The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 62
Page 78
... depends - and the Russians know that it depends on how likely we consider it that such retaliation could itself remain limited . That is , it - - depends on how likely it is in our judgment that 78 ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY.
... depends - and the Russians know that it depends on how likely we consider it that such retaliation could itself remain limited . That is , it - - depends on how likely it is in our judgment that 78 ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY.
Page 146
... depends on coordination , the timely de- struction of communication may be a winning tactic . When a man and his wife are arguing by telephone over where to meet for dinner , the argument is won by the wife if she simply an- nounces ...
... depends on coordination , the timely de- struction of communication may be a winning tactic . When a man and his wife are arguing by telephone over where to meet for dinner , the argument is won by the wife if she simply an- nounces ...
Page 157
... depends on his anticipation of the threatener's final choice . The threatener's first choice- to threaten or not — thus depends on what he expects the threat- - Column sees that he needn't reason any further , that Row has a clearly ...
... depends on his anticipation of the threatener's final choice . The threatener's first choice- to threaten or not — thus depends on what he expects the threat- - Column sees that he needn't reason any further , that Row has a clearly ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game