The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 122
... structure of the game and the ability of the player to find a way to commit himself , to " enforce " the commitment against himself . Furthermore , we have allowed the move structure of the game to be asymmetrical ; the " winner " is ...
... structure of the game and the ability of the player to find a way to commit himself , to " enforce " the commitment against himself . Furthermore , we have allowed the move structure of the game to be asymmetrical ; the " winner " is ...
Page 162
... structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis . A second one , somewhat more general , is that there is a danger in too much abstractness : we change the character of the game when we dras- tically ...
... structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis . A second one , somewhat more general , is that there is a danger in too much abstractness : we change the character of the game when we dras- tically ...
Page 268
... structure is . Harsanyi , to emphasize this , has even added explicitly the postulate of symmetrical moves : " The bargaining parties follow identical ( symmetric ) rules of behaviour ( whether because they follow the same principles of ...
... structure is . Harsanyi , to emphasize this , has even added explicitly the postulate of symmetrical moves : " The bargaining parties follow identical ( symmetric ) rules of behaviour ( whether because they follow the same principles of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game