The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 154
... payoff in that upper - left cell , which is 2. ( B ) If , instead , Row commits himself to row ii ( subtracts 5 from his payoff in row i ) , Column chooses II in preference to I ; and Row knows he will get 5. Finally , ( C ) if Row ...
... payoff in that upper - left cell , which is 2. ( B ) If , instead , Row commits himself to row ii ( subtracts 5 from his payoff in row i ) , Column chooses II in preference to I ; and Row knows he will get 5. Finally , ( C ) if Row ...
Page 180
... payoffs for the two players separately , no violence is done by adopting , for each player , a scale of measurement that sets his preferred payoff equal to +1 and his next preferred payoff to o . The full in- terpretation , then , of ...
... payoffs for the two players separately , no violence is done by adopting , for each player , a scale of measurement that sets his preferred payoff equal to +1 and his next preferred payoff to o . The full in- terpretation , then , of ...
Page 185
... payoff matrix ( Fig . 1 ) can be used to illustrate this situation if we change the rules of the game to permit Row ... payoff in the lower left cell differs from zero , say 0.5 or 0.5 , the for- mula for optimum value of differs ...
... payoff matrix ( Fig . 1 ) can be used to illustrate this situation if we change the rules of the game to permit Row ... payoff in the lower left cell differs from zero , say 0.5 or 0.5 , the for- mula for optimum value of differs ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game