The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 60
... choose " heads " or " tails " without com- municating . If both choose " heads , " A gets $ 3 and B gets $ 2 ; if both choose " tails , " A gets $ 2 and B gets $ 3 . If they choose differently , neither gets anything . You are A ( or B ) ...
... choose " heads " or " tails " without com- municating . If both choose " heads , " A gets $ 3 and B gets $ 2 ; if both choose " tails , " A gets $ 2 and B gets $ 3 . If they choose differently , neither gets anything . You are A ( or B ) ...
Page 126
... chooses strategy I , forcing Row to choose between payoffs of 1 and o ; Row chooses strategy i , providing Column a payoff of 2. But if we allow Row to make a threat , he declares that he !! S I II I II i i 10 9 1 10 ii ii 8 0 0 0 0 曾 ...
... chooses strategy I , forcing Row to choose between payoffs of 1 and o ; Row chooses strategy i , providing Column a payoff of 2. But if we allow Row to make a threat , he declares that he !! S I II I II i i 10 9 1 10 ii ii 8 0 0 0 0 曾 ...
Page 178
... chooses II knowing that Row will then choose i . Given the threat — and assuming that Row is committed to it and that Column knows it - the choice of II yields unattractive outcomes for both of them , and Column can be expected to choose ...
... chooses II knowing that Row will then choose i . Given the threat — and assuming that Row is committed to it and that Column knows it - the choice of II yields unattractive outcomes for both of them , and Column can be expected to choose ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game