The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 3
... kind of behavior . Crudely speaking , the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest , in which the participants are trying to " win . " A study of conscious , intelli- gent , sophisticated conflict behavior of successful behavior- is ...
... kind of behavior . Crudely speaking , the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest , in which the participants are trying to " win . " A study of conscious , intelli- gent , sophisticated conflict behavior of successful behavior- is ...
Page 57
... kind of game - provide some clue for coordi- nating behavior , some focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do . Finding the key , or rather finding a key -any key that is ...
... kind of game - provide some clue for coordi- nating behavior , some focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do . Finding the key , or rather finding a key -any key that is ...
Page 68
... kind of resignation of both participants . " Fact - finding " reports may also tend to draw expectations to a focus , by providing a suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy that otherwise exists : it is not the facts themselves ...
... kind of resignation of both participants . " Fact - finding " reports may also tend to draw expectations to a focus , by providing a suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy that otherwise exists : it is not the facts themselves ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game