The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 152
... Column has first move in the original game , that is , chooses his column before Row makes his final choice of row . Originally Row , having second move , had four strategies avail- able . He could pick i no matter what ; he could pick ...
... Column has first move in the original game , that is , chooses his column before Row makes his final choice of row . Originally Row , having second move , had four strategies avail- able . He could pick i no matter what ; he could pick ...
Page 154
... Column is now denoted by three pairs of symbols , such as o - I , I - II , 2 - I , which would mean , " Choose column I if he does not commit himself , column II if he com- mits himself to row 1 , and column I if he commits himself to ...
... Column is now denoted by three pairs of symbols , such as o - I , I - II , 2 - I , which would mean , " Choose column I if he does not commit himself , column II if he com- mits himself to row 1 , and column I if he commits himself to ...
Page 186
... Column to choose I ; no commitment at all leaves Column pre- ferring II ; a threat to choose i unless Column chooses I will be ineffective unless Row promises to abstain from choosing ii . In all of these " pure - strategy " cases , Row ...
... Column to choose I ; no commitment at all leaves Column pre- ferring II ; a threat to choose i unless Column chooses I will be ineffective unless Row promises to abstain from choosing ii . In all of these " pure - strategy " cases , Row ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game