The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 182
... reduce a threat by reducing the probability of its fulfillment reduces the expected value of the outcome proportionately for both players , while a П direct reduction in size might not be restricted to proportionate 182 STRATEGY WITH A ...
... reduce a threat by reducing the probability of its fulfillment reduces the expected value of the outcome proportionately for both players , while a П direct reduction in size might not be restricted to proportionate 182 STRATEGY WITH A ...
Page 231
... reduce or to eliminate the advantage of striking first . It must assume that if the advantage of striking first can be elimi- nated or severely reduced , the incentive to strike at all will be re- duced . 1 The New York Times , December ...
... reduce or to eliminate the advantage of striking first . It must assume that if the advantage of striking first can be elimi- nated or severely reduced , the incentive to strike at all will be re- duced . 1 The New York Times , December ...
Page 242
... reducing the num- ber of aircraft that might be needed in a surprise attack , with missiles promising to reduce the total time available between the initial actions in readying a strike and the explosion of weapons on target , and with ...
... reducing the num- ber of aircraft that might be needed in a surprise attack , with missiles promising to reduce the total time available between the initial actions in readying a strike and the explosion of weapons on target , and with ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game