The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 3
... behavior , conscious and unconscious , and to motivations as well as to calculations and those that focus on the more rational , conscious , artful kind of behavior . Crudely speaking , the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest ...
... behavior , conscious and unconscious , and to motivations as well as to calculations and those that focus on the more rational , conscious , artful kind of behavior . Crudely speaking , the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest ...
Page 4
... behavior . If we confine our study to the theory of strategy , we seriously restrict ourselves by the assumption of rational behavior - not just of intelligent behavior , but of behavior motivated by a con- scious calculation of ...
... behavior . If we confine our study to the theory of strategy , we seriously restrict ourselves by the assumption of rational behavior - not just of intelligent behavior , but of behavior motivated by a con- scious calculation of ...
Page 223
... behavior , " a " tacit game , " and a " bargaining game . " DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT ( PARAMETRIC BEHAVIOR ) First we may try supposing that each player takes the prob- ability of being attacked as given , that is , as a parameter and not a ...
... behavior , " a " tacit game , " and a " bargaining game . " DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT ( PARAMETRIC BEHAVIOR ) First we may try supposing that each player takes the prob- ability of being attacked as given , that is , as a parameter and not a ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game