The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 18
... one's agents and partners . In principle , one might evade extortion equally well by drugging his brain ... one's own actions or of one's own assets . Mossadeq and my small children have already been referred to ; but the same tactic is ...
... one's agents and partners . In principle , one might evade extortion equally well by drugging his brain ... one's own actions or of one's own assets . Mossadeq and my small children have already been referred to ; but the same tactic is ...
Page 102
... one's immediate adversary , and the intellectual challenge and bilateral com- petition motivate the player toward the correct ( and only ) type of winning . But for a mixed - motive game , " winning " must be made to involve one's abso ...
... one's immediate adversary , and the intellectual challenge and bilateral com- petition motivate the player toward the correct ( and only ) type of winning . But for a mixed - motive game , " winning " must be made to involve one's abso ...
Page 160
... one's self will behave . One constrains the partner's choice by constraining one's own behavior . The object is to set up for one's self and communicate persuasively to the other player a mode of behavior ( including conditional ...
... one's self will behave . One constrains the partner's choice by constraining one's own behavior . The object is to set up for one's self and communicate persuasively to the other player a mode of behavior ( including conditional ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game