The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 89
... involved in wars , strikes , negotiations , and so forth , requires a more ambivalent term . In the rest of this book I shall refer to the mixed game as a bargaining game or mixed - motive game , since these terms seem to catch the ...
... involved in wars , strikes , negotiations , and so forth , requires a more ambivalent term . In the rest of this book I shall refer to the mixed game as a bargaining game or mixed - motive game , since these terms seem to catch the ...
Page 164
... involved in " taking a hint " ; it is an empirical question whether rational players , either jointly or individually , can actu- ally do better than a purely formal game theory predicts and should consequently ignore the strategic ...
... involved in " taking a hint " ; it is an empirical question whether rational players , either jointly or individually , can actu- ally do better than a purely formal game theory predicts and should consequently ignore the strategic ...
Page 201
... involved in or near a neutral country with troops or other commitments that we are not altogether sure our- selves about whether we could evade a fight in case of invasion , may genuinely keep the enemy guessing . In sum , it may make ...
... involved in or near a neutral country with troops or other commitments that we are not altogether sure our- selves about whether we could evade a fight in case of invasion , may genuinely keep the enemy guessing . In sum , it may make ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game