The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 10
... present deficiencies are not in the mathematics , and that the theory of strategy has suffered from too great a willingness of social scientists to treat the subject as though it were , or should be , solely a branch of mathematics ...
... present deficiencies are not in the mathematics , and that the theory of strategy has suffered from too great a willingness of social scientists to treat the subject as though it were , or should be , solely a branch of mathematics ...
Page 271
... presents a model that is explicitly tacit in its final stage . The model's relation to the cooperative game was heuristic ... present paper is that the relation is likely to be mechanical rather than intellectual if a symmetrical move ...
... presents a model that is explicitly tacit in its final stage . The model's relation to the cooperative game was heuristic ... present paper is that the relation is likely to be mechanical rather than intellectual if a symmetrical move ...
Page 288
... present frame of mind we ought to take the Nash point . Finally , consider another variant . We are shown the diagram of the game that has just been played and told that we are now to be perfect partners , winning and losing together ...
... present frame of mind we ought to take the Nash point . Finally , consider another variant . We are shown the diagram of the game that has just been played and told that we are now to be perfect partners , winning and losing together ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game