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tions are more potent; they carry faith into a boundless sphere; plunging into the infinite, their object is never limited by their own bounds; they find sea-room in that shoreless ocean in which their peculiarities fit them to operate. These convictions are the loftiest prerogatives and the transcendent glories of the human intellect.

But, in addition to these primary faculties, we have there productive powers of memory and imagination, and likewise the comparing faculty by which judgments are formed. Primitive judgments are based on the relations of intuitive objects. Thus, in comparing the nature of duration with that of space, we judge the latter has three dimensions, and duration only one of simple continuance. But we have hinted at the functions of judgment with the single aim of distinguishing between the knowledge thus acquired and that of intuition. Judgment by comparison elicits other ideas from those before obtained, but has no power to originate them. What is not known previously to judging can never be matters of judgment. As the intuitions would be valueless alone, so judgment would be useless without them. When the intellectual process is legitimate, the certainty of the intuitions is transferred to the conclusion. The reality of the one secures the reality of the other.

Were time and space mere mental forms, so must be all their relations unfolded by mathematics; so must be all bodies in space, all events in time, all mental and all material substances. The presence of a complex object is proof that the mind has advanced beyond its primary intuition. Thus the impossibility of two parallel straight lines inclosing space is intuitively perceived; but that this is true in all like cases is reached by another step. The necessity that a given event must have a cause is intuitively seen ; but that this is true of all events the mind perceives at a stage beyond intuition. This latter is a generalization based not on external experience, which must ever be partial, but based on the inward laws of mind, to which universal necessity ever attaches itself.

The distinction cannot be too carefully made between what takes place in intuition and what occurs at other stages of the intellect. Let it be illustrated by the difference between selfconsciousness and personal identity. That is purely intuitive; this involves the additional exercise of memory. The past self

and the present self are made one self by this twofold exercise, But the identity of nothing beyond self can be certified by this process. Nothing else lies so perfectly within the range of consciousness. What is unconscious may pass unobserved changes, and retain the same form. This is true of one's own organism; the identity of this is only apparent. The body being unconscious, may pass the changes of waste and repair without one's notice. The certainty of its being bears the evidence of intuition; but for its identity is demanded very different evidence. One's personality being exclusive of his body, he may dwell in it, or in another, or out of either, without impairing his identity. Since the first moment of memory there is a real identity of mind; otherwise self-consciousness, with the aid of this recalling faculty, could not fail to detect the mutation. But the range of experimental facts lying out of the sphere of intuitive knowledge, errors may occur there, but not here.

There is palpably an error in the statements that no mammal is warm-blooded, and therefore no warm-blooded animal is a mammal. But where does the error lie? Not in the law of thought, for that inferred correctly, but in the alleged fact of the premises. This is an error of experience; that is an intuitive axiom. In the one we mistake, in the other never. Thus the unmistakable certainty with which individuals are intuitively apprehended is no indemnity against error in arranging them into classes. Without individuals we could have no universals, any more than we could have thousands without units. But the certainty of the former may or may not transfer itself to the latter.

The causal judgment is a fact in all mental history; the denial of power as the mind's primary apprehension leaves this judgment unaccounted for. The reality of this conviction alone can account for what a new event forces upon us. Numerous reasons combine to deny this causal judgment to experience, and refer it to an ever-operative law of mind. The period of life at which it arises is too early for it to originate in experience. Its universality admits not of such a source; its necessity makes it impossible that its source should be experimental. The slightest introspection will convince us that no uniformity in the order of the succession of events through the longest duration will create the conviction of their necessity. The demand for a cause on the occurrence of an event then springs up out of the depths of our being in all the power of a primary conviction. But this is true of cause only in its simplest state; not that its effects are seen in the cause, or that the agency is detected which energizes in the cause; only that an adequate cause is an absolute necessity. The disclosure of its hidden energies, the a priori knowledge of its future operations, is the prerogative of no intuition of the mind.

Cause operates in space, and time in its production of all external events. But space and time are neither causal nor dependent on cause. As they are never causal, or dependent on an antecedent cause, they form a class alone. This immutability, belonging to the principles of the intellect, precludes all radical change from the moral faculties.

The office of the intellect is to discover moral qualities, not to originate them; not to evoke them from its own depths and attach them to objects, but to discriminate them in the very nature of moral acts. A moral act is not good because the mind approves it, but the mind approves of it because it finds it to be good. This correspondence, resting on the nature of

. the object and on the constitution of the mind, must remain changeless as they through all states of being and periods of duration. A want of this uniformity in the standard of moral good would shatter the foundation of virtue, betray the rights of conscience, and obscure the perfections of Jehovah. The opposing theory, which makes right a mere feeling, might find all the virtue among men in the mere temperament of the race. Though the discovery of the right is ever attended with an impulse in that direction, the connection of that impulse with that intellection places it above the sphere of fitful emotions. The moral intuitions, like the intellectual, stir the mental law to ascend to a moral governor. Thus are we carried irresistibly to the character of our SUPREME AUTHOR.

Our author advances from these primary intuitions to what is indirectly revealed by them. Scientific knowledge can no more be acquired by intuition than without intuition. Its elements consist in such intuitions, but they must be arranged and generalized to constitute science. The utmost confusion ensues by the failure to distinguish between what is known at a glance and what is reached by classification and deduction.

We have adverted to another important distinction on which our author insists, between truth founded on experience and that based on the laws of thought. Thus the result of a thousand experiments is that about one fifth of our atmosphere is of oxygen; but this experimental knowledge may apply to no other globe in the universe. But when we contemplate two parallel straight lines produced a single rod without the possibility of inclosing space, we know the same impossibility would exist were they protruded through boundless space. This suggests the peculiar character of our necessary beliefs, as stretching beyond both our notions and cognitions of objects. We can never determine that our ideas must be commensurate with the objects they apprehend; these are extended, those are not. The object may be infinite; the thought grasping it is finite. Let any mind, by reflex action, attempt to fix limits to this object, and its uniform experience will be failure.

The principles, then, on which Dr. M'Cosh has proceeded in this discussion should not escape us. They may be recalled in the few following sentences :

1. They recognize but two sources of our primary knowledge of single objects, namely, that of sense-perception, and that of self-consciousness. In the former the mind operates through the five senses; in the latter in thinking, feeling, and willing.

2. In thought we distinguish the qualities and relations of those concrete objects, as time concreted with an event, space with a body, and cause with an effect.

3. The mind is constructed to analyze and synthetize, by which it reaches the loftiest generalizations of universal and necessary truth.

4. Experimental knowledge, being necessarily partial, can never have the qualities of necessity and universality. Thus the positive poles of magnets mutually repel, but it may not be so on another planet. But in all worlds every quality requires a substance, and all sin is of ill desert.

5. That the mind cannot employ intuitive convictions in science only by the associated exercise of the logical understanding.

Most pleasant should we find it to dismiss our anthor with these commendations, but paramount regard for truth compels us to advert in a different tone to another portion of his work. Had his book exhibited throughout the sifting analyses which are striking in most parts of it, the following paragraph would make no part of this review.

Of that most troublesome word CAUSE, he has made the loosest application, though the sharpest definition of it was demanded in so critical a discussion. No other word has more entangled thought. It has been used in the sense of efficient cause, material cause, formal cause, and final cause. Indeed, our author's use of it claims still greater license, as he substituted cause and effect for substance and quality. When these are interchangeably used or tumbled together the confusion is complete, and a lurking-place is provided for atheism. When efficient cause, that mightiest attribute of mind, is made to invest matter, how is any radical distinction possible between the made and the Maker ? May not pantheism be right in dispensing with a personal Deity? If causal power belongs to nature, then her operation cannot be a swift witness of her living Author, but a usurper of his throne.

But our author's mistake is not restricted to his terminology. He both verbally and really ascribes power to material substance. (pp. 263–277.) “Every effect,” says he,“ proceeds from one or more substances having potency.” That potency is here used

" in the sense of efficient cause, it is impossible to doubt, as it is added. “If this world be an effect, we look for its cause in a being possessing power.”

The “potency,” therefore, ascribed to matter answers to the power” which invests the Creator. The idea is the very same whenever he substitutes cause and effect for substance and quality.

What can involve more utter confusion than thus to confound the inert mass with the spirit-mind? “the clod with omnipotence.” There is doubtless a viewless agency at work in nature, operating by uniform rules. One of its modes is the order according to which mechanical and chemical elements are arranged. Another develops itself in the arrangement of matter in geometrical forms, a third in converting other matter into plants. Another order is observed in changing vegetable substance into animal organs. But what has this manitold process to do with the power which carries it on! Each ut these changes is as utterly apart from power in its subject

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