The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 28
Page 66
... suppose that the master - of - ceremonies in that problem considered the first offer already to have spoiled the game and thought he might confuse the players by announcing the reversal of their prize schedules . A will get whatever ...
... suppose that the master - of - ceremonies in that problem considered the first offer already to have spoiled the game and thought he might confuse the players by announcing the reversal of their prize schedules . A will get whatever ...
Page 198
... suppose an armored column were sent to Berlin in the event that ground access were denied , or suppose , once a transport squeeze on Berlin became intolerable , troops were sent in to claim and hold a corridor ; suppose actions were ...
... suppose an armored column were sent to Berlin in the event that ground access were denied , or suppose , once a transport squeeze on Berlin became intolerable , troops were sent in to claim and hold a corridor ; suppose actions were ...
Page 215
... Suppose the value of " winning " a war , denoted by h , may exceed 1 ; if it does , and if it is always a winning strategy to attack when the other does not , both players have dominant strategies at " attack . " They both gain zero ...
... Suppose the value of " winning " a war , denoted by h , may exceed 1 ; if it does , and if it is always a winning strategy to attack when the other does not , both players have dominant strategies at " attack . " They both gain zero ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuver mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game