The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 5
... gains and losses between two claimants but with the possibility that particular outcomes are worse ( better ) for both ... gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make ...
... gains and losses between two claimants but with the possibility that particular outcomes are worse ( better ) for both ... gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make ...
Page 46
... gain depends on the choices of both . Each of the four possible combined choices , AB , Aß , aB , or aß , yields a particular gain or loss for North and a par- ticular gain or loss for East . No compensation is payable between North and ...
... gain depends on the choices of both . Each of the four possible combined choices , AB , Aß , aB , or aß , yields a particular gain or loss for North and a par- ticular gain or loss for East . No compensation is payable between North and ...
Page 215
... gain zero , when they might have had more if they could have abstained . Suppose , now , that the probability of achieving surprise , and thereby winning , is only Q , so that the expected value to be achieved through unilateral attack ...
... gain zero , when they might have had more if they could have abstained . Suppose , now , that the probability of achieving surprise , and thereby winning , is only Q , so that the expected value to be achieved through unilateral attack ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game