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that if goods are sold abroad to be delivered in England, where they are prohibited, the contract is void, and the buyer shall not be liable to an action for the price, because it would be an inconvenience and prejudice to the state if such an action could be maintained.” And accordingly, in a subsequent case of Biggs v. Laurence, (y) the defendant, who lived in Cornwall, sent an order to one of the plaintiffs, residing in Guernsey, who was a partner with three other plaintiffs, all living in England, for some brandy, which he directed to be delivered to the captain of a smuggling vessel, and some of the brandy was delivered at Guernsey, and the rest at sea; the whole being put by the partner at Guernsey into half-ankers, and ready slung for the purpose of smuggling, but it was brought into England at the risk of the defendant : the Court eld that the action could not be supported.
So, where prohibited drugs were sold knowingly to be used in brewing, such sale was declared void : thus, in the case of Langton v. Hughes, (z) which was an action for goods sold and delivered by a druggist to a brewer, the seller knowing at the time of the sale that they were to be used in the brewery. The goods consisted of Spanish juice, isinglass, ginger, and other articles, the use of which by brewers is contrary to the provisions of 42 Geo. 3. c. 38., by which they are prohibited from using any thing but malt and hops in the brewing of beer. The Court held that the action could not be sustained.
10. TRADING TO THE East Indies.] — By the stat. 7 Geo. 1. c. 21. s. 2., “ All contracts made by His Majesty's subjects for loading any ship in the service of foreigners with a cargo to trade to the East Indies, are declared void.” And therefore, to an action of debt on a bond, the defendant pleaded that it had been unlawfully agreed between the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the plaintiffs should sell and deliver to the defendant certain goods, to be shipped by the defendant in Lon. don, to be carried to Ostend, and there to be shipped on board other vessels to the East Indies. The Court determined, that the plaintiffs must be deemed principals in the transaction, and that the case was directly within the act of parliament. (a)
11. FORESTALLING, REGRATING, &c.] - Forestalling, regrating, and engrossing are treated by the law as offences against public trade, and are on that account illegal. Forestalling is described in the stat. 5 & 6 Edw. 6. c. 14., to be the buying or contracting for any merchandize or victual coming in the way to market, or dissuading persons from bringing their goods or provisions there, or persuading them to enhance the prices there; regrating, to be the buying of corn or other dead victual in any market, and selling it again in the same market, or within four miles of the place; and engrossing, the getting into one's possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn or other dead victuals, with intent to sell them again. This statute was repealed by 12 Geo. 3. c. 71.; but forestalling, regrating, and engrossing are still offences at common law; and it has been decided that selling corn in sheaves is illegal, as being in effect forestalling the market. (6) But a sale of growing crops of corn or of hops is not contrary to law. (c)
(y) 3 Term Rep. 454. Et vide Part II. (a) Lightfoot v. Tenant, i Bos. & Pul. c.l.
551. Vide 53 Geo. 3. c. 155., and Chitty (z) Maule & Selw. 593.
on Commerce, 1 vol. 666. F
12. SALE OF BRICKS.] — The stat. 17 Geo. 3. c. 42., which requires bricks for sale to be of certain dimensions, and gives a penalty for the breach of that regulation, was passed to protect the buyer against the fraud of the seller ; bricks therefore sold and delivered under the statutable size unknown to the buyer, the seller cannot recover the value of them; for the policy of the act was to protect the buyer against the fraud of the seller, and this can only be done by holding that the latter shall not recover the value of such bricks so sold. (d)
13. TREATING AT ELECTIONS.] – By the statute 7 & 8 W. 3. c. 4. (which was made to prevent all species of bribery and corruption at elections for members of parliament,) it is enacted, “ That no person after the teste of the writ to the sheriff, shall before his election, directly or indirectly, give, present, or allow to any person or persons having voice or vote in such election, any money, meat, drink, entertainment, or provision; or make any present, gift, reward, or entertainment; or shall at any time hereafter make any promise, agreement, obligation, or engagement, to give or allow any money, meat, drink, provision, present, reward, or entertainment, to or for
such person or persons in particular, or to any such county, city, &c., or to or for the use, &c. of any such person, in order to be elected, or for being elected to serve in parliament for such county, city, &c.”
Upon this statute it has been holden, (e) that an innkeeper furnishing provisions for voters, at the request of a candidate, after the teste of the writ, cannot recover the expences of such provisions against the candidate. And non-resident voters are equally within the meaning of this act as resident voters. (f)
14. BANKRUPTS.] - All agreements by a bankrupt with a creditor to pay money, fc. for signing his certificate, are declared void by the stat. 5 Geo. 2. c. 30. s. 11., which enacts, “ That every bill, note, contract, agreement, or other security whatsoever, to be made or given by any bankrupt, or by any other person, unto, or to the use of, or in trust for any creditor or creditors, or for the security of the payment of any debt or sum of money due from such bankrupt at the time of his becoming
(6) Hadham's case, 3 Inst. 197.
(c) Ribbans v. Crickett, 1 Bos. & Pul. (c) Bristow v.Waddington, 2 New Rep. 264. See also the Bribery Act, 2 Geo. 2. 355.
c. 24, (d) Law v. Hodson, 11 East Rep. 300. (f) i Campb, Rep. 550. in notis. But see Johnson. 7. Hudson, Ibid. 180.
bankrupt, or any part thereof, between the time of his becoming bankrupt and such bankrupt's discharge, as a consideration, or to the intent, to persuade him, her, or them to consent to or sign any such allowance or certificate, shall be wholly void and of no effect; and the monies thereby secured or agreed to be paid shall not be recovered or recoverable." (g)
15. SALE OF LIQUORS.]— By the statute 24 Geo. 2. c. 40. s. 12., (which was made for the purpose of preventing the pernicious effects of drandrinking and selling liquors in small quantities,) it is enacted, “ That no person or persons whatsoever shall be entitled unto, or maintain any cause, action, or suit for, or recover either in law or equity, any sum or sums of money, debt, or demands whatsoever, for or on account of any spirituous liquors, unless such debt shall have really been and bona fide contracted at one time, to the amount of 20s. or upwards; nor shall any particular article or item in any account or demand for distilled spirituous liquors, be allowed or maintained, where the liquors delivered at one time, and mentioned in such article or item, shall not amount to the full value of 20s. at the least, and that without fraud or covin."
But this statute does not extend to liquors purchased for the purpose of being sold again. (h)
(8) Vide Smitk v. Bromley, Doug. 696.
(h) Vide Peake's case, N.P. 180., et vid. post, Part II. tit. Sale of Goods.
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, OR WITHIN WHAT TIME
AN ACTION UPON PROMISES MUST BE BROUGHT.
Y the statute 21 Jac. 1. c. 16. s. 3. it is enacted and declared, that “ all actions
upon the case (which comprehends contracts, agreements, and promises) other than such accounts as concern the trade of merchandize between merchant and merchant, their factors or servants, shall be commenced and sued within six years next after the cause of such action or suit, and not after. Nevertheless, if any person or persons, entitled to any of the said actions, shall be, at the time of any such cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond the seas, then such person or persons shall be at liberty to bring the same action, within such time as is before limited, after their coming to or being of full age, discovert, of sane memory, at large, and returned from beyond the seas." And by the statute 4 Ann. c. 16. s. 19. it is also declared that, “ if any person or persons against whom there shall be any such cause of suit or action for seamen's wages, or any of the causes of action mentioned in the 21 Jac. 1., shall be, at the time of any such cause of suit or action'accrued, beyond the seas, then the person or persons entitled to such suit or action, shall be at liberty to bring the said actions against such person and persons, after their return from beyond the seas, within such times as are respectively limited for the bringing of the said actions by this act, and by the said other act of 21 Jac. 1."
Upon these statutes it has been determined, that if the plaintiff be in England when the cause of action accrues, though he afterwards go abroad, the time of limitation begins to run ; so that if he or his representatives do not sue within six years, the statute is a bar. (a) And if one of several plaintiffs be abroad, and the others in England, the action must be brought within six years after the cause of action arises. (6)
It has also been determined, that the statute of limitations extends to persons in Scotland. (c) But if the plaintiff or defendant be abroad, or beyond the sea, at the time when the cause of action accrues, the statute will not begin to run till their return to this country. (d) And if
(a) 1 Wils. 134.
) 1 BI. Rep. 286.
the plaintiff be a foreigner, and do not come to England for a great many years after the cause of action arises, he still has six years after his coming hither to bring his action. (e) And if he never come to England himself, he has always a right of action while he lives abroad; and after his death, his executors, or administrators are in the same situation. (f)
The statute cannot be a bar in any case, unless the time of limitation is expired after there has been a complete cause of action; as, if a man promise to pay ten, pounds to. J. S. when he comes from Rome, or when he marries ;.and.ten years after, J. S. marries, or comes from Rome, the right of action accrues from the happening of the contingency, from which time the statute will begin to run, and not from the time of the promise. (g)
One of the objects of the statute of James, for limiting the period in which the action should be brought, was to protect persons from long protracted claims, when the vouchers and documents, and indeed all traces of evidence relating thereto might be lost, and the party left wholly undefended by the improper neglect, of the claimant. Another more important object was to prevent the mischief which might happen in the commission of perjury in endeavouring to support and establish suclydormant claims. As, however, many just claims may lie dormant either from negligence, or from particular causes with regard to the situation and circumstances of the parties, it has been determined, that if after the six years have elapsed, the party, upon whom the claim is made, either expressly promises or acknowledges the existence of the debt or contract, or promises to pay the debt or perform the contract, such acknowledgment or promise will take the case out of the statute, and entitle the party claiming to recover. And a conditional promise has been holden, sufficient for this purpose, as well as an absolute one; as where the defendant said to the plaintiff, Prove your debt and I will pay it. (h) It was formerly doubted.whether a mere acknowledgment of the debt, without a promise of payment, was sufficient to take the case out of the statute; such an acknowledgment being only considered as evidence of a promise ; as in trover, where a demand and refusal are not holden to be a conversion, but only evidence of it. (i) To prevent the operation of the statute, it is, in general, necessary to prove an express acknowledgment of the existence of a debt. (k) And where a defendant having entered into a guarantie in writing, and become
it at the period of more than six years before the com. (e) 3 Wils, 145.
(h) 1 Ld. Raym. 389. 422. Carth. 470 (f) Vid. Tidd's Prac. 16. 7 ed. where 12 Mod. 224. the cases on this statute are collected (i) See Tidd's Prac. 21. and digested.
(k) Vide Rowcroft v. Lomas, 4 Maule (g) Godb. 437. 1 Lev. 48. 1 H. Bl. 631. & Sel. 457. 2 Bur, 1099, 5 Bur. 2630,