The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 85
... concert their intentions in this fashion , as do the applauding members of a concert audience , who must at some point " agree " on whether to press for an encore or taper off together . If chess is the standard example of a zero - sum ...
... concert their intentions in this fashion , as do the applauding members of a concert audience , who must at some point " agree " on whether to press for an encore or taper off together . If chess is the standard example of a zero - sum ...
Page 113
... concert . One wants to know how everyone else is going to act and whether everyone else will do what he knows he ought to . A test vote in a legislature or some particular simultaneous action among the group , like a mass protest , is ...
... concert . One wants to know how everyone else is going to act and whether everyone else will do what he knows he ought to . A test vote in a legislature or some particular simultaneous action among the group , like a mass protest , is ...
Page 164
... concert on the same picture or suggestion ? The answer to this question can be found only by trying . But , if they can , they can do something that no purely formal game theory can take into account ; they can do better than a purely ...
... concert on the same picture or suggestion ? The answer to this question can be found only by trying . But , if they can , they can do something that no purely formal game theory can take into account ; they can do better than a purely ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game