The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 37
... chance " which recognizes that , in the events that led up to an accident , there was some point at which the accident became inevitable as a result of prior actions , and that the abilities of the two parties to prevent it may not have ...
... chance " which recognizes that , in the events that led up to an accident , there was some point at which the accident became inevitable as a result of prior actions , and that the abilities of the two parties to prevent it may not have ...
Page 97
... chance of guessing a coin . But in the common - interest version they must somehow use the labeling of the stations in order to do better than pure chance ; and how to use it may depend more on imagination than on logic , more on poetry ...
... chance of guessing a coin . But in the common - interest version they must somehow use the labeling of the stations in order to do better than pure chance ; and how to use it may depend more on imagination than on logic , more on poetry ...
Page 183
... chance that the accident will occur before the hitchhiker has a chance to comprehend the threat and comply . In this case , the risk of accidental fulfillment is an integral part of the threat . The only way one can make the threat is ...
... chance that the accident will occur before the hitchhiker has a chance to comprehend the threat and comply . In this case , the risk of accidental fulfillment is an integral part of the threat . The only way one can make the threat is ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game