The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 26
... offer accompanied by this invoca- tion is a final offer , and is so recognized . If each party knows the other's true reservation price , the object is to be first with a firm offer . Complete responsibility for the outcome then rests ...
... offer accompanied by this invoca- tion is a final offer , and is so recognized . If each party knows the other's true reservation price , the object is to be first with a firm offer . Complete responsibility for the outcome then rests ...
Page 270
... offer . ( For simplicity again , let us suppose that the same operation either makes an offer or changes it , so that we may always assume that a " current offer " exists . ) There must then be some critical moment in time , a finite ...
... offer . ( For simplicity again , let us suppose that the same operation either makes an offer or changes it , so that we may always assume that a " current offer " exists . ) There must then be some critical moment in time , a finite ...
Page 274
... offer and ( in contrast to the earlier version ) that the process of recording a new offer , once started , cannot be stopped before it is completed . Under this procedure , any offer in- itiated during the next to last minute of the ...
... offer and ( in contrast to the earlier version ) that the process of recording a new offer , once started , cannot be stopped before it is completed . Under this procedure , any offer in- itiated during the next to last minute of the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game