The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 53
Thomas C. Schelling. 3 BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , AND LIMITED WAR Limited war requires limits ; so do strategic maneuvers if they are to be stabilized short of war . But limits require agreement or at least some kind of mutual ...
Thomas C. Schelling. 3 BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , AND LIMITED WAR Limited war requires limits ; so do strategic maneuvers if they are to be stabilized short of war . But limits require agreement or at least some kind of mutual ...
Page 191
... limited war and the context in which it Occurs . Why would one threaten limited war rather than all - out war to deter an attack ? First , to threaten limited war- according to this analysis — is to threaten a risk of general war , not ...
... limited war and the context in which it Occurs . Why would one threaten limited war rather than all - out war to deter an attack ? First , to threaten limited war- according to this analysis — is to threaten a risk of general war , not ...
Page 257
... limited war . It has , of course , been argued that there are political disadvantages in our using nuclear weapons in limited war , particularly in our using them first . Even those who consider a nuclear fireball as moral as napalm for ...
... limited war . It has , of course , been argued that there are political disadvantages in our using nuclear weapons in limited war , particularly in our using them first . Even those who consider a nuclear fireball as moral as napalm for ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game