The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 28
... position constrained by law , and it is evident that Congress will not be reconvened to change the law within the necessary time period , then the executive branch has a firm position that is visible to its negotiating partners . When ...
... position constrained by law , and it is evident that Congress will not be reconvened to change the law within the necessary time period , then the executive branch has a firm position that is visible to its negotiating partners . When ...
Page 30
... position and an effort to make the eventual outcome in- , commensurable with the initial positions . If the subjects under negotiation can be enlarged in the process of negotiation , or the wage figure replaced by fringe benefits that ...
... position and an effort to make the eventual outcome in- , commensurable with the initial positions . If the subjects under negotiation can be enlarged in the process of negotiation , or the wage figure replaced by fringe benefits that ...
Page 35
... position , and that if he does there are no grounds for believing it to reflect on his original principles . One must seek , in other words , a rationalization by which to deny oneself too great a reward from the opponent's concession ...
... position , and that if he does there are no grounds for believing it to reflect on his original principles . One must seek , in other words , a rationalization by which to deny oneself too great a reward from the opponent's concession ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game