102, 270, 271,) prove that his idea of the duties of a Commander were even more cruel than those of Dundee, who never upon any occasion recommended or practised either torture or military devastation. But according to the present enlightened ideas, what is the extremity of cruelty in a Prelatist and Jacobite, is quite proper and necessary in a Whig and Revolutionist.

Dureing this march Keppoch, &c.-p. 242.

Dundee has been repeatedly accused of this act of severity, but the present vindication is entitled to some weight. Even had he authorized it, he would have been no worse than Mackay.

Two hundred of Sir John Maclean's Isleanders, &c.—p. 244.

Vide Mackay's account of this skirmish, pp. 38 and 39, in which he makes the loss of the Highlanders very severe. But whatever may have been the loss on either side, it contributed materially to raise the spirits of the Mountaineers.

Repulsing dragoons on ground where their horses could not act was, after all, no very astonishing feat; but so far from having that unbounded confidence in themselves. that is generally attributed to them, the Highlanders, like all raw troops, felt considerable awe for their disciplined and completely appointed opponents, and were delighted to find that they could meet them upon any terms.

But Locheill, now past the sixtyeth year of his age, &c.—p. 250.

Locheil's opinion upon this subject, and description of the Highland tactics, is extremely curious. Perhaps it may not be uninteresting to contrast it with General Mackay's statement upon the same subject, who describes them as never fighting against regular forces, upon "any thing of equal terms, without a sure retreat at their back, particularly if their ennemies be provided of horse; and to be sure of their escape in case of a repulse, they attack bare-footed, without any cloathing but their shirts and a little Highland dowblet, whereby they are certain to outrun any foot, and will not readily engage where horse can follow the chase any distance. Their way of fighting is to divide themselves by Clans, the Chief or principal man being at their heads, with some distance to distinguish betwixt them. They come on slowly till they be within distance of firing, which, because they keep no rank or file, doth ordinarly little harm. When their fire is over they throw away their firelocks, and every one drawing a long broadsword with his

targe, such as have them, on his left hand, they fall a running toward the ennemy, who, if he stand firm, they never fail of running with much more speed back again to the hills." (Vide p. 51.)

How far the General was correct in his ideas may be gathered from the subsequent conduct of the Highlanders at Sheriffmuir, Prestonpans, Falkirk, and Culloden, all of which battles were fought upon open and level plains, without any hills in the rear of the positions.

But Alexander Mac Donald of Glengarry, &c.-p. 259.

What a contrast is the present character and account of Glengarry to that which is usually given ;--indeed, it would seem that if the gallant and eccentric individuals who are usually denominated the last of the Chiefs, had appeared among their more cool and sagacious progenitors, they would have passed for little better than mountebanks.

Dundee kept the higher ground—p. 265.

This sentence is only to be found in the Cartsburn MS.

Discovered the body of their noble General-p. 269.

The account of Dundee's death here given tends to throw discredit on the authenticity of the letter he is alleged to have written after his wound, and in this the text coincides with the most accurate historians.

Now, if the reader will but reflect-p. 273.

This sentence is likewise only to be found in the Cartsburn MS. Lord Balcarras, however, does not say that Dundee made signs, but that he was in the act of riding to Sir Donald's battalion. But it may be observed, that as the MacDonalds were posted on the extreme left, Dundee, in riding to them, would have exposed his right, not his left side; but there can be no doubt that the fatal shot was received under the left arm. How singular that the MacDonalds here, without the slightest difficulty, took up that very position which, being assigned them at Culloden, was one of the principal causes of the defeat of the Highlanders.

But the death of Gilbert Ramsay-p. 280.

This singular and striking anecdote must, it is believed, rest upon the authority of the text. Ramsay's death seems, however, to have excited some attention, for it is mentioned by Mackay, p. 265, where he says, "both Dundie, Pitcur, one Ramsay, and others, were killed at the first onset."

The gallant Earl of Dunfermline's love for ardent spirits appears not to have diminished during the course of his campaigns. Mackay says, (p. 277,)" Colonell Canan is in no reputation or esteem by them, for he and Dumfermling doe nothing but drink acquavity, as I'm informed."

But notwithstanding of all this-p. 275.

It is commonly supposed that Mackay was Dundee's fortunate competitor upon this occasion. But the account here given is so circumstantial, that it is probably correct.

He was much master in the epistolary way of writing-p. 279.

Possibly the account of the battle of Drumclog, which is the only letter of Dundee's which the Editor has seen, may have been an exception to his usual style. But a more wretched production, both in point of composition and orthography, was never penned.

I have been the more particular, &c.-p. 281.

This is the most circumstantial account of this remarkable engagement which has yet appeared, and seems perfectly well authenticated. From it it appears that the Highland Chiefs were even more uncertain than General Mackay as to the conduct of their troops, only the Highlanders took a different mode of animating their men. Locheil's going to every man in his Clan, and taking his solemn promise either to do his duty or die, may well be opposed to General Mackay's assurance, "that if they kept firm and close they should quickly see their enemys take the hills for refuge." (Vide p. 63.) We question if Donald M'Bane, or any soldier who had previously seen the Highlanders fight, would have received this as a fact, and he totally omitted to give any reason why their adversaries would act in this manner. Indeed, the General admits that when he thus confidently predicted victory, he had not had experience "of their way of nor firmity

in fighting," (vide p. 45,) and that his troops were not well trained or armed to encounter such an adversary, (vide p. 114.)

It also appears that it was solely owing to there not being a sufficient number of Highlanders to attack the whole of Mackay's army, that part of them maintained their ground for a short time. This circumstance has been very differently represented. Mackay gives an explanation which he concludes by saying it was partly owing to their being English, "preferring," he says, "the English commonality in my judgment in matter of courage to the Scots," (vide p. 59.) This is certainly candid, and the General is borne out by the fact, that at no period of their history did the Lowland Scots display so little courage as when fighting for Kirk and Covenant.

It likeways is proper to mention, that an old Highlander, in describing the engagement to Burt, (vide his Letters from the Highlands, vol. ii. p. 226,) says that there was an English regiment which the Highlanders did not care to attack ;-the object of the shrewd old Celt was obviously to underrate the prowess of his countrymen, to render Government less anxious about their conduct.

But the truth is, nothing more thoroughly demonstrates the utter consternation into which both officers and men were thrown, than the fact that such a circumstance should have been reckoned any thing more than a bare and imperfect performance of their duty. Lord Balcarras is much nearer the truth when he says, that had they chosen they might have fallen on the flank of the Highlanders and defeated them. No one can read General Mackay's description of their retreat without seeing that they were quite as unfit to resist an attack as their slaughtered brethren, (vide p. 58.)

Whether this defeat was owing to an unreasonable and unmeaning panic, as is generally alleged, or, as has been occasionally hinted, to the men finding their weapons utterly unfit to encounter the Highlanders in close combat, is a question of no practical importance since the universal disuse of the sword and target in regular armies. But whether modern troops would have fared better may be judged of from the fact, that these cowardly and ill disciplined men (as they are usually called) killed more of their adversaries by three vollies than was ever done by a similar number during the whole of the last war. As to fixing the bayonet, the old bayonet, when fixed, was a much better weapon than the modern, (if there be any correctness in the laws of mechanical action,) and the Highlanders, after receiving the last fire of their opponents, gave their own fire, threw down their musquets, drew their swords and daggers, and adjusted their targets. If the regular forces could not fix their bayonets in that time, what is the use of attempting to train men at all? It is also much to be questioned if any of those columns, which in modern engagements are represented as being driven back so shattered and discomfited by the fire of their opponents, as to be physically unable to close, ever lost, like the Camerons, one half of their number.

The present Memoirs amply prove that the Highlanders themselves attributed their success solely to the superiority of their arms and mode of fighting.

At the battle of the Boyne the victors mustered 36,000 men, and lost about 500. The vanquished amounted to 33,000 men, and lost about 800, in all 69,000 combatants and 1300 killed. (Vide Dublin University Magazine, April 1842, p. 486.)

At Killiecrankie the Highlanders amounted to little more than 1800 men, their loss was 600; the Royal forces to about 3500, their loss 1800. The whole number of combatants being thus 5300, and the total loss 2400. That is, at the Boyne about one man in fifty fell; at Killiecrankie nearly every second man perished. Yet the carnage of the Boyne and the skirmish of Killiecrankie are expressions frequently employed by his

torians.

Donald M'Bane's account of the latter engagement may not be unacceptable to some readers. It is as follows:

"At length our enemy made their appearance on the top of a hill. We then gave a shout, daring them, as it were, to advance, which they quickly did to our great loss. When they advanced we played our cannon for an hour upon them; the sun going down caused the Highlandmen to advance on us like madmen, without shoe or stoking, covering themselves from our fire with their targes; at last they cast away their musquets, drew their broadswords, and advanced furiously upon us, and were in the middle of us Some fled before we could fire three shots a piece, broke us, and obliged us to retreat.

to the water, and some another way, (we were for most part new men ;) I fled to the baggage, and took a horse in order to ride the water; there follows me a Highlandman with sword and targe, in order to take the horse and kill myself. You'd laught to see how he and I scampered about. I kept always the horse betwixt him and me; at length he I went above the Pass, where I met with drew his pistol, and I fled; he fired after me. another water very deep; it was about 18 foot over betwixt two rocks. I resolved to jump it, so I laid down my gun and hat and jumped, and lost one of my shoes in the jump. Many of our men was lost in that water and at the Pass."

Donald, who continued in the army, served in Flanders during the whole of the Duke of Marlborough's wars, and his adventures form the most naive and interesting autobiography of a private soldier that has yet been published, and certainly prove that the British army in those days was in a state of frightful moral degradation. Donald turned a most skilful swordsman, and his love for duels became so great, that he frequently fought four or five in a day.

He wound up his career by defeating, (when at the advanced age of 67,) in single combat, a young Irishman, who was then the champion swordsman of Great Britain. After this, Donald coolly remarks that he will fight no more, but repent of his former wickedness.

The details of this singular rencontre were recovered by the indefatigable Mr Chambers, and appeared in an early number of the Journal, and are here repeated.

"At the time Bane engaged the prize-fighter, alluded to in the last page of his life, it was usual for persons of that description, when expert in the art, to go from place to place bidding defiance to all opponents, and after remaining a certain time, if no one entered the