the dominion of the seas, which England had fully established; though experience has shown that no fleet, however triumphant, can hermetically seal the ports of a great country, or even prevent a squadron from finding its way to the most distant regions. This had just been made evident, when the French, in the face of the