The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 155
... better . Applying this criterion , the first row is dominated by the third , and we strike it out . ( The argument might be that Row can safely eliminate the strategy represented in the first row , since the third is at least as good in ...
... better . Applying this criterion , the first row is dominated by the third , and we strike it out . ( The argument might be that Row can safely eliminate the strategy represented in the first row , since the third is at least as good in ...
Page 164
... better than a purely deductive game theory would predict . And , if they can do better if they can rise above the limitations of a purely formal game theory - even a norma- tive , prescriptive , strategic theory cannot be based on ...
... better than a purely deductive game theory would predict . And , if they can do better if they can rise above the limitations of a purely formal game theory - even a norma- tive , prescriptive , strategic theory cannot be based on ...
Page 214
... better by attacking , no matter what C does . But in this case , as distinct from the case portrayed in Fig . 19 , he is worse off than if neither side had elected to attack . It is C's knowledge of R's dominant strategy that causes ...
... better by attacking , no matter what C does . But in this case , as distinct from the case portrayed in Fig . 19 , he is worse off than if neither side had elected to attack . It is C's knowledge of R's dominant strategy that causes ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game