The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 91
... rules of etiquette and social restraint , including some ( like the rule against ending a sentence with a preposition ) that have been divested of their relevance or authority , seems to depend on their having become " solutions " to a ...
... rules of etiquette and social restraint , including some ( like the rule against ending a sentence with a preposition ) that have been divested of their relevance or authority , seems to depend on their having become " solutions " to a ...
Page 268
... rule for its own termination , let us look at the rules for termination first.1 If we are to avoid adding a whole new dimension to our payoff matrix , in the form of discount rates , we must suppose that the game is terminated soon ...
... rule for its own termination , let us look at the rules for termination first.1 If we are to avoid adding a whole new dimension to our payoff matrix , in the form of discount rates , we must suppose that the game is terminated soon ...
Page 283
... rule of elimination that leads to an unambiguous choice or a high probability of concerted choice . And one of these rules , or clues , or suggestions , is mathematical symmetry.18 16 The basic intellectual premise , or working ...
... rule of elimination that leads to an unambiguous choice or a high probability of concerted choice . And one of these rules , or clues , or suggestions , is mathematical symmetry.18 16 The basic intellectual premise , or working ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game