The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 197
... Russians to get out of Hungary or it will work terrible damage on the USSR . The Russians ignore the threat , since there is no persuasive way for the threatening country to make itself have to do anything so suicidal . Alternatively ...
... Russians to get out of Hungary or it will work terrible damage on the USSR . The Russians ignore the threat , since there is no persuasive way for the threatening country to make itself have to do anything so suicidal . Alternatively ...
Page 198
... Russians get out ? The sooner they get out , the sooner the risk of war ( from this cause ) will be terminated or reduced . The country applying the pressure is not saying , " Get out or we shall deliberately start a war . " The ...
... Russians get out ? The sooner they get out , the sooner the risk of war ( from this cause ) will be terminated or reduced . The country applying the pressure is not saying , " Get out or we shall deliberately start a war . " The ...
Page 251
... Russians with inadvertent war . From the foregoing considerations , it is not at all clear that the stability of the balance of terror the lack of temptation to de- liberate surprise attack , and the immunity of the situation to false ...
... Russians with inadvertent war . From the foregoing considerations , it is not at all clear that the stability of the balance of terror the lack of temptation to de- liberate surprise attack , and the immunity of the situation to false ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game