The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 30
... Negotiations . If a union is simultaneously engaged , or will shortly be engaged , in many negotiations while the ... negotiation , or the wage figure replaced by fringe benefits that cannot be reduced to a wage equivalent , an " out ...
... Negotiations . If a union is simultaneously engaged , or will shortly be engaged , in many negotiations while the ... negotiation , or the wage figure replaced by fringe benefits that cannot be reduced to a wage equivalent , an " out ...
Page 33
... Negotiation . A number of other characteristics deserve mention , although we shall not work out their implica- tions . Is there a penalty on the conveyance of false information ? Is there a penalty on called bluffs , that is , can one ...
... Negotiation . A number of other characteristics deserve mention , although we shall not work out their implica- tions . Is there a penalty on the conveyance of false information ? Is there a penalty on called bluffs , that is , can one ...
Page 79
... negotiation make prior discussion impossible , there is still a useful idea that emerges from one of our earlier games . It is that negotiation or communication for the purpose of coordinating expectations need not be reciprocal ...
... negotiation make prior discussion impossible , there is still a useful idea that emerges from one of our earlier games . It is that negotiation or communication for the purpose of coordinating expectations need not be reciprocal ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game