BOOK IV.

That this was a practice, presenting the strongest

CHAP. 5. demand for effectual regulation, its obvious conse1765. quences render manifest and indisputable. In the first place, it laid the nabobs, rulers, and other leading men of the country, under endless and unlimited oppression; because, so long as they on whom their whole power and influence depended were pleased to desire presents, nothing could be withheld which they either possessed, or had it in their power to ravage and extort. That the temptations under which the servants of the Company were placed carried them to those heights of exaction which were within their reach, is far from true. They showed, on the contrary, a reserve and forbearance, which the education received in no other country, probably in the world, except their own, could have enabled men, in their extraordinary circumstances, to maintain. Besides the oppression upon the people of the country, to which the receiving of presents prepared the way, this dangerous practice laid the foundation of perpetual perfidy in the servants of the Company to the interests of their employers. Not those plans of policy which were calculated to produce the happiest results to the Company, but those which were calculated to multiply the occasions for presents, and render them most effectual, were the plans recommended by the strongest motives of interest to the agents and representatives of the Company in India. It is still less true, in the case of perfidy to the Company, than in the case of oppression to the natives, that the interests of the Company's servants were to the greatest practicable extent pursued. There seems not, upon the most jealous scrutiny, any reason to believe that any one of the greatest transactions, or revolutions, in which the English, up to this period, were instrumental, was not sincerely regarded

of the Servants forbidden.

331

CHAP. 5.

1765.

at the time, by the men on whom the decision de- BOOK IV. pended, as required by the interests of their employers and country; nor has it yet been certainly made appear, that in any of the instances in question, the circumstances of the moment admitted of a better decision.

The Company now resolved that the benefit of presents should at any rate change masters: And they ordained and commanded, that new covenants, dated May, 1764, should be executed by all their servants, both civil and military, binding them to pay to the Company the amount of all presents and gratuities in whatsoever shape, received from the natives, in case the amount exceeded four thousand rupees; and not to accept any present or gratuity, though not exceeding four thousand rupees, if amounting to so much as one thousand, without the consent of the President and Council. An unbounded power was still reserved by the Honourable Company for receiving or extorting presents in benefit to themselves. But as their servants were in no danger of being so rapacious for their masters' emolument, as their own, any effects which this regulation was calculated to produce were all naturally good.

With these powers and regulations Lord Clive (such was now the rank and title of this AngloIndian chief) sailed from England on the 4th of June 1764, and arrived at Madras on the 10th of April, 1765; where he received intelligence that the dangers of which the alarm had sent him to India were entirely removed; that the troops were obedient; that not only Meer Causim was expelled, but all his supporters subdued; that the Emperor had cast himself upon the protection of the English; and that the Nabob Meer Jaffier was dead. His sentiments upon

1765.

BOOK IV. this intelligence were communicated in a private CHAP. 5. letter to Mr. Rous, dated seven days exactly after his arrival; "We have at last," said he, " arrived at that critical period, which I have long foreseen; 1 mean that period which renders it necessary for us to determine, whether we can or shall take the whole to ourselves. Jaffier Ally Khan is dead, and his natural son is a minor; but I know not whether he is yet declared successor. Sujah Dowla is beat from his dominion; we are in possession of it, and it is scarcely hyperbole to say, To-morrow the whole Mogul empire is in our power. The inhabitants of the country, we know by long experience, have no attachment to any obligation. Their forces are neither disciplined, commanded, nor paid as ours are. Can it then be doubted that a large army of Europeans will effectually preserve us sovereigns; not only holding in awe the attempts of any country Prince, but by rendering us so truly formidable that no French, Dutch, or other enemy, will presume to molest us. You will, I am sure, imagine with me, that after the length we have run, the Princes of Indostan must conclude our views to be boundless; they have such instances of our ambition, that they cannot suppose us capable of moderation. The very Nabobs whom we might support would be either covetous of our possessions, or jealous of our power. Ambition, fear, avarice, would be daily watching to destroy us: a victory would be but a temporary relief to us; for the dethroning of the first Nabob would be followed by setting up another, who, from the same principles, would, when his treasure admitted of his keeping up an army, pursue the very path of his predecessor. We must indeed become Nabobs ourselves, in fact, if not in name;-perhaps totally so without disguise, but on this subject I can

for the Company, and for himself.

333

1765.

not be certain until my arrival in Bengal." With BOOK IV.
these views of the bold and splendid measures which CHAP. 5.
it was now the time to pursue; and anticipating the
important effects which those dazzling transactions
would have on the price of the Company's Stock,
this great man forgot not to deliberate how they
might be directed to bear upon his own pecuniary
interests. He wrote on the very same day to his
private agent in London, as follows; "I have desired
Mr. Rous to furnish you with a copy of my letter to
him of this day's date, likewise with the cypher, that
you may be enabled to understand what follows:
'The contents are of great importance, that I would
not have them transpire. Whatever money I have
in the public Funds, or any where else, and as much
as can be borrowed in my name, I desire may be,
without loss of a minute, invested in East India
Stock. You will speak to my Attorneys on this
point. Let them know I am anxious to have my
morey so disposed of; and press them to hasten the
affair as much as possible.'" The letter to Mr.
period which inter-

Rous, and the shortness of the
vened between the arrival of Lord Clive in Bengal
and his assuming the duanee or revenues, would
leave no doubt that he commanded all the money
which he possessed, or which he could borrow, to be
invested in India Stock, in contemplation of the rise
of price which that measure was calculated to pro-
duce; had he not, when examined on the subject of
this letter by the Committee of the House of Com-
mons, declared absolutely, "that he had not while
at Madras formed the resolution to seize the du-
anee."

Extracts of both Letters are given in the Appendix, No. lxxxii. and ixxxiii. of the Third Report of the Committee, 1772.

1763.

CHAP. VI.

Political state of Carnatic-Views of the Nabob on Governor of Velore, King of Tanjore, and Marawars-Treaty with Tanjore-Company's Jaghire-War on Mahomed Issoof-Mound of the Cavery.

BOOK IV. BY the final overthrow of the French in Carnac, the CHAP. 6. British in that part of India had accomplished an object far greater than any to which, at the beginning of the contest, they had even elevated their hopes. To see Carnatic under the Government of a chief, who should have obligations to them for his elevation, and from whose gratitude they might expect privileges and favour, was the alluring prospect which had carried them into action. They not only now beheld the man, whose interests they had espoused, in possession of the government of the country, but they beheld him dependent upon themselves, and the whole kingdom of Carnatic subject to their absolute will.

It was the grand object of deliberation, and the grand practical difficulty, to settle in what proportion the powers and advantages should be divided between the nominal sovereign and the real one. Clear, complete, well-defined, and unambiguous regulations, are naturally employed for the prevention of discordance, when the parties have wisdom, and are free from clandestine views. On the present occasion, according to the slovenly mode in which the business of government is usually transacted, few things were re