The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 45
... other's prudence ( or the other's confidence in the first's prudence , and so forth ) on a large issue . But , if a number of preparatory bar- gains can be struck on a small scale , each may be willing to risk a small investment to ...
... other's prudence ( or the other's confidence in the first's prudence , and so forth ) on a large issue . But , if a number of preparatory bar- gains can be struck on a small scale , each may be willing to risk a small investment to ...
Page 115
... other's preferences . To assume that either knows the " true " payoff matrix of the other is often to make an ... other's welfare , as when husband and wife discuss whether or not to go to a movie , each wanting to do whatever the other ...
... other's preferences . To assume that either knows the " true " payoff matrix of the other is often to make an ... other's welfare , as when husband and wife discuss whether or not to go to a movie , each wanting to do whatever the other ...
Page 274
... other player before the expiration of the minute , the game is essentially the same as before ; " simultaneous " now means within a minute of each other for practical purposes , and again neither can see the other's final offer as he ...
... other player before the expiration of the minute , the game is essentially the same as before ; " simultaneous " now means within a minute of each other for practical purposes , and again neither can see the other's final offer as he ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game