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loss was, however, so severe, amounting in his small detachment to 222, including eleven officers, that he suspended his intention of advancing at present upon the capital, and awaited at Dubhoy the termination of the rainy season and the arrival of further reinforcements. This partial success, meanwhile, produced an impression favourable to the English and their ally. Several of the late adherents of the ministry espoused their cause, even the nizam began to waver. The next campaign was therefore expected to open under very promising auspices, when circumstances occurred which gave an entirely new turn to affairs.

The company, who had hitherto left the three presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay separate and independent, were now induced, by the inconveniences which had arisen from this arrangement, to establish one central authority. They vested in the governor-general and council of Calcutta a controlling power over the other two presidencies. The latter, however, were not as yet much inclined to acquiesce; and that of Bombay in particular had, in the late transactions, made very little reference to their new superiors. The supreme council, on being apprized of their proceedings, strongly condemned them, as unjust in themselves, and contrary to the policy inculcated by the company, of avoiding all interference in the internal concerns of Indian states. This step is generally blamed by English politicians, though, as it appears to us, without any good reason. There seems more room to question the propriety of superseding entirely the Bombay government, and sending Colonel Upton direct from Bengal to conclude a fresh treaty. This had certainly the effect of placing the inferior presidency in a degrading situation, and of exposing it to the contempt of the native powers. It has also been observed, that the Hindoo courts interpret every conciliatory wish as a sign of weakness, and immediately rise in their demands. Nana Furnavese, a Bramin minister, who had attained an entire ascendency at Poonah, assumed a lofty tone; and, indeed, as the English continued to demand the cession of Bassein and Salsette, he complained, not without some reason, that after having frankly admitted the unwarrantable ground on which their claim to these places rested, they should still wish to retain possession of them.

In short, the negotiation took so unfavourable a turn, that Colonel Upton announced to the councils both of Calcutta and Bombay, that in all probability it would be immediately broken off. Suddenly, however, the Mahratta minister, seeing that the British authorities were really determined to renew the war, and consequently had in no degree been actuated by fear, yielded almost every point in dispute. A treaty was concluded at Poorundur, by which they obtained the cessions demanded; while a month was fixed as the period within which the army of Ragoba was to be reduced, and their protection entirely withdrawn from him.

Affairs seemed amicably settled, when the wheel of events brought round another remarkable change. The court of directors at home, on being apprized of the arrangement made by the government of Bombay with Ra→ goba, were more swayed by its immediate advantages than by their general principles, and sent out a cordial approba tion of the measure. Their despatch to this effect arrived immediately after the conclusion of the treaty of Poorundur. It was impossible at once to annul so solemn a transaction; but the council at Bombay exulted in an extraordinary de gree over the superior presidency which had so harshly censured their conduct, and became accordingly disposed to find pretexts for placing themselves again in a hostile atti tude towards the administration at Poonah. They by no means withdrew entirely their protection from Ragoba; they even derived encouragement from intrigues carried on to re-establish his influence, which, however, were baffled by the profound political skill of Furnavese. The latter re ceived with great favour a Frenchman named St. Lubin, who appears to have held out to him the expectation of a strong military force from Europe. It was concluded, on the whole, that Nana had shown a hostile disposition; and Mr. Hornby, the Governor of Bombay, entered on the minutes a general review of Mahratta affairs, in which he concluded that they were fast verging to a crisis that would compel the English either to take some active and decisive part, or to relinquish for ever the hopes of improving their own condition in the west of India. Mr. Hastings, too, though he had concurred in the censure on the Bombay government, now began to think that better terms might have been gained by the treaty of Poorundur. He granted

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authority to them "to assist in tranquillizing the dissensions of the Mahratta state;" to promote which object he sent Colonel Leslie with a strong detachment to march across the centre of India from Bengal to the western

coast.

The authorities at Bombay were not only highly elated by the sanction thus given to their schemes, but even adopted the rash resolution of accomplishing them with their own resources, lest the glory should be shared by the troops under Colonel Leslie. In vain did Mr. Draper represent the importance of delay till their forces should be concentrated. Mr. Carnac, who had now the lead in the council, not only carried his point of immediately opening the campaign, but was himself placed at the head of a committee to aid in the direction of military operations. The command, in consequence of the claims of seniority, devolved on Colonel Egerton, whose health was extremely infirm, and who had acquired all his military experience in Germany, so that an Indian war presented a scene altogether new to him. However, a force of 3900 men, of whom only 600 were British, landed at Panwell, and advanced to attack the capital of the Mahratta empire. The march of an army in India, encumbered with baggage, bullocks, and beasts of burden, is always slow; but the tardiness of this movement was altogether unprecedented. In eleven days they had not cleared above eight miles. A week more brought them, on the 9th January, 1779, to the village of Tullygaom, where they found in front an army of about 50,000 men, who began to skirmish in their usual desultory manner. They did not, however, venture on a serious attack; but though nothing had occurred which might not have been foreseen with the utmost certainty, Mr. Carnac and Colonel Cockburn, who, in consequence of Colonel Egerton's sickness, had succeeded to the command, formed the determination, from which nothing could dissuade them, of immediate retreat. Such a step, in the face of a Mahratta host, with their clouds of cavalry, was more perilous than the boldest advance. The English troops had scarcely begun to retrograde when their rearguard was assailed by the whole force of the enemy. For tunately it was commanded by Captain Hartley, a young officer of high rank and rising reputation, who gallantly

withstood several most furious charges; and they were finally unable to make a serious impression on any part of the line. The loss, however, was very severe, amounting to upwards of three hundred, among whom were fifteen European officers.

After this action the military authorities decided that even retreat was no longer practicable, and consequently that there remained no resource but negotiation. This, of course, was equivalent to offering the enemy a carte blanche as to the terms on which the invaders should be allowed to return to Bombay. In vain did Hartley remonstrate against this humiliating step, and point out a course by which the retreat might have been effected; in vain did Carnac advance objections, which, however, he forbore to press; nothing could shake the pusillanimous determination of the commanders. They were even prepared to give up Ragoba, had not that chief made a private agreement to surrender himself to Sindia. The British themselves, by treating with the latter, obtained somewhat more favourable terms: still the convention of Worgaom, if not the most disas trous, was much the most disgraceful event which had marked the annals of our army in India. All the points in dispute were yielded; all the recent acquisitions were to be restored; and orders were sent that the troops now marching upon Bengal should proceed no farther.

Both at Bombay and at home the utmost indignation was felt at this convention. Mr. Carnac, Colonels Egerton and Cockburn, were all three dismissed from the service. Their conduct in the present instance certainly appears quite indefensible, and it is not a little remarkable that it formed a decided contrast to that exhibited by them on former occasions. Cockburn, in particular, had distinguished himself by exploits of the most daring valour, and was considered one of the best officers in the service; but the qualities which had fitted him for a secondary part proved insufficient to guide his judgment in this higher and more arduous station. The treaty was immediately annulled, as having been concluded without sufficient authority, and the arrival of Colonel Leslie with his detach ment was alone waited for in order to commence offensive operations. This officer, however, had not made the des patch which was expected. His march having been

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harassed by some of the Rajpoot chiefs, he absurdly allowed himself to be drawn into petty contests, and in the course of five months had not proceeded above 120 miles. Mr. Hastings was obliged to supersede him, and send in his place Colonel Goddard, who, by passing over three hundred miles in twenty days, reached Surat, and avoided the snares formed by the enemy to interrupt his progress.

This commander, who, though acting on a conciliatory system towards the Bombay government, was invested with jurisdiction nearly independent, began with an attempt to negotiate. This being found impracticable, on account of the lofty tone assumed by the cabinet of Poonah upon its recent success, hostilities were immediately commenced; and the English appeared no longer as auxiliaries to Ragoba, but as principals. On the 1st January, 1780, Colonel, now General, Goddard crossed the Tuptee, and before the end of the month reduced Dubhoy, and carried by storm Ahmedabad, the great but decayed capital of Guzerat. Then, however, he learned that Sindia and Holkar, with upwards of twenty thousand horse, had crossed the Ner budda, and were advancing to attack him. The former chief opened a negotiation with the British, for whom he professed a warm attachment; but, as it was soon perceived that he sought only to gain time, Goddard deter mined, if possible, to bring him to a general action. He attacked his camp by night, and succeeded in surprising some of his outposts; but the day dawned in time to enable the main body to mount their horses and present themselves in order of battle. They even made a movement as if to charge; but, being received with a brisk fire, galloped off, and were soon out of sight; and the English commander, who imagined he had gained a decisive victory, learned that the Mahratta army, quite entire, had taken a fresh position at a little distance. He again endeavoured to bring them to action; but on his near approach they merely discharged a flight of rockets, and disappeared, as before. Wearied with these fruitless and harassing operations, he at length removed his army, and placed it, during the rains, in cantonments on the Nerbudda.

During the next dry season, which commenced in October, 1780, the general employed himself in the siege of Bassein, while Colonel Hartley covered his operations,