The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 164
... question whether two people , look- ing at the same ink blot , can identify the same picture or sug- gestion in it if each is trying and knows that the other is trying to concert on the same picture or suggestion ? The answer to this ...
... question whether two people , look- ing at the same ink blot , can identify the same picture or sug- gestion in it if each is trying and knows that the other is trying to concert on the same picture or suggestion ? The answer to this ...
Page 165
... question whether players can do better than that . How well one can take a hint and what kinds of hints are most successful are empirical questions of social per- ception , probably amenable to experimental study . ( The same problem ...
... question whether players can do better than that . How well one can take a hint and what kinds of hints are most successful are empirical questions of social per- ception , probably amenable to experimental study . ( The same problem ...
Page 286
... question is whether players who are both rational and imaginative are quite as impotent as Luce and Raiffa insist . Can players corre- late strategies without communicating ? This an empirical question ; the ex- periments of Chapter 3 ...
... question is whether players who are both rational and imaginative are quite as impotent as Luce and Raiffa insist . Can players corre- late strategies without communicating ? This an empirical question ; the ex- periments of Chapter 3 ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game